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To all children and adults experiencing a traumatic brain injury and to their families, whose 
lives will never be the same again after such a dramatic event. 
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Preliminary Note 
This PhD uses the « Paper-based» model, (« thèse sur articles » in French). 
 
Because of the paper-based thesis format, some information may be 
repeated, or appear not chronologically. Chapters corresponding to 
published or submitted papers are reproduced faithfully to the journal it has 
been published in (therefore abstract and paper length, use of UK/US 
language corresponds to the journal requirements and is not uniform across 
chapters). The results are discussed in each chapter separately and the final 
discussion is only a global discussion of themes not developed in the 
papers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
CHILDHOOD TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is the leading cause of death and acquired disability in 
children1,2. Annual incidence of TBI in children, adolescents and young adults (up to 24 
years) has been recently estimated in a systematic review1 at 691 per 100.000 attending the 
hospital emergency room, 74 per 100.000 being hospitalized, and 9 per 100.000 deaths. Boys 
are more represented than girls (sex ratio 1.4/1 before the age of 10 and 2.2/1 after the age of 
10) 1. Childhood severe TBI is usually defined as a TBI with initial or lowest Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS) score ≤8. The incidence of TBI is 75 % per year3. Most TBIs are mild and the 
prevalence of severe TBI is unknown. Of hospitalized TBIs 17% are estimated to have severe 
TBI1. In McKinlay et al.’s cohort3, moderate and severe TBI accounted for 10% of all TBI.  
The leading cause of TBI in infants and very young children aged less than 2 years are falls 
followed by assaults or abusive head trauma and motor-vehicle crashes4. In Thurman’s 
review1, among children aged less than 5 years, falls accounted for about two-thirds of 
injuries. In this age group, motor vehicle–related incidents accounted for comparatively small 
proportions of injuries but most were fatal. Among children aged 5 to 14 years, falls remained 
the leading cause, followed by sports or recreation-related injuries, followed by motor vehicle 
injuries. Among youths aged 15 years or older, motor vehicle–related incidents are the leading 
cause of brain injury, followed by assault, then sports-related incidents and firearms. 
Childhood TBI often results in impairments in children’s sensory-motor and cognitive 
functioning including deficits in executive functioning, language, memory, attention, 
processing speed, working memory 5–7. Behavioural and emotional problems are also 
frequently reported in children with TBI 7,8, as well as impaired social problem-solving and 
moral reasoning9,10. Those deficits often have a significant and longstanding impact on the 
child’s everyday functioning, communication skills, adaptive functioning, social interactions, 
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academic achievement, as well as poorer participation in society, difficulty maintaining 
employment and social relationships 11–16. 
TBI in children takes place in the context of ongoing cognitive development, so as well as 
disrupting current abilities, TBI may interrupt or affect skills that are still developing or that 
are to develop in the future and therefore may have more unpredictable consequences than 
adult TBI that occurred in a mature brain (see Anderson for a review17).  
Despite some improvement of cognitive function after the acute phase, it has been observed 
that children with severe TBI tend to show a slower rate of subsequent development so that 
the gap between the severe TBI and the control groups may expand over time 6. This has been 
termed the « growing into deficit » model, and was based on large meta-analysis by Babikian 
and Asarnow6 , where most studies did not follow children more than two years post injury. 
Subsequent cohorts that followed children longer after TBI, however, noted less pessimistic 
outcome trajectories: by 30 months after insult, recovery seems to stabilize and children begin 
to make appropriate developmental gains, with age-appropriate progress documented five 
years18 and ten years post injury19 (but persistent impairment after severe TBI, as children 
make progress but do not catch up to expected level of cognitive development).  
EF IN CHILDREN 
Executive functions (EF) are a collection of related but distinct abilities that allow individuals 
to engage efficiently in intentional, goal-directed problem-solving actions20,21 through 
conscious and effortful processing22 and to adapt to new situations in the real world 23. 
Different models of EF have been proposed, but Diamond’s model24 is developmentally most 
robust and practical to use. 
There is general agreement that there are three core executive functions (EF) 25,26:  
-inhibition [inhibitory control, including self-control (behavioural inhibition) and interference 
control (selective attention and cognitive inhibition)] 
-working memory (WM) 
-and cognitive flexibility (also called set shifting, mental flexibility, or mental set shifting).  
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Inhibitory control of attention enables us to selectively attend, focus on what we choose and 
suppress attention to other stimuli, irrelevant for the current task24. We need such selective 
attention during activities such as cooking when we want to concentrate on the recipe rather 
than the TV or thinking about the holidays that are about to start. We can also choose to 
voluntarily to inhibit attention to particular stimuli (e.g. taking the comb on the table and 
comb our hair) and attend to more appropriate stimuli, based on our goal or intention (e.g. 
take the mixer to mix the ingredients). Inhibitory control of attention (or selective or focused 
attention) is an endogenous, top-down, active, goal-driven, voluntary, volitional, form of 
attention, sometimes called « executive attention »27, and is contrasted with automatic, 
bottom-up exogenous attention, driven by a salient stimulus such as a klaxon or a strong 
smell28. Cognitive inhibition involves resisting extraneous or unwanted thoughts or memories, 
including resisting interference. Cognitive inhibition is usually in the service of aiding WM 
and tends to correlate more with WM measures than with other types of inhibition. Self-
control is the aspect of inhibitory control that involves control over one’s behaviour and 
control over one’s emotions in the service of regulating behaviour 24. Inhibition is extremely 
hard for young children24, with a very rapid progress in inhibition to 5 years of age20, less 
rapid between 5 and 8 and then slowed but continued progress during childhood and 
adolescence29.  
Working memory (WM) involves holding information in mind and mentally working with it 
(or said differently, working with information no longer perceptually present)30,31. Working 
memory supports inhibitory control24. You must hold your goal in mind to know what is 
relevant or appropriate and what to inhibit. “By concentrating especially hard on the 
information you are holding in mind, you increase the likelihood that information will guide 
your behaviour, and you decrease the likelihood of an inhibitory error (mistakenly emitting 
the default, or normally prepotent, response when it should have been inhibited)”24. Various 
models of WM have been proposed, the most often used in adults being Baddeley’s30: the 
central executive acts as supervisory system and controls the flow of information from and to 
its two slave systems: the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The 
phonological loop stores verbal content, whereas the visuo-spatial sketchpad caters to visuo-
spatial data. Infants of only 9 to 12 months can update the contents of simple information. 
However, being able to hold many things in mind or do mental manipulation is far slower to 
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develop and shows a prolonged developmental progression32. Other contemporary models of 
WM are discussed later in relation to prospective memory.  
Inhibitory control supports working memory24. To relate multiple ideas or facts together you 
must be able to resist focusing exclusively on just one thing, and to recombine ideas and facts 
in new, creative ways, you need to be able to resist repeating old thought patterns. Inhibitory 
control can also aid WM by helping to keep our mental workspace from becoming too 
cluttered by suppressing extraneous thoughts (i.e., gating out irrelevant information from the 
WM workspace), resisting proactive interference by deleting no-longer relevant information 
from that limited-capacity workspace. 
Cognitive flexibility is being able to change perspectives and requires to inhibit our previous 
perspective and load into WM a different perspective24. One aspect of cognitive flexibility is 
being able to change perspectives spatially (e.g., “What would this look like if I viewed it 
from a different direction?”) or interpersonally (e.g., “How does it look from your point of 
view”). Flexibility builds on inhibition and WM and comes in later in children’s 
development33. By age 4.5-5 years, most typically developing children preform simple 
flexibility tasks (such as identify both figures in an ambiguous figure or switch sorting 
dimensions34, but not until 7 to 9 years of age, can children switch flexibly on a trial-by-trial 
basis as usual paradigms testing flexibility require33.  
From these three core EFs, higher order EFs are built such as reasoning, problem solving and 
planning35. Fluid intelligence is included in these higher-order EFs. Previous research has 
shown that intelligence is inextricably linked to EFs in childhood36–38 and the view that EFs 
are independent has been questioned in the literature, even in adults39,40.  
Diamond’s model of EF in development is summarised in the figure Intro.1 24. 
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Figure Intro.1. Model of Executive functions (Diamond 2013), reproduced with the permission of the author. 
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Based on the study of adults with brain insult, traditional localizationist views have argued 
that executive skills are primarily mediated by prefrontal cortex. It remains unclear whether a 
similar pattern of localization exists in childhood. In Jacobs’ study41 that compared a range of 
EFs, there was little difference in executive processes between frontal and extra-frontal 
lesions groups. Their results provide support for contemporary models that propose a 
distributed, but integrated neural network for executive skills, suggesting that the integrity of 
the entire brain is necessary for adequate executive functions in childhood. Further, focal 
lesions to any brain region during development may render children vulnerable to a range of 
executive deficits that would not normally be expected following similar pathology in 
adulthood. 
OTHER COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS RELYING ON 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS 
EFs are specifically involved in a series of related cognitive functions that impact everyday 
functioning in social and academic areas42, vocational outcome and participation in society. 
Examples of such functions include social cognition, social problem solving 10, social 
behavioural regulation 13,43, metacognition/self-awareness44,4546 and prospective memory47 48 
49 50. This PhD focuses on the latter two. 
Metacognition is the conscious knowledge of cognitive processes as well as the ability to 
consciously monitor and regulate one’s ongoing activities or processes while engaging in a 
task51. Metacognition refers to the awareness of one’s own cognition and is used in the 
context of normal functioning. The concept of awareness/self-awareness (or more usually lack 
of awareness), on the other hand, is usually used in the context of pathology and refers to the 
awareness of one’s deficits, including cognitive deficits. As such, self-awareness can be 
viewed as metacognition applied to difficulties in cognitive functioning.  
Although terminology varies across the disciplines of psychology, education or 
neuropsychology, metacognition comprises metacognitive knowledge (MK), metacognitive 
skills and metacognitive beliefs.  
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Metacognitive knowledge is the knowledge of cognitive processes and products52 and has 
three components: Declarative MK (assertions about the word and the knowledge of the 
influencing factors of human thinking such as memory and attention53), Procedural MK 
(knowledge of the methods for achieving goals and the knowledge of how skills work and 
how they are to be applied54) and Strategic/Conditional MK (the awareness of the conditions 
that influence learning such as why strategies are effective, when they should be applied and 
when they are appropriate 55. According to Montague, procedural MK is necessary to apply 
declarative MK efficaciously and to coordinate problem solving; conditional MK enables a 
learner to select appropriate strategies and to adjust behaviour to changing task demands.  
Metacognitive skills, also termed executive control are the voluntary control people have over 
their own cognitive processes and rely heavily on EF. These skills include prediction, 
planning, monitoring and evaluation. Metacognitive beliefs are the broader general ideas and 
theories people have about their own and other people’s cognition 56 (attribution, motivation, 
self-esteem) although their truly metacognitive nature is debated 57,58.  
Metacognition is known to be poorer in younger children. It has been studied mostly in 
relation to metamemory 59,60,61,62,63. From 8 years, when prompted, children begin to 
accurately predict that they would later recall specific details correctly and predict that the 
answers they provided were correct 5960, 61. Not until 11-and 12- years-of age, however, can 
children selectively withdraw answers that would have been incorrect, although 9-and 10-
year-olds already present well-developed monitoring skill 6263.  
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to perform intended activities 64. PM 
tasks require retrospective memory to remember the task, but depend on executive functions 
(EF) 65 for successful goal maintenance, retrieval and implementation at the right moment. At 
least three attributes are accepted as characterizing a PM task: (1) a delay between formation 
of the intention and the opportunity to carry it out; (2) absence of an explicit reminder to carry 
out the task at an appropriate moment; (3) the need to interrupt one’s ongoing activity in order 
to carry out the intention. Literature on prospective memory in typically-developing children 
shows improvement in PM performance across the age range from 2 to 12 years50,66. Small 
children as young as two can succeed in PM if motivation is high (remind their Mum to buy 
them sweets)67. As they grow older, children become increasingly skilled at using external 
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reminders to cue PM and increasingly proficient at applying time-checking strategies. It has 
been proposed, however, that those age effects that have been documented in the literature, 
may be entirely attributable to factors such as: (1) unequal difficulty of the on-going task, 
allowing less attentional resources to PM tasks in younger children; (2) retrospective memory 
component; (3) motivation. When taking these into account, age effects of PM are typically 
small68. 
EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION AND RELATED 
COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTIONS IN CHILDREN 
WITH TBI 
EF can be impaired after traumatic brain injury (TBI) 12,69–72 6,69 and influence a series of 
outcomes including academic achievement42,73,74, social cognition10, vocational outcome 15 
and ability to live independently. The level of executive dysfunction is found to be related to 
the injury severity and younger age at injury 14,71,75–79. Relationship between age at injury and 
outcome is complex and literature begins to suggest that it is not linear19,80. TBI sustained at 
an earlier age (when cognitive functions have not yet developed) is prone to generalized 
delayed adverse outcome, but outcome may be even worse when the function is at a rapidly 
developing stage77 at the time of injury. 
Impaired awareness/metacognition, sometimes also termed “anosognosia”, is a common 
phenomenon described in children who have sustained a TBI 818283, but few studies have 
explored it, partly because of a lack of underlying models and lack of adequate assessment 
tools. In children, self-awareness is particularly difficult to capture and assess, as it results 
from a combination of organically based unawareness (due to brain injury) and simple 
developmental immaturity 83 present in typically developing children as well, which makes it 
harder to characterize. In metamemory, children with TBI have exaggerated overconfidence 
in their performance and poor estimation of memory span84.  
Prospective memory (PM) has been shown to be impaired in children with brain injuries 85,86. 
PM problems are reported as a major concern by the parents of children with TBI 87. The 
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ability to compensate for PM deficits in adults significantly predicts the ability to live 
independently88. Parents of children with TBI report serious concerns for their child’s safety 
and ability to be left unsupervised even briefly because of substantial PM impairments87. 
EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION AND GOAL 
NEGLECT 
As noted earlier, working memory (WM) involves holding information in mind and mentally 
working with it (or said differently, working with information no longer perceptually 
present)30,31.  
Cowan’s model of WM89,90 in adults distinguished between (1) information that is accessed at 
any moment for further processing (the focus of attention), and (2) the information held 
available in the background for later use (the activated part of long-term memory). Only the 
focus of attention is assumed to have limited capacity. The activation of representations in 
long-term memory is not capacity limited, but activation may be reduced through decay or 
interference. In his model, information can be processed in the focus of attention without 
being impaired by the demand to hold other information in the activated part of long-term 
memory. Cowan’s model is supported by simple experiments such as Garavan’s 91: Garavan 
asked participants to count squares and triangles that appeared sequentially, in random order, 
on the screen, so that participants had to remember and update two running counts 
simultaneously. The task was self-paced, so the latency of individual counting operations 
could be measured. Garavan observed that a switch from one mental counter to the other (e.g., 
when a triangle followed a square) took 300–500 ms longer than updating the same counter 
again (e.g., when a square followed a square). This indicates that participants held one counter 
in the focus of attention while memorizing the other outside the focus. He concluded that the 
300-500 extra ms reflected the time it takes to switch the focus of attention from one list 
(square) item to the other (triangle). 
Cowan’s “focus of attention” was then split further into two different regions in Oberauer’s 
model. In a series of experiments, Oberauer 92 showed that:  
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-There are items memorized for later recall but not accessed during a concurrent processing 
task: these items do not affect the speed of the processing task because they are in the 
activated long-term memory (e.g. holding in memory a number list while updating another 
number list with arithmetic operations).  
-There are other items that are held available for direct access and which affect the processing 
latencies (updating another number list with arithmetic operations).  
-Finally, there is a single item at any moment that is actually selected as the object of a 
cognitive process (the number currently undergoing the arithmetic operation). 
 
Oberauer conceptualized working memory as a concentric structure of representations with 
three functionally distinct regions (see Intro.2). 
1. The activated part of long-term memory can serve, to memorize information over brief 
periods for later recall. 
2. The region of direct access holds a limited number of chunks available to be used in 
ongoing cognitive processes. 
3. The focus of attention holds at any time the one chunk that is actually selected as the object 
of the next cognitive operation. 
 
So for Oberauer, working memory is an organized set of representations characterized by 
their increased state of accessibility for cognitive processes and contents of working memory 
can be categorized with respect to their access status.  
The limits of working memory capacity reflect the limited number of independent elements 
that can be held in the region of direct access at the same time. This region, therefore, 
corresponds most closely to what Cowan89,90 named the focus of attention (i.e. Cowan’s focus 
of attention corresponds therefore to both Oberauers’ region of direct access AND focus of 
attention). Retrieving an item from working memory, either for recall or for manipulation, 
means bringing this item into the focus of attention. Only objects within the region of direct 
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(and not activated long-term memory) access are regarded as selection candidates by the focus 
of attention. “The focus of working memory therefore has a function with respect to memory 
that is equivalent to the function of a focus of attention in perception. (p412) ”92 
Figure Intro.2: Oberauer’s concentric model of working memory. 
 
Nodes and lines represent a network of long-term memory representations, some of which are 
activated (black nodes). A subset of these items is held in the region of direct access (large 
oval). Within the region of direct access, one item is selected for processing by the focus of 
attention (small oval). Activated items outside the region of direct access but inside the 
activated part of long-term memory, are accessible only indirectly, via associative links 
(dotted lines) to representations in the more central regions 
 
DUNCAN’S MODEL OF GOAL NEGLECT 
In adults, Duncan’s theory of “goal neglect” 93,39,40 suggests that much of human behaviour is 
controlled by goal and subgoals lists. As we proceed in a task, new candidate goals arise by 
working backward from a currently active supergoal (see figure Intro.3). These candidate 
goals are bringing the supergoal closer. For example, a final goal of making a soup (i.e. 
“supergoal” in Duncan’s terminology), suggests a requirement for peeled and chopped onions 
(subgoals serving to achieve the super goal). At a particular time during the cooking, peeling 
onions becomes the current goal. Current goals can be totally overturned, however, by novel 
input (e.g. making soup is abandoned if the baby tips over its high-chair). In this case it is the 
input from the environment that suggests a new goal, by working forward from current 
situation to new current goal. Candidate goals suggested both by working backward and by 
working forward compete for control of behaviour.  
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Figure Intro.3: Working backwards from the supergoal to subgoals, according to 
Duncan’s model of goal neglect 
 
Goal competition is influenced by a series of factors that Duncan et al. 39 explored in 
successive experiments: a goal was more likely to be neglected if the task was novel, 
complex, if patients were not prompted, if they were stressed by time pressure, if they had 
frontal lobe damage or low fluid intelligence g, or if the delay between goal instruction and 
possibility to fulfil the goal was long. Finally, in the case of two concomitant goals, the goal 
given second was more likely to be neglected. 
Duncan proposed that dysexecutive patients are impaired in the construction and use of 
goal/subgoal lists, and are more vulnerable to external input changing their planned 
behaviour, resulting in disorganized behaviour and neglect of the main (super-) goal. 
 
OBERAUER’S MODEL EXPLAINING GOAL NEGLECT 
PHENOMENON 
Oberauer’s model can be very useful in explaining goal neglect in patients with executive 
dysfunction experience. As the focus of attention can manipulate one item only, only the 
Make a soup 
(final goal or 
"supergoal"
Prepare 
vegetables
Peel the 
onions
Chop onions
Wash the 
leeks
Fill pan with 
water
Heat up pan 
full of water
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current sub-goal is held in the focus of attention, while the final goal is held in the activated 
long-term memory. Following Oberauer’s model, the final goal is therefore not accessible 
directly but linked to the current sub goal through associative links (see figure Intro.4). The 
activation of representations of the final goal in long-term memory can, however, become lost 
through decay or interference. As tasks proceed, the final goal progressively drops towards 
less activated parts of long-term memory. Following Oberauer’s view that WM is an 
organized set of representations characterized by their increased state of accessibility for 
cognitive processes, a goal whose activation levels have dropped within long-term memory is 
less accessible and more likely to be forgotten/neglected.  
Figure Intro.4: Oberauer’s model applied to goal maintenance that allows an organized 
behavior during a task and the retrieval and implementation of an intention in 
prospective memory. 
 
 
Sustained attention and the right frontal-thalamic-parietal sustained attention system 
especially94 allow patients with intact EF to regularly update the level of activation of the goal 
and maintain it at a level of activation sufficient to be accessed by the region of direct access 
and to come to the focus of attention when needed. Dysexecutive patients on the other hand, 
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have impaired sustained attention and do not maintain the activation of the goal, which 
eventually becomes inactivated in long-term memory (note it is not deleted - as patients can 
usually recall what their goal was if they are prompted, but they will not implement the goal 
spontaneously in their action because it has become inaccessible to the focus of attention). In 
such cases, external input (habits or environmental triggers) are more likely to oppose and 
displace higher order goals, resulting in cue-dependent or distracted behavior, relying more on 
environmental inputs than self-generated goals needed to achieve the goal of the task at hand 
(supergoal). 
GOAL NEGLECT AND PROSPECTIVE MEMORY 
In the same way that goal neglect theory attempts to explain failure to maintain a task’s final 
goal in WM (i.e. in a time-limited duration), goal neglect can be applied to prospective 
memory failures, to explain failure to maintain memory for a goal over a longer duration 
(hours, days or month). Because the construct is the same, again Oberauer model is useful to 
explain how an intention can inappropriately drop to general (inactivated) long-term memory 
and no longer be activated and therefore become inaccessible to the focus of attention. In this 
case, environmental cues (e.g. seeing a letter box and remembering to post a letter) that 
normally act as associative links are no longer sufficient (because the goal is too low in 
activation and accessibility for the focus of attention to use it). When exploring PM in the 
laboratory, PM tasks tend to use infrequent targets: the higher the frequency of target stimuli, 
the more the task relies on working memory, because the frequent target acts as a constant 
reminder of the intention and is therefore maintains its activated state in long-term memory92. 
On the other hand, if the target is infrequent, as the on-going task proceeds, the intention 
drops progressively to lower attentional levels. Dysexecutive patients therefore are more 
likely to experience PM failures, by being impaired in upgrading the activation of their 
intention. 
 
INTERVENTIONS BASED ON THE MODEL OF GOAL NEGLECT 
AND IMPAIRMENT IN VIGILANT ATTENTION  
Goal Management Training (GMT) approaches to executive dysfunction aim to train adult 
patients to maintain goal activation, by compensating for vigilant attention impairment 
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through the use of content-free cues that can be either external, exogenous (such as auditory 
alerts9596, text messages with a “Stop” cue97) or patient-generated (by training patients to 
regularly pause action and remind themselves of their goal 98,99 ) - In GMT patients are 
encouraged to stop ongoing behaviour in order to define goal hierarchies39 and monitor 
performance and regularly update current goals in working memory. Goal Management 
Training methods target executive dysfunction as well as prospective memory, because the 
underlying impairment (goal neglect resulting from deficient endogenous reactivation of 
relevant goals) is considered to be the same. While GMT is widely used in adults98–101, the 
validity of interventions derived from Duncan’s model has never been explored in children. A 
number of questions arise: Is it possible to alleviate prospective memory impairment by using 
goal neglect-based interventions? Will an improvement in PM be accompanied by 
improvement in complex task management?  
REHABILITATION OF EXECUTIVE 
DYSFUNCTION IN CHILDREN 
Apart from visuo-spatial and verbal working memory 102–106, and attention107–109 where some 
approaches have proven effective, there is a lack of validated methods for EF rehabilitation in 
children 107,110–113. 
While in adults metacognitive strategies are recommended to alleviate EF dysfunction113–115, 
in children most metacognitive strategies described in the literature are theory-based and not 
validated. Evidence of their age-appropriateness is lacking. Many questions do not have an 
evidence-based answer yet: from a developmental point of view, from which age is a child 
able to learn to use a particular metacognitive strategy (MS), irrespective of brain injury 
status? Are brain injured children capable of understanding, learning and using a 
metacognitive technique efficiently, despite specific impairments in EF-related function 
including metacognition? Can metacognition (and especially metacognitive strategies use) be 
trained in children who have suffered a TBI? And from which age? Can metacognitive 
strategies be used in children who are not fully aware of their difficulties because of 
developmental immaturity and, in the case of TBI, additional deficits in organic anosognosia?  
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In adults, awareness it is an important factor mediating the effect of interventions: (1) 
individuals with acquired brain injury (ABI) who lack awareness of their deficits often 
demonstrate poorer motivation for therapy, resist treatment recommendations and develop 
fewer compensatory strategies 116; (2) patients are more willing to strategies to compensate 
for their memory difficulties than to compensate for their dysexecutive syndrome 117, possibly 
because it is easier to be aware of memory problems than of EF problems; (3) EF training 
programmes that has been demonstrated to be effective in adults with ABI include awareness 
interventions in order to obtain maximum motivation for the rehabilitation program118,119. In 
children, very little is known about how to assess self-awareness and influence of self-
awareness on intervention effects. Can self-awareness be assessed in children and how? Are 
children with TBI aware of the impairment caused by their executive dysfunction? What steps 
are needed for a child to become aware of his/her impairment? Will self-awareness influence 
the effectiveness of interventions aiming at compensating an EF deficit? 
Given the frequency of executive dysfunction after TBI, the extensive consequences of EF 
impairment on academic achievement, everyday life and overall independence, and the lack 
of validated rehabilitation methods, there is an urgent need for research to progress in the 
domain of EF rehabilitation in children.  
PHD OVERVIEW 
Part one of this PhD aims to characterize executive dysfunction after childhood TBI and its 
impact on two specific related cognitive functions: prospective memory and self-awareness. 
Chapter 1 examines the degree of EF deficit in children with severe TBI using a prospective 
longitudinal study, and explores the controversial age at injury effects. Chapter 2 examines 
the severity of PM impairment using an ecological test of EF, the Children’s Cooking Task 
(CCT)120,121, in a large convenience sample of children with TBI and other acquired brain 
injuries. Chapter 3 examines the frequency of PM impairment long-term post severe TBI 
using the same cohort as chapter 1. Finally, Chapter 4 is a pilot study that explores self-
awareness in a small (N=5) sample of children with severe TBI and proposes a model of child 
anosognosia. Note that the data of this chapter 4 was gathered during a pilot EF intervention 
that is detailed in section 2. Together the aim of section one is to document, assess, 
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characterize and quantify impairment in EF, in PM and in self-awareness following childhood 
severe TBI.  
 
Part 2 of this PhD aims to develop an intervention to improve executive functions after 
severe childhood TBI. First, chapter 5 gives an overview of current practices, promising 
approaches and challenges in EF rehabilitation in children (NB: A French adaptation of this 
chapter can be found in the appendix). Chapter 6 then reviews the effectiveness of 
approaches to executive dysfunction used in adults, based on Duncan’s model of goal neglect 
(and especially Goal Management Training - GMT), that were considered as possible 
candidates for treating executive dysfunctions in children as well. Chapters 7 and 8 then 
present the experimental data on the GMT adapted to children, identify possible factors 
limiting intervention effectiveness and challenges in research on EF intervention and discuss 
the use of metacognitive strategies in children with TBI.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Childhood severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) is usually defined as a TBI with initial or 
lowest Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score ≤8. The incidence of TBI is high ( 1.75 % per 
year)3. Most TBI are mild and the prevalence of severe TBI is not precisely known. Annual 
incidence of hospitalized TBI is estimated at 74/ 100 000, of which 17% are estimated to have 
severe TBI1. In McKinlay et al. cohort3, moderate and severe TBI accounted for 10% of all 
TBI. 
Executive functions (EF) are a collection of related but distinct abilities that allow individuals 
both to engage efficiently in intentional, goal-directed, problem-solving actions20,21 through 
conscious and effortful processing22 and to adapt to new, complex situations in the real 
world20,23. According to Diamond’s developmental model of EF24, there are 3 core EF: 
inhibition, working memory and flexibility. (1) Inhibition enables us to selectively focus on 
what we choose and suppress attention to other stimuli and resist interference24. One 
particular form of inhibition is Inhibitory control of attention which is interference control at 
the level of perception. Terminology and models of EF are numerous, but in this paper, we 
will call “attention”, the function termed in literature “inhibitory control of attention”, 
“attentional inhibition” or “focused”/”selective” attention which is an endogenous, top-down, 
active, and volitional, form of attention, that is part of inhibition in Diamond’s model (as 
opposed to automatic attention, driven by a salient stimulus such as a klaxon)28. Inhibition is 
extremely hard for young children24, with a very rapid progress in inhibition up to 5 years of 
age20, less rapid between 5 and 8 ad then slowed but continued progress during childhood and 
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adolescence29. (2) Working memory (WM) involves holding information in mind and 
mentally working with information no longer perceptually present30,31. Infants of only 9 to 12 
months can update the contents of simple information. However, being able to hold many 
things in mind or perform mental manipulation is far slower to develop and shows a 
prolonged developmental progression32. (3) Cognitive flexibility (“thinking outside the box”) 
is being able to change perspectives and requires to inhibit our previous perspective and load 
a different perspective into WM 24. Flexibility builds on inhibition and WM and comes in 
later in children’s development33. By age 4.5-5 years, most typically developing children 
preform simple flexibility tasks (such as identify both figures in an ambiguous figure or 
switch sorting dimensions34, but not until 7 to 9 years of age, can children switch flexibly on a 
trial-by-trial basis as required by usual paradigms testing flexibility33. From these three core 
EF, higher order EFs are built such as reasoning, problem solving and planning, which 
develop later, around the age of twelve122, although these skills exist and develop during early 
childhood as well20. 
EF are often impaired after TBI6,69 and influence a number of outcomes including academic 
achievement42,73,74 social cognition10, vocational outcome 15 and ability to live independently. 
The level of executive dysfunction is found to be related to the severity of injury and younger 
age at injury12,14,71. TBI in children takes place in the context of ongoing cognitive 
development, so as well as disrupting current abilities, TBI may interrupt or affect skills that 
are still developing or that are to develop in the future and therefore may have more 
unpredictable consequences than adult TBI that occurred in a mature brain (see Anderson for 
a review17). Relationship between age at injury and outcome is complex and literature begins 
to suggest that it is not linear19,80. TBI sustained at an earlier age is prone to generalized 
delayed adverse outcome when cognitive functions have not yet developed at the time of 
injury but outcome may be even worse when the function is at a rapidly developing stage77 at 
the time of injury. Anderson et al. compared intellectual, executive and behavioural outcomes 
after focal injuries across six age at injury groups (congenital to late childhood injuries) and 
found patterns of impairment that varied across domains, suggesting that different stages of 
brain development may be critical for different functions80. For EF, Anderson et al. found that 
the 10-12 years at injury group had better EF compared to children injured at a younger age, 
but children aged 3-6 at injury performed better than those injured at 7-980. Crowe et al. found 
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that for intellectual ability (IQ), children injured in middle childhood (7-9 years) 
demonstrated poorer outcome18 than their older and younger peers. Because the relationship 
may not be linear, evidence is contradictory, some studies showing an increased risk of 
impairment with early age at injury80,123,124, while others do not find an age at injury 
effect19,71,73,125. 
The aim of this study was to estimate EF impairment after childhood severe TBI, using a 
prospective, longitudinal, two-year follow-up of children with severe TBI, and to explore 
factors predicting EF outcome. Secondary aims were (1) to analyze differences in component 
EF development post TBI across assessment times; (2) to analyze differences when outcome 
is based on questionnaires or on performance-based tests only; (3) to compare recovery 
trajectories across age at injury groups, testing the hypothesis of greater vulnerability when 
TBI occurs during rapid cognitive development stage. 
 
METHODS 
All children consecutively admitted to the pediatric neurosurgical intensive care unit of 
University Necker Enfants Malades Hospital between January 2005 and December 2008, 
within the first 6 hours following TBI, and meeting the inclusion criteria were offered to 
participate in the study, and followed-up prospectively over two years. Children included in 
this study constitute the TGE cohort (this stands for “Traumatisme Grave de l’Enfant”, i.e. 
Severe Childhood Trauma). Inclusion criteria were: children aged 0-15 years, who had 
sustained a severe accidental TBI defined as Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) of 8 or lower 
and/or an Injury Severity Score126 > 16. Exclusion criteria were: children with no vital signs 
upon admission, children with non-accidental head injury, previous history of diagnosed 
neurological, psychiatric or learning disability. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee and parents gave their informed written consent to this observational study. At the 
initial acute phase, the following data was collected: lowest GCS score, coma duration. After 
acute care management, survivors in need of rehabilitation were referred to a specialized 
rehabilitation center for children with acquired brain injury in Saint-Maurice Hospitals, and 
followed at 3, 6, 12 and 24 months.  
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Demographic and environmental data was collected, such as parental education level 
(graduation from high school or not), and the language(s) spoken at home (French 
exclusively, or other language/bilingual). Children’s EF were evaluated on a series of 
performance-based, paper-and-pencils tests of EF as well as more ecological questionnaires of 
EF completed by parents.  
Regarding performance-based tests, there were no tests in French that could be administered 
across the full 0-17 years at testing age range, therefore not all children were administered the 
same tests (see table 1.1). Tests were selected for this study based on: large administration age 
range, adequate psychometric properties and previous use in children with TBI. The 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Tests (WCST), the Stroop and the Tower Test have been used in the 
same or similar form in major publications on childhood EF, both in developmental122 and 
TBI litterature6,72. The NEPSY-1127–129 was, at the time of inclusion, the main available 
assessment tool for EF. Its psychometric properties are well-established according to the 
Society of Pediatric Psychology Evidence-Based Assessment Task Force Workgroup130, and 
it has been used in neurological poplulations131–133. There are no validated N-back working 
memory tasks available in French. Therefore the Children’s Memory scale134–136, often used 
in children with TBI 137–139, was chosen, as its concentration-attention index includes classical 
working memory tests such as backwards spans and letter number sequences. Description of 
performance-based tests can be found in supplemental data 1.1.  
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Table 1.1: Executive Functions (EF) tests used to construct component EF 
Z-scores.  
Inhibition Flexibility Attention Planning 
 
Working 
Memory  
Stroop 
Test140,141 
Interference 
score (child 
version: 12-
16; adult 
version: after 
16) 
Wisconsin 
Card Sorting 
test142, 
percentage of 
perseverative 
errors (8 – 89 
years) 
NEPSY-1127 
Visual 
Attention 
subtest (age 
range: 3-12) 
NEPSY-1127 
Tower test 
(age range: 
5-12) 
Children’s 
Memory 
Scale134,135 
Attention/ 
Concentration 
Index (age 
range: 5-16) 
NEPSY-1127 
Statue subtest 
(age range: 3-
12) 
NEPSY-1127 
Design 
Fluency 
subtest (age 
range: 5-12) 
NEPSY-1127 
Auditory 
Attention (age 
range: 5-12) 
Lussier 
Tower of 
London143: 
number of 
success (age 
range: 7-17, 
used from 13 
in our study) 
 Total Number 
of trials in 
Lussier Tower 
of London143 
(age range: 7-
17 used from 
13 in our 
study) 
  
BRIEF * 144–
146 inhibition 
subscale (age 
range 5-18) 
BRIEF 144–146 
flexibility 
subscale (age 
range 5-18):  
CBCL† 147 
Attention 
subscale 
(preschool: 
1,5-5; school 
version 6-18)  
BRIEF 144–146 
planning 
subscale (age 
range 5-18) 
BRIEF 144–146 
working 
memory 
subscale (age 
range 5-18) 
Note: Details and description of performance-based tests can be found in supplemental data 
1. BRIEF: Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function, parental form; CBCL: Child 
Behavior Checklist 
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Supplemental Data 1.1: Performance-based tests of executive functions 
Stroop tests requires children to name the ink color of a list of words representing colors (e.g.: If the 
word “blue” is written with a red color, the child must name it as “red”, thus inhibiting the prepotent 
reading response “blue”).  
In the statue test, the child is to pretend s/he is a statue and not move, regardless of the distractions, 
during 75 seconds.  
In the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), the child is given cards with drawings differing in the 
type of geometrical form (square, triangle…), in the color of forms and in the number of forms. The 
child is expected to classify the forms according to different classification criteria (form, color, 
number) s/he must find her/himself. In order to succeed, the child must think flexibly and change 
classification system when s/he is cued to.  
In the Tower tests (Lussier and NEPSY-1), analogs of the widely studied Tower of London and 
Tower of Hanoi 148,149, the child must replicate a tower, made of pegs and must plan the order in 
which s/he displaces pegs. The NEPSY-1 tower records only the number of succeed towers 
(measure of planning), whereas Lussier’s version allows also to screen for flexibility by reporting 
perseverative behaviors, indicated by the number of trials (a child with impaired flexibility may 
perseverate on the same error several times).  
In drawing fluidity (NEPSY-1), the child must create as many different designs as possible by 
joining points in different ways.  
The visual attention test (NEPSY-1) requires the child to cross target drawings (age-adapted 
complexity) among a list of non-target drawings.  
In auditory attention (NEPSY-1), the child must pick colored forms from a box, following auditory 
commands (e.g. pick up squares when he hears “square” while listening to a list of words), 
increasing in complexity.  
Working Memory (WM) was assessed using the Children’s Memory Scale measure of WM150, 
referred to as the “attention/concentration index” in the manual: tests including retaining a series of 
numbers and of number-letters sequences as well as backwards digit span.  
 
Regarding “ecological” questionnaires of EF, we used the Behavior Rating Inventory of 
Executive Functions (BRIEF) questionnaire144, 145 and the attention subscore of the Child 
Behavior Checklist (CBCL)147. The BRIEF yields 8 subscales, leading to 3 composite scores: 
a Metacognition index (MI), a Behavioral Regulation index (BRI), and a Global Executive 
Composite score. Higher scores correspond to increased EF difficulties in daily life. The 
BRIEF has large normative data for children aged 5 to 18, high internal consistency146, good 
validity 151, good test-retest reliability146 and is a recommended outcome measure for children 
with TBI152. It is the most commonly used questionnaire of EF and is sensitive to EF deficits 
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in children with TBI 151,153,71,14. The CBCL has high test–retest reliability and validity154 and 
is the most commonly used test to assess behavior problems after TBI 155,156. Questionnaires 
were obtained only for children whose parents could read French.  
All scores were transformed into Z-scores, in order to ease comparisons and to compute 
composite scores. This comprehensive assessment yielded a single score for each EF 
(inhibition, attention, WM, flexibility and planning), that incorporate performance-based tests 
and questionnaires. Composite EF scores were also calculated: a performance-based score 
(mean of all performance-based tests scores) and a global EF score (mean of all performance-
based tests scores, BRIEF MI and BRI). The global and performance-based EF scores were 
computed only for children aged 3 or more at assessment because only one test could be 
administered before three and these scores would therefore not have been accurate. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
All analysis were computed on IBM SPSS Statistics 21. The few outliers were trimmed to 
three standard deviations from the mean for analysis.  
Injury variables and outcome variables were analyzed for normality using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, and quantified analysis of skewness and kurtosis divided by their standard error 
(1.96 criteria). Normality analysis revealed that coma duration and GCS were not normally 
distributed (skew towards shorter coma duration; skew towards higher GCS and significant 
kurtosis), therefore a dichotomized version of those variables was created, in order to meet the 
assumptions of the general linear model: coma duration ≤ 7 days versus ≥8 days and GCS ≤ 6 
versus ≥7. For all covariance analysis, covariates included: family characteristics (language 
spoken and parental education), injury severity characteristics (dichotomized coma duration 
and GCS). These covariates were used based on previous literature reporting their importance 
and on correlations with the global EF score in our sample (see supplemental data 1.2). 
Scores of children with TBI were compared to norms by the one-sample t-test to detect if their 
mean Z-scores differed significantly from the normal population. A repeated measures 
ANCOVA was used to assess if scores changed over time. A Multivariate analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) was used to explore outcome on the 5 component EF, across 3 
assessment times.  
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Age at injury effects were explored using a two-way mixed repeated measures Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) that examined change in global EF score and in component EF 
scores across assessment time and across age at injury groups. Age at injury was not used as a 
continuous variable, because previous research suggests its relationship with recovery is not 
linear, some age at injury groups being more vulnerable. Children were divided into 5 age-at-
injury groups, the first 4 were based on age groups previously used in research on age at 
injury effects 80,157, based on neurosciences developmental data158–160: 0-2 years, 3-6 years, 7-
9 years , and 10-12 years. A fifth group (13-15 years at injury) was necessary as our sample 
used a larger age range than previous research on age at injury groups. Age at injury groups’ 
differences on covariates were test by Chi squared test.  
Recovery was assessed by the difference in Z-scores between 24 and 3 months, indicating 
how much progress a child had made, rather than how close to norms s/he was at 24 months 
post-injury. Differential recovery trajectories were explored for this progress score for the 5 
age groups, using ANCOVA. In the 0-2 year’s group, only two children were old enough to 
be tested at both 3 and 24 months, enabling calculation of an EF progress score, thus this age 
group was not considered in EF progress analysis.  
Effect sizes for ANCOVAs were calculated using partial η squared (η²ρ) and interpreted by 
Cohen’s guidelines as follows: small: 0.01; medium: 0.06; large: 0.14.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was used to analyze factors influencing outcome by 
entering in step one family characteristics (language spoken and parental education), in step 
two injury severity characteristics (dichotomized coma duration and GCS) and in step three, 
five age at injury group dummy variables. Missing values were excluded listwise. For 
predicting progress, only children aged >2.75 years at injury were included, as this was the 
minimal age allowing EF progress calculation from 3 to 24 months.  
RESULTS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Eighty-one children were included at the acute stage of TBI between January 2005 and 
December 2008. Sixteen children died during acute care, leaving 65 children at the 3 months 
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assessment. Of those 65, eleven were under the age of 3 at 3 months post-injury, which did 
not allow a reliable global EF score to be computed. Among the older children, two were in a 
minimally responsive state, precluding any cognitive assessment. At 12 months post-injury, 
one child was lost to follow-up, for one child parents withdrew consent and nine children 
were still under three. All remaining children could by then be tested. At 24 months, 2 more 
children were lost to follow-up, and three were still under of the age of three. Characteristics 
of included children are presented in table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Participants demographic and injury severity characteristics. 
Demographic Variables  
Gender: Boys; N (%) 43 (66%)  
Age at injury (years): Mean (SD; range) 8.1 (4; 3 months - 14 
years 11 months) 
Number of children in each age at injury group: 
0-2 / 3-6 / 7-9 / 10-12 / 13-15 
 
13/12/16/10/14 
Language spoken at home (N=64)*: French/other or bilingual; N 
(%) 
37 (58%)/ 27 (42%) 
Country of origin of parents (N=58)*: France/ at least one parent 
from another country; N (%) 
29 (50%)/29 (50%) 
Parental education (N=63)*: under/above high school graduation; N 
(%) 
34 (54%) / 29 (46%) 
TBI medical and severity characteristics 
Glasgow Coma Scale score [GCS; mean (SD; range)] 6.7 (1.41; 3 – 9) 
GCS dichotomized (≤ 6; ≥7); N (%) 26 (40%) / 39 (60 %) 
Coma duration [days; mean (SD; range] 6.6 (4.83; 1 – 23) 
Coma duration dichotomized (≤ 7 days; ≥8 days); N (%) 46 (71%) /19 (29%) 
 TBI immediate outcome 
Admitted to a rehabilitation center after acute care: yes/no; N (%) 54 (83%) / 11(17%) 
Performance IQ at 3 months post injury; mean (SD) 83.1 (16) 
Verbal IQ at 3 months post injury; mean (SD) 88.0 (19)  
Full Scale IQ at 3 months post injury; mean (SD) 85.2 (18) 
Note: * data missing in a few cases; IQ: Intelligence Quotient  
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Supplemental Data 1.2: Correlations between global EF score and demographic and 
injury variables 
Spearman's Rho Global composite 
score at 3 months 
(Nmin= 50) ‡ 
Global composite 
score at 12 months  
(Nmin= 52) ‡ 
Global composite 
score at 24 months  
(Nmin= 57) ‡ 
Progress on EF 
global score. 
(Nmin=52) ‡ 
Parental 
education† 
.38* .31* .33* 0.16 
Language 
spoken at 
home† 
-.28* -0.17 -0.14 0.10 
GCS 
(continuous) 
0.20 0.12 0.24* -0.11 
Coma Duration 
(continuous) 
-0.23 -0.24* -0.07 0.25 
Age at injury 
(continuous) 
0.11 -0.04 0.22 0.00 
Coma duration 
< 7 days or ≥ 8 
days† 
-0.27* -.28* 0.00 .45* 
GCS 
dichotomized 
(≤ 6; >7) † 
-0.31 -0.13 -0.34* 0.10 
† Point-biserial correlations 
*p<0.05 
‡ children aged <3 years at assessment time were excluded from analysis, as few test could be administered in 
this age range, leading to inaccurate composite score  
 
COMPARISON WITH NORMS AND CHANGE OVER TIME 
Composite EF scores and BRIEF T-scores are reported in table 1.3, and component EF scores 
are displayed in figure 1.1. Patients did not differ from the norms on planning at any 
assessment time, whereas they did for the global EF score, and the attention and working 
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memory scores at all time points (p<0.001). Performance-based scores differed significantly 
from the norms only at the 3 months assessment.  
Table 1.3: Composite scores and BRIEF T-scores at 3, 12 and 24 months post injury. 
 3 months 12 months 24 months 
Z-scores N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI 
Global EF score ‡ 52 -0.47** -0.67; -0.26 54 -0.26* -0.45; -0.08 58 -0.34* -0.54; -0.13 
Performance-
based EF score ‡ 
52 -0.36** -0.56; -0.16 54 0.05 -0.13; 0.23 58 -0.11 -0.31; 0.08 
T-scores N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI 
BRIEF BRI 28 57* 53; 61 34 57* 53; 62 35 58* 53; 63 
BRIEF MI 28 55* 50; 60 34 55* 51; 58 35 55* 51; 59 
BRIEF GEC 28 56* 52; 61 34 56* 52; 60 35 57* 52; 61 
*Score statistically different from norms, p<0.05 
** Score statistically different from norms, p<0.001 
‡ Children aged < 3 at assessment time were excluded from analysis, as few tests could be 
administered in this age group, leading to inaccurate composite score. 
Note: BRIEF= Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Functions; MI= Metacognition index; 
BRI= Behavioral Regulation index; GEC=Global Executive Composite Score  
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Figure 1.1: EF Z-scores across assessment times compared to norms 
 
Statistically different from norms: * p<0.05     ** p<0.0001 
Note: significance for attention at 24 months should be interpreted with caution as its 
distribution was bimodal and violated assumption for normality. 
 
Performance-based score change across time was significant, [F(2,86)=4.48, p=0.014, 
η²ρ=0.09], with significant pairwise Sidak-adjusted comparisons showing a difference 
between 3 and 12 and 3 and 24 months (p<0.001), but no significant difference between 12 
and 24 months. Global EF score improved between 3 and 12 months [Huynh-Feldt F (1.64, 
91.2) =6.35, p=0.03, η²ρ =0.12; Sidak-adjusted comparison p=0.01], but the change between 3 
and 24 months was not significant (p=0.09). BRIEF indices differed from norms at all 
assessment times. Changes in BRI and MI across time were not significant. Detailed scores 
for BRIEF subscales can be found in supplemental data 1.2. 
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Supplemental Data 1.2: BRIEF subscores at 3, 12 and 24 months post injury 
  
3 months 12 months 24 months 
N=28 N=34 N=35 
  Mean (SD) 95%CI† Mean (SD) 95%CI† Mean (SD) 95%CI† 
BRI 57 (12)* 53 ; 61 57 (13)* 53 ; 62 58 (14)* 53 ; 63 
MI 55 (12)* 50 ; 60 55 (12)* 51 ; 58 55 (12)* 51 ; 59 
GEC 56 (12)* 52 ; 61 56 (13)* 52 ; 60 57 (13)* 52 ; 61 
Inhibition 57 (12)* 52 ; 61 56 (13)* 51 ; 60 56 (12)* 52 ; 61 
Shift 57 (10)* 54 ; 61 58 (12)* 54 ; 62 57 (13)* 52 ; 61 
Emotional 
Control 
56 (12)* 52 ; 61 56 (12)* 52 ; 60 58 (15)* 53 ; 63 
Initiation 53 (12) 48 ; 58 54 (13) 50 ; 58 53 (13) 49 ; 58 
Working 
Memory 
57 (11)* 52 ; 62 58 (13)* 54 ; 62 60 (15)* 55 ; 65 
Plan/Organize 56 (13)* 50 ; 60 54 (12)* 51 ; 58 53 (11) 50 ; 58 
Organization 
of Materials 
52 (10) 47 ; 56 49 (9) 46 ; 52 51 (10) 48 ; 55 
Monitor 55 (12)* 51 ; 60 55 (12)* 51 ; 58 54 (12)* 50 ; 59 
*Score statistically different from norms, p<0.05 
†BCa 95% Confidence Interval, based on 1000 bootstrap samples 
Note: Standard error for all means = 2 
BRIEF= Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functions; MI= Metacognition index; BRI= 
Behavioral Regulation index; GEC=Global Executive Composite Score  
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INFLUENCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND INJURY CHARACTERISTICS 
ON COMPONENT EF 
Using Roy’s largest root, MANCOVA revealed a significant effect of parental education [ϴ = 
0.15; F (4,111)=4.07, p=0.004] and assessment time [ϴ=0.11; F (4,112)=2.98, p=0.022] on 
component EF. Note attention was removed from the MANCOVA as its distribution was 
binomial at 24 months and violated the assumption of normality. Follow-up ANOVA 
revealed children whose parents had a lower education showed significantly worse scores on 
all EF components than those with higher education level, [F(1,114)=5.62 for flexibility, 5.53 
for planning, 15.06 for WM, 6.44 for inhibition (all ps< 0.05, with WM p<0.001)]. Planned 
simple contrast revealed that flexibility scores improved significantly between 3 and 12 
months (p=0.034) and 3 and 24 months (0.007), while repeated contrast revealed than the 
change from 12 to 24 month was not significant. For other EF components, change in score 
was not significant.  
AGE AT INJURY EFFECTS 
Age at injury groups did not differ significantly in terms of demographic and severity factors, 
except for parental education, which was significantly lower in the 7-9 years age at injury 
group (p=0.03).  
AGE AT INJURY EFFECTS ON REAPETED MEASURES OF EF 
A two-way mixed repeated measures ANCOVA was used to examine change in EF 
composite score across assessment times and across age at injury groups, Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity was significant (p = 0.040), therefore Huynh-Feldt estimate was used for 
significance. All covariates made a significant contribution, as denoted by time x coma 
duration interaction [(F2,90)=11.01, p<0.001, η²ρ =0.20]; main effect of GCS [(F1,45)=6.85, 
p=0.012, η²ρ =0.13] and of parental education, [(F1,45)=5.61, p=0.022, η²ρ =0.11]. 
There was a significant time x age at injury group interaction [F(8,96)=3.65, p=0.001, 
η²ρ=0.23]; however, none of the planned contrasts was significant. Main effects of age at 
injury group were not significant. There was a significant and large effect of assessment time, 
[F(2,90)= 8.40, p<0.001, η²ρ = 0.16]. Post hoc comparisons adjusted with Bonferroni method 
showed a significant progress in the global EF score only between the 3-and 12-months 
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assessments: mean difference in Z-score=0.30 [0.14-0.45], SE=0.06, p<0.001 (with 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons). The difference in scores between 12 and 24 
months was not significant, nor was the difference between 3 and 24 months, although there 
was a trend towards better scores at 24 months, with a Z-score mean difference =0.20 [0.15-
0.46], SE = 0.09, p=0.086.  
AGE AT INJURY EFFECTS ON OVERALL EF PROGRESS 
There was a significant large effect of age at injury group on the amount of EF progress 
[F(3,38)=4.10, p=0.01, η²ρ =0.25]. Planned repeated contrasts revealed that children injured 3-
6 recovered similarly to those injured 7-9 (see figure 1.2), but children injured 10-12 
recovered better than those injured 7-9, and than those injured 13-15 (difference in Z score 
progress =0.71, p=0.003 and 0.65, p=0.006 respectively). The 13-15 age at injury group 
seemed to show nearly no recovery.  
Figure 1.2: Progress in EF global score between 3 and 24 months according to age at 
injury group 
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AGE AT INJURY EFFECTS ON COMPONENT EF 
A repeated ANCOVA was used for each component EF across 3 assessment times. There was 
no time x age at injury group interaction. Age at injury effect was not significant. 
MODEL PREDICTING EF SCORES AT 3, 12, 24 MONTHS AND 
AMOUNT OF EF RECOVERY OVER TIME 
Family characteristics alone did not significantly predict EF outcome, however when 
combined with injury severity, the model accounted for 34% of the variance in EF at 3 
months, and for 23% of the variance at 24 months.  
Regarding improvement over time, the regression model showed that better EF progress 
between 3 and 24 months was predicted by longer coma duration and age at injury group 10-
12. Detailed results of the regression can be found in table 1.4 
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Table 1.4: Regression Models 
 F Sig. ΔR2  Sig Standardized Beta t Sig. 
EF at 3 months model 
Step 1 3.91* 0.0026 0.13* 0.026    
Step 2 6.48* 0.000  0.21* 0.001    
 Parental Education* 0.26 2.14 .037 
 GCS* 0.34 -2.89 .006 
 Coma duration* -0.29 -2.39 .021 
Step 3 3.24* 0.05 0.19 0.845    
EF at 12 months model : all steps non-significant 
EF at 24 months model 
Step 1 2.29 0.111 0.076 0.11    
Step 2 3.95* 0.007 0.15* 0.008    
 Parental Education* 0.28 2.18 .034 
 GCS* 0.40 -3.24 .002 
Step 3 2.82* 0.011 0.085 0.21    
 GCS* 0.35 -2.87 .006 
 Age at injury 10-12* 0.35 2.36 .022 
Amount of EF recovery over time model 
Step 1  0.27 0.767 0.12 0.767    
Step 2  2.34 0.071 0.17* 0.019    
 Coma duration* 0.45 2.96 .005 
Step 3  3.40* 0.06 0.20* 0.013    
 Coma duration* 0.46 3.33 .002 
 Age at injury 10-12* 0.50 3.15 .003 
Note: Step 1 = family characteristics (language spoken and parental education); step 2 = injury severity 
characteristics (dichotomized coma duration and GCS); step 3 = five age at injury group dummy variables.  
*Significant at 0.05 
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DISCUSSION 
Children had significant impairment on WM, inhibition, attention and global EF following 
severe TBI. For flexibility and performance-based tests, children were impaired at 3 months 
only and improved to reach scores in the normal range by 12 months. No impairment was 
found on planning at any time. Global EF was predicted at 3 and 24 months by GCS score 
and parental education. Global EF outcome at 24 months and progress on EF were also 
predicted by age at injury but the relationship was not linear, children aged 10-12 at injury 
showing better outcome than older and younger children. Coma duration predicted global EF 
at 3 months but was no longer a significant predictor at 24 months. 
STRENGTH OF THE STUDY 
This was a prospective longitudinal study including a large group of children with severe TBI. 
Larger cohorts of childhood TBI published so far usually include heterogeneous samples of 
children with a range of TBI severity, where children with severe TBI are usually relatively 
few compared to the rest of the group (42 severe out of 330161, 50 out of 13242, 18 out of 5471, 
13 out of 40162, 33 out of 122123, 14 out of 5979, 13 out of 4019, 33 out of 6314, 23 out of 8772). 
Further, most samples focus on a restricted age range. Larger samples of severe TBI (N= 
118)163 did not assess EF and were not prospective studies, with an important selection bias 
(towards very severe injuries and inclusion of children hospitalized in an intensive 
rehabilitation department). Children in this sample were aged 0-15 years, and were included 
prospectively immediately after uniformly severe TBI. The prospective longitudinal nature of 
this this study allowed capturing positive outcomes compared to retrospective studies based 
on the inclusion of patients in rehabilitation73 163. This is to our knowledge the largest study 
assessing EF prospectively in children with severe TBI. The disadvantage was the lack of 
uniform EF measures across the sample, which is the main reason for age restriction in other 
studies. Nonetheless, the use of a global EF score allowed comparing children who had 
different tests. Using both performance-based tests of EF and ecologically-valid 
questionnaires to assess EF, the global EF score was likely to be representative of true EF 
impairment.  
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Finally, this sample was representative of the TBI population in the Paris region, as children 
whose parents did not speak French were not excluded, contrary to other studies161. This 
factor did not allow obtaining questionnaire data for the whole group, however all children 
could be tested at least on standardized tests. As part of non-French speaking and low 
education parents are likely to have more difficulty to apply for help and understand 
counselling regarding their child because of language restrictions, it is important that those 
children are not excluded from trials. 
EF TESTS 
PERFORMANCE-BASED TESTS VERSUS QUESTIONNAIRES, THE ISSUE OF 
NOVELTY 
The performance-based EF score showed a significant recovery at 12 and 24 months 
compared to the 3 month assessment, with no residual difference when compared to norms. 
This is consistent with previous reports that children’s scores on performance-based tests of 
EF improve over time79,164. It is difficult, however, to interpret reported improvements on 
performance-based measures of executive functioning, because better scores may be related 
either to recovery, or increased practice with the tests. As the whole purpose of EF tests is to 
prevent lapses into automaticity and promote conscious, novel and effortful processing 22,165, 
the scores at 12 ad 24 months may not be reliable because requirement of novelty of EF tests 
to make significant demands on EF 166,165,93,167,22 was not met. Further, in Vriezen and Pigott’s 
153 study, performance-based tests underestimated the child’s level of executive functioning 
when compared to questionnaires of daily EF, perhaps due to the highly structured nature of 
standardized assessment in performance-based tests. Another explanation to consider is the 
comparison to norms instead of to a matched control group, which would have allowed 
controlling for the practice effect. 
Contrary to performance-based tests of EF, no recovery was found on BRIEF questionnaires, 
which is consistent with studies reporting no improvement in EF (measured by BRIEF) 
during the first year after TBI161. The major limitation of questionnaires, which was obvious 
in our study, is the need for parents to speak the language of questionnaire.  
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When using the global EF scores that integrated both questionnaires and performance-based 
scores, our findings were somehow in-between, as there was a trend towards improvement 
between 3 and 24 months, although it did not reach significance. These results confirm 
previous concerns about EF performance-based tests’ validity and promote their use 
combined with questionnaires. The significant improvement found between 3 and 12 months 
but not between 3 and 24 months is not surprising: it confirms Babikian and Asarnov meta-
analysis that showed initial good recovery followed by an absence of age expected progress, 
resulting in lower Z-scores6 at longer term follow-up. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EF AND IQ 
Most EF tasks involve complex, overlapping and multi-faceted functions that tap both 
executive and non-executive processes162. Isolating the influence of these processes is 
difficult20,122 and purely “executive” tasks do not exist162. The current findings of EF 
impairment may be impacted by the patients’ impaired general cognition (general intellectual 
skills, visual-spatial processing, processing speed, memory…), which may have exaggerated 
the observed deficits. Previous research has shown that intelligence is inextricably linked to 
EF in childhood36–38 and the view that EF are independent has been questioned in the 
literature, even in adults39,40. Further, a number of studies have used IQ subtests to assess 
EF22,34,58. For these reasons IQ was not used as a covariate in the analyses.  
COMPONENT EF EVOLUTION OVER TIME 
Ewing-Cobbs et al. 77 found that children tested 1-2 years post-injury performed worse on 
measures of inhibitory control and working memory, but not on measures of cognitive 
flexibility, when compared to controls. Our findings are similar, with important recovery for 
flexibility across time but persistent inhibition and WM deficit at 24 months post-injury. 
Similarly to Ewing-Cobbs’s69 and Anderson’s33 studies, flexibility was found to be quite 
robust to TBI effects, with rapid significant recovery across assessments and no significant 
deficit by 12 months post-injury. Because inhibitory control and working memory undergo 
rapid development during early childhood, but flexibility has a relatively flatter 
developmental trajectory, Ewing-Cobbs and colleagues interpreted this finding as supporting 
the idea that skills in a rapid stage of development are more vulnerable to the effects of TBI. 
Our study may support this view. A large meta-analysis also found largest effects on WM6. 
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Similarly to other studies, we did not find planning impairment79. This skill is thought to 
emerge later, around 12 years of age168 and therefore deficits may not be clearly apparent 
before that age. A meta-analysis has found large effects on planning, becoming apparent only 
after 24 months6 post–injury, but overall the children in the included studies were older than 
in our study. As 60% of the children in our study were under 12 by the 24 months testing, a 
longer follow-up may have allowed detecting significant impairment as children grew older. 
Another explanation could be the lack of sensitivity of the tests used, especially for the 
NEPSY-1 Tower test that has failed to produce lower scores for the clinical groups in Schmitt 
et al. study169 compared to controls. However, this is unlikely as our planning score also 
included other tests than the NEPSY-1 tower. 
In this study, attention was impaired at all assessment times, compared to norms. Our results 
are consistent with Babikian and Asarnov meta-analysis who reported attention impairments 
following severe childhood TBI6, although other studies reported opposite results71,123,162. As 
attention is a complex construct, including different types of attention, the limited number of 
performance-based tests used in past studies may not have captured attention deficits. Indeed, 
some of the tests used in previous studies can be argued to offer a poor reflection of 
attentional skills (e.g. forward digit span only79,162). In our study, performance-based tests of 
attention were combined with a more ecological measure of everyday attention, which 
probably led to a more sensitive reflection of attentional deficits experienced following severe 
TBI, as already suggested in previous research123. To support this interpretation, we reran the 
analysis without including the CBCL attention subscale and found no attention deficit 
compared to norms. The lack of sensibility of performance-based tests is an on-going concern 
in attention and EF research161,170,171. 
AGE AT INJURY 
A number of studies did not report effects of age at injury. This is probably due to the 
restricted ranges of age at injury used (1-7 years19,71, 3-672, 0-6 years73, 12-17125), as studies 
using larger age at injury ranges found an effect both for general intellectual ability80,123,157,172 
and EF80. Previous research has often assumed that age effects are linear, that is, younger age 
at injury leads to poorer outcomes. However, literature has now shown the child’s brain step-
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wise maturation, with critical maturational periods173–175, separated by less rapid development 
periods, which makes a linear relation between age at injury and cognition unlikely.  
Crowe et al.157 found that the 7-9 years at injury period is the most vulnerable to adverse 
outcome after brain injury compared to younger and older at injury periods, but also found a 
better recovery for 10-12 years at injury (better processing speed and performance IQ),which 
is consistent with our results of best EF recovery for children injured 10-12. Visual inspection 
of progress (figure 1.2) seemed indeed to show very little recovery in the 7-9 years at injury 
group. In Crowe’s study there wasn’t a 13-15 age at injury group to compare our results to: in 
our study this group’s recovery seemed very close to that of 7-9 years at injury. Nonetheless 
their progress was significantly worse than the 10-12 group. After the age of 12, higher order 
EF develop, such as planning, higher order attention; frontal lobes show important 
myelination during adolescence. Therefore, the 13-15 group may have been more vulnerable 
to brain injury because of rapidly developing EF skills at the time of injury. Unfortunately, 
most studies do not include large age ranges and adolescents have rarely been compared to 
younger age groups. Overall, our results seem to support age at injury as an important 
predictor of executive functioning after childhood severe TBI, but with a nonlinear pattern of 
vulnerability. These results support the theory of children’s brain increased vulnerability 
during rapid EF development, or more precisely, that when a cognitive function is not in a 
rapidly developing stage (10-12 group), EF are less vulnerable to adverse effects of severe 
TBI. Adolescence may represent another higher risk group, comparable to the 7-9 age group. 
We did not find an age at injury effect for component EF. This may be due to a lack of power 
as a number of tests could not be administered before the age of 5, resulting in smaller sample 
size than for the global EF score. Another explanation is that the age at injury groups, defined 
by overall developmental stages80,157, did not represent meaningful periods for each EF 
component, which develop at different speeds and different critical maturation periods. 
Literature does not have a clear agreement on developmental stages of each EF, as results are 
very dependent on how an EF is assessed: not all tests make the same demands on a same EF, 
not all tests have the same developmental discriminant validity, and most of tests rely on other 
cognitive processes and other EF. 
 
56 
 
PREDICTORS OF EF 
Our study used a simplified dichotomous measure of socio-economic status (SES) using 
parental education. Effect of SES confirms earlier litterature72,176 that found that more 
educated home environment is associated with better cognitive performance. Parental 
education influenced all components of EF, especially WM, and was a significant predictor of 
EF at 3 and 24 months.  
Coma duration has been found to significantly predict EF in past research in children163,177 
and adults178 with brain injuries, even if different results have been found using the BRIEF 
questionnaire exclusively in a mixed sample of children with mild and severe TBI 124. In our 
study, longer coma duration predicted worse EF at first (3 months) but no longer at last (24 
months) assessment, suggesting that after initial increased EF difficulty, in the long term, 
longer coma duration is not predictive of poorer outcome following severe TBI. Further, 
progress on EF was significantly larger when coma duration was longer, probably because of 
lower EF at 3 months yielding mathematically larger difference between the 2 assessments. 
As such coma duration effect on progress was somehow artificial. Babikian and Asarnov 
meta-analysis also found largest recovery for most severe TBI, who had the most impaired 
scores at initial assessments6.  
Most studies have associated GCS<9 (severe TBI) with poorer outcome179,71,73, but most of 
them compared children with mild and moderate injuries to those with severe TBI. GCS has 
been shown to predict outcome in TBI on a range of dependent variables179, including general 
intellectual skills73,157, EF71,79 and mathematics skills73. Our study shows further that among 
children with severe injury, GCS ≤6 is a significant predictor of worse EF immediately after 
injury (3 months) and at 2 years, compared to those with a GCS of 7-9.  
Overall in our sample, higher GCS, higher parental education and age at injury 10-12 (i.e. 
probably during less rapid brain maturation) predicted better EF at 24 months. Only age at 
injury (10-12 group) predicted amount of EF progress between 3 and 24 months post injury, 
when coma duration’s artificial effect was removed. 
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RECOMENDATIONS 
Literature published so far shows a lack of consistency in the way component EF are 
conceptualized and assessed6,71,72,124,162. Future studies should aim at selecting tests that are 
validated measures of EF, and not IQ subtests thought to reflect EF. Ecologically valid tests, 
such as the BRIEF questionnaire should be included, as performance-based tests alone tend to 
underestimate EF impairment. Because of language barriers with questionnaires, the 
combined use of performance-based ecological tests with strong psychometric properties, 
would make a great contribution to the field120,180,181. The issue of retest effect in EF tests 
remains an important concern for results interpretability, and future research should 
encourage development of parallel forms of ecological EF tests.  
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
Relying on norm-referenced tests of EF and comparing the TBI group scores to norms instead 
of using a prospective control group may have underestimated EF difficulties. Massagli et 
al.179 who compared the magnitude of impairment in a cohort of children with TBI using both 
methods, found that using population norms underestimated impairment compared to use of 
controls. Similar findings have been reported in other causes of acquired brain injury, with a 
difference magnitude of up to 1-2 SD.38 
We did not have a measure of pre-injury functioning and therefore could not include pre-
injury factors in our analysis, while pre-injury factors such as cognitive reserve have shown to 
mediate effects of TBI79,172. Also the measure of family environment variables was rough as 
only parental education was included, rather than measures of family functioning, which has 
been shown to be crucial in TBI outcome72,182. Family functioning questionnaires were not 
available in French at the time of the study planning (and the same language issue would have 
limited the findings to a subgroup). 
Since the study has been performed, guidelines have been published regarding valid outcome 
measures recommended in childhood TBI183, and could be used in future studies. At the time 
of the study, few tests of EF were available in French. Results based on NEPSY-1 should be 
interpreted with caution, as the hypothesized five-factor structure outlined in NEPSY-1 
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manual (EF being one of the factors) was never evaluated by the authors and Stinnett et al.184 
provide evidence for a single factor for the NEPSY-1. Further some of the discriminant 
validity findings of NEPSY-1 are weak (e.g.: statue test discriminates children with dyslexia 
from controls but not children with ADHD from controls); and NEPSY-1 validity in TBI is 
based on small samples (n=9 for attention and tower test). EF impairment may have been 
underestimated due to NEPSY-1’s insufficient discriminant validity. Finally, a number of 
children were assessed on performance-based tests only, either because their parents were not 
sufficiently fluent in French, or because the BRIEF questionnaire can only be used from age 
5. As performance-based tests of EF are known to underestimate EF impairment, the overall 
EF impairment in our study was probably underestimated. Children whose parents do not 
sufficiently master the French language are, however, an important and challenging 
population clinicians need to take care of and future studies should make all possible efforts 
to integrate them in longitudinal studies, in spite of assessment difficulties.  
CONCLUSIONS 
EF are impaired following childhood severe TBI. While flexibility and planning seem quite 
robust to TBI effects, impairment on WM, inhibition, attention and global EF is persistent at 
24 months post injury. Longer coma duration is a pejorative factor shortly after injury, but 
does not seem to influence EF on the longer term (24 months). Parental education is an 
important predictor of EF recovery. Ewing-Cobbs’s hypothesis of greater vulnerability of the 
developing brain during phases of rapid development is supported by our results, with 
children aged 10-12 (corresponding to a relatively stable phase of cognitive development) at 
injury showing better progress from 3 to 24 months, irrespective to how impaired they were at 
3 months, and better EF at 24 months. Relying only on performance-based EF tests can 
underestimate EF impairment and our study confirms concerns about ecological validity of 
usual EF tests. 
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CHAPTER 2: ECOLOGICAL 
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY 
ASSESSMENT IN CHILDREN WITH 
ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY USING THE 
CHILDREN’S COOKING TASK 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to perform intended activities 64. 
Children with PM impairment can fail to deliver important messages to parents, forget 
appointments, or fail to bring necessary items for planned activities. PM tasks require 
retrospective memory to remember the task, but depend on executive functions (EF) 65 for 
successful goal maintenance, retrieval and implementation at the right moment. PM depends 
upon frontal lobe integrity185, with a key role for rostral prefrontal cortex (BA10)186.  
Literature on prospective memory in typically-developing children shows improvement in PM 
performance across the age range from 2 to 12 years50,66: children become increasingly skilled 
at using external reminders to cue PM and increasingly proficient at applying time-checking 
strategies. In typically-developing children aged 6-12, performance on EF tasks such as 
planning and switching 47, working memory 48, and inhibition 49 is correlated with PM50. PM 
and retrospective memory are not strongly associated in typically developing children187. 
PM has been shown to be impaired in children with brain injuries 85,86, even after cues are 
given 188, and even under strong incentive conditions 189. PM problems are reported as a major 
concern by the parents of children with traumatic brain injury (TBI) 87. Adult patients with 
ABI generally obtain lower results than control participants on experimental PM tasks190, 
detecting fewer prospective cues and retrieving fewer actions191. The majority of memory 
failures they report are prospective in nature192. The capability to compensate for PM deficits 
in adults significantly predicts the ability to live independently88. Parents of children with TBI 
report serious concerns for their child’s safety and ability to be left unsupervised even briefly 
because of substantial PM impairments87. Children with ABI may display normal 
performance on standard neuropsychological assessment, and still be impaired on functional 
memory193 and especially PM. In spite of these reports, very few standardized tests address 
PM issues, especially in naturalistic settings180.  
McCauley et al.85,189,194 used a monetary incentive to increase children’s performance on an 
event-based PM task consisting of asking the examiner for points (exchangeable for dollars or 
for pennies) before each new neuropsychological test. Although the incentive was naturalistic, 
the testing used an office-based setting and a verbal non-ecological task. A promising 
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approach for studying PM is the use of virtual reality and computer games to assess PM (e.g.: 
TEMP task195 in adults, simulating driving around shops to prepare a dinner or a holiday; the 
CyberCruiser66,50 in children simulating driving a vehicle across a variety of scenes to 
explore, and requiring to remember to refuel the vehicle after a cue), but unfortunately this 
approach is not yet used in clinical practice. A functional memory test that has been used in 
children with acquired brain injuries (ABI)196,197 is the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test 
(RMBT) for Children198,199: it has shown to be sensitive to everyday memory problems 196,193, 
and it includes two subtests tapping prospective memory. The RMBT however is an office-
based test, performed in a very structured environment, and it may not fully capture children’s 
PM in real, motivating, complex and playful activities. Recently it has been proposed to use a 
real cooking task (Children’s Cooking Task – CCT) to explore EF in children with ABI120,121, 
as children find it fun200 and because cooking is a novel open ended task, requiring 
adaptability and innovative strategies that challenge the child’s EF.  
The aims of this study were (1) to explore if children who have sustained an ABI suffer PM 
impairment, measured both in a complex ecological real life EF task, the Children’s Cooking 
task and using the two PM subtests of the RBMT ; (2) to explore if the CCT PM score is 
sensitive to developmental changes in PM in healthy controls and in patients with ABI; (3) to 
replicate the findings that the CCT discriminates children with various types of ABI from 
typically developing controls121,120 on a larger number of patients.  
METHODS 
Children were recruited from 3 different regions of France. Inclusion criteria for children with 
ABI were: age 8-20, a brain injury sustained after birth and prior to the age of 16, at least one 
year prior to the study, necessiting on-going rehabilitation or follow-up. Exclusion criteria 
were: severe reading or vision impairment that would impeed the child to read/see the recipe, 
severe behavior problems, and homogenous intellectual disability (full scale IQ < 70). 
Exclusion criteria for typically developing controls were diagnosed neurological or 
psychiatric condition or history, intellectual disbility, inability to attend a mainstream school. 
All children were divided in 3 age groups (8-10; 11-13 and 14-20 groups). 
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Eighty-seven children participated in the study, separated in three age-groups: 54 children 
with ABI [8-10 years (n=10), 11-13 years (n=16) and 14-20 years (n=28)] and 33 typically 
developing matched controls (n=7, 17, 19 children in each group respectively). There was no 
significant difference between groups regarding age or gender (see table 1). Causes of ABI 
were TBI (N =43), brain tumours (N=7), ischemic or haemorrhagic stroke (N=3), drug 
intoxication (N=1). Mean age at injury was 8.98 years ±3.35 (range 7 months – 14.4 years). 
For TBI, mean Glasgow Coma Scale Score was 7.48 ± 3.14 (range 3-15), length of coma was 
7.13 days ± 8.5 (range 0-45). 
All children with ABI had been recently (< 6 months) assessed for general intellectual ability, 
using the age-appropriate Wechsler Scales (WISC III, WISC IV or WAIS III) prior to 
inclusion in the study, and the assessment was recorded for each patient. WISC III was used 
for children who were part of a cohort study that used WISC III as a follow-up measure. 
When the neuropsychological assessment had included the 2 PM sub-tests of the Rivermead 
Battery Memory Test (RBMT) 198 199, results were also recorded. In the “remembering a 
hidden belonging” sub-test, an object is hidden, and the subject is required to ask for it at the 
end of the test session and to remember where it was hidden. In the “remembering an 
appointment” sub-test, an alarm is set to ring after 20 minutes, and the child is required to ask 
a specific question when the alarm goes off. The total of both PM tasks raw scores was used 
to screen for a possible correlation with the CCT PM score.  
Prospective memory (PM) was assessed in all children using the Children’s Cooking Task 
(CCT)120,121. In the CCT, children have to prepare a real chocolate cake and a fruit cocktail 
following a structured, photo-cued, child-friendly recipe contained in a cookbook including 
distracters. Instructions for all the key steps are clearly stated, with a picture for each step, 
although some actions embedded in a step are not necessarily explicitly detailed, in order to 
assess children’s adaptability to the context (e.g.: using straw to open and empty an apple 
juice pack into a glass). The CCT can be performed from the age of eight. Scoring is based on 
the number of errors and qualitative data (goal achievement, occurrence of dangerous 
behaviours, spontaneous initiation of both recipes and necessity of an adult intervention to 
prevent task failure or consequences of a dangerous behaviour). Details of CCT scoring can 
be found in the CCT scoring manual (unpublished, available from the last author) and 
previous publications about the test120,121. Normative data is not available yet. The CCT has 
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good inter-rater and test–retest reliability, high internal consistency, as well as good 
discriminant and concurrent validity120.  
Four PM tasks are embedded in the CCT instructions, although the original CCT scoring had 
not used these tasks for a specific PM subscore: (1) making a fruit cocktail after finishing the 
chocolate cake; (2) putting the dirty disches in the sink; (3) putting the rubbish in the bin; (4) 
telling the examiner that the task is finished. These 4 PM tasks are explicitly mentioned to the 
child before the start of the task, and they are written in the instruction sheet that is given to 
the child and placed in front of him/her during the whole duration of the test (“Today, you 
will prepare a chocolate cake and a fruit cocktail .... please place everything that needs to be 
washed in the sink and the rubbish in the bin... Tell me when you have finished”- refer to 
Chevignard et al.121 and CCT manual201 for complete detailed instructions). Furthermore, 
before beginning the task the child is asked to summarise the instructions; thus ensuring the 
child has understood and remembered them. 
Scoring for PM tasks was developed as follows: 0: failure to achieve: 1: achieved after a 
specific cue is given (“look at the instructions, you have forgotten something”); 2: achieved 
after a non-specific cue (“are you sure you have finished?”); 3: achieved spontaneously 
(without any cue). The CCT manual provides examiners with a progressive range of cues to 
be given to the child if s/he forgets one of the PM tasks after finishing the chocolate cake. The 
final score for all four PM tasks developed for this study ranged from 0 to 12. With this 
scoring system, a PM score < 8 showed inability to react to non-specific cues. 
Observation and scoring were performed by three different examiners (AKP, VS, CA), who 
received a specific training on the use of the CCT and regularily consulted the author of CCT 
(MC). Ambigous behaviour scoring was discussed with the author of CCT (MC).  
Data were analyzed by IBM SPSS statistic 19, using non parametric statistics, as the number 
of errors in the CCT was not normally distributed. In order to compare children with ABI to 
controls, a Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples was used for quantitative data 
(number of errors on CCT, task duration, PM score) with reported standardized test statistic 
(Z). For CCT qualitative data, a Fisher exact test was used with reported Cramer’s V as 
measure of effect size (range 0 and 1). Differences between age groups were explored by 
Kruskal-Wallis test and Jonckheere test to screen for trend. A Bonferroni adjustment was used 
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for multiple comparison of PM scores between controls and children with ABI for 3 age 
groups with a significance level of 0.05/3 = 0.017. Correlations between CCT PM score, 
number of errors in the CCT, RMBT PM subtests scores and age were analyzed by Spearman 
correlation coefficient.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Total number of errors – replication of earlier findings: ABI and controls significantly 
differed on the total number of errors in the CCT (see table 2.1) (p<0.001), replicating earlier 
findings that children with ABI are severely impaired on ecological EF assessment using real 
cooking121,120. The number of errors in the CCT showed a developmental trend in typically 
developing children: as children grew older, they made less errors (Jonckheere test J=-3.16; p 
= 0.002), with a significant difference in the number of errors across age groups (Kruskal 
Wallis test, H(2)=11.6; p=0.003). Children with ABI also showed a developmental effect on 
number of errors in the CCT (Jonckheere test J= -3.39; p = 0.001), with a significant 
difference in the number of errors across age groups (Kruskal Wallis test, H(2)=11.4, 
p=0.003). Further there was a significant medium size negative correlation between the total 
number of errors and age, both in controls (r=-0.561; p=0.001) and children with ABI (r=-
0.502; p<0.001), indicating that as children grow older, they make less errors in the CCT. 
This is consistent with literature on progressive maturation of EF 20,122.  
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Table 2.1: Comparison of demographic characteristics and of test scores in children with 
acquired brain injury and typically developing controls.  
 ABI 
[mean (SD)]   
Controls 
[mean (SD)]   
Effect size and 
significance † 
N 54 33  
Age (years) 13.3 (3.05) 12.5 (2.40) p=0.13 
Sex (% boys) 64 61 p=0.5  
CCT Prospective Memory Score (/12) 8.6 (2.6) 11.1 (1.7) z=-4.7; p=0.000* 
    Cocktail 2.4 (0.9) 2.9 (0.4) z=-2.8; p=0.006* 
    Rubbish in the bin 2.2 (1.1) 2.7 (0.6) z=-2.0; p=0.039* 
    Dirty dishes in the sink 2.2 (1.1) 2.77 (0.6) z=-2.4; p=0.016* 
    Say “I finished” 1.8 (1.5) 2.8 (0.75) z=-3.4; p=0.001* 
Total number of errors in the CCT 75.4 (52) 28 (36.6) z=5.6; p=0.000* 
Qualitative analysis of CCT    
      Task duration [min] 47 (17.3) 31.9 (9.5) z= 4.5; p= 0.000* 
      Goal achievement [no] 55% 9 % V = 0.46†;  p=0.000* 
      Dangerous behaviours [yes] 63% 9 % V = 0.3†  ; p=0.003* 
      Spontaneous initiation of both recipes [no] 33 % 8% V= 0.28†; p=0.013* 
      Intervention of an adult necessary [yes] 60% 11% V = 0.45†; p=0.000* 
RMBT PM subtest Standard score (0-2)  
     Appointment  
     Hidden belonging 
 
1.22 (0.6) 
1.41 (0.6) 
  
Wechsler Standard scores#  
(WISC III n= 18, WISC IV n= 27, WAIS IV 
n=8) 
    
Processing Speed Index 80.7 (18.3)   
Working Memory Index 82.8 (19.9)   
Perceptual Organization/Reasoning Index# 84.0 (13.4) -  
Verbal Comprehension Index 89.2 (18.3) -  
Note: apart from qualitative data denoted by † which is reported by Cramer’s V from Fisher’s exact test, the 
statistics reported are standardized Z statistic obtained by Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples;   
* denotes significant results (p<0.05); 
 # Perceptual Organization index from WISC III and WAIS III and Perceptual Reasoning Index from WISC IV 
were pooled to obtain a unique mean score of perceptual abilities;   
ABI: Acquired brain injury; CCT: Children’s Cooking Task; RMBT: Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test; PM: 
Prospective Memory. 
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As expected, the total number of errors in the CCT, which is a measure of ecological global 
executive functioning, was correlated with the CCT PM score (r=-.336, p=0.039) in the 
control group; i.e. as children made more errors, they had a lower PM score. This is consistent 
with literature showing that in typically-developing children aged 6-12, performance on EF 
tasks such as planning and switching 47, working memory 48, and inhibition 49 is correlated 
with PM. In children with ABI however, the CCT PM score and the total number of errors 
were not correlated, similar to Ward et al. study, who found that most EF tests were not 
predictive of PM86.  
Prospective Memory: PM scores for typically developing controls were significantly higher 
(Mean rank=59.77) than those of children with ABI (Mean Rank= 34.36; p<0.001; see table 1 
The performance of older children (14-20) with ABI did not differ significantly from the 
performance of young (8-10) controls, while 89% of their typically developing peers aged 14-
18 obtained the maximum possible PM score (see figure 1). The difference was still 
significant (p<0.001) when subjects with impaired working memory index (<65) were 
excluded from analysis, suggesting that poor PM was not due to poor short-term or working 
memory. Examples of behaviour of children with ABI in relation to PM tasks and before the 
task ended included: leaving the kitchen after having prepared the cake to go play in the next 
room, licking various utensils and objects on the table instead of picking up the utensils and 
rubbish on the table, drinking the fruit cocktail, beginning to play with a smartphone halfway 
through tidying and leaving the cake burn in the oven. Children with ABI were not helped by 
non-specific cues: 44% of them did not manage the PM tasks even after non-specific cues 
were given (PM score<8), versus only 6% of the controls, all of whom were in the youngest 
age group (8-10). In the two PM sub-tests of the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test 
(RBMT), only 11% of children with ABI obtained the maximum score on the two sub-tests 
used, whereas according to the normative data, 80% of children aged 8 to 14 are expected to 
do so.  
In the youngest age group only, we found a significant correlation between age at injury and 
PM score (r= 0.7; p=0.025): the earlier the injury, the lower the PM score was. There was no 
overall effect of age at injury in the whole ABI group. 
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No significant correlation was found between the PM score on CCT and sum of PM raw 
scores of RMBT in the ABI group.  
Developmental changes in PM scores: PM scores of the youngest typically developing 
controls (8-10) and of children with ABI of all ages showed important variability (see figure 
1), whereas older controls (11-13 and especially 14-20) showed very homogeneous high 
scores, suggesting important PM development from age 8 to 11 in typically developing 
children, with mature PM by the age of 14 on the CCT PM tasks. In typically developing 
controls only, PM showed a developmental trend: as children grew older, they had higher 
(better) PM scores (Jonckheere test J=2.701; p = 0.07), with differences between age groups 
that were statistically significant (Kruskal Wallis test, H(2)= 6.99; p=0.03) and a significant 
correlation (r=0.373, p=0.032) between age and the CCT PM scores. Difference between age 
groups and trend in children with ABI were not significant, but there was a correlation 
between PM score and age in this group (r=0.275, p=0.044), suggesting improvement of PM 
with age. Given the variability in patient’s CCT PM scores in the 11-13 and to a lesser extent 
the 14-20 group, we expect that a larger sample size would have enabled us to find an age 
effect with the statistical tests used. An alternative explanation could be that children with 
ABI precisely do not improve their PM at the critical time of PM improvement found in 
typically developing controls of our sample, potentially due to lack of normal EF maturation 
found in typically developing children. However, ABI severity could not be considered in 
multivariate analyses along with age and age at injury given the heterogeneous sample. One 
cannot exclude that effects of age at injury or severity also contributed to this finding. 
Our study adds objective data to the parental reports87 and to the previous studies 85,86,188,189 
reporting that PM is impaired after brain injury in children. In this study, however we used an 
ecological assessment consisting of simple and natural PM tasks, very close to what is 
expected of a child (e.g.: put the rubbish in the bin after finishing an activity, follow 
instructions at school, similarly to the CCT where two recipes need to be prepared). Results 
showed severe impairment on these simple PM tasks after childhood ABI. Similarly to 
McCauley et al. study 188, children with ABI were not helped by non-specific cues. 
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Figure 2.1: Boxplot of Prospective Memory Scores according to age group and injury 
status 
 
 
Note: The tinted box represents the interquartile range (i.e. the middle 50% of scores), the 
thick horizontal line represents the median, the whiskers represent the range of the top 25% 
and 25% bottom, excluding outliers (represented by a circle) and extreme cases (represented 
by a star).  
 
It might be argued that the success or failure on these tasks was not related to PM ability only 
but that it may have been influenced by other factors and especially, social cognition (children 
are expected to clean after finishing an activity) and theory of mind (deducing that “I have 
finished” is to be said if examiner is not reacting at the end of the test). If, however, implicit, 
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socially-driven cues were the reason children with ABI performed poorer on PM tasks, 
performance should have been corrected after being given non-specific cues explicitly, which 
was not the case. The lack of correlation between the two assessments of PM (RBMT 
subscores and CCT MP score) speaks to the problem we face in studying PM in non-natural 
settings: do the ecologically valid tests really measure the same thing as the laboratory tests in 
children? Although meant to be “ecological”, the RBMT is still a paper-and-pencil task that 
comprises only two PM items and is therefore probably insufficient to adequately screen for 
PM difficulties. The same discrepancies have been found in other ecological assessments of 
executive functioning and remain an important issue that needs further research170,180.The 
main limitation of this study is the absence of retrospective memory data that could account 
for PM failure. Also, mechanisms of injury may have influenced PM but the small numbers of 
children in each condition did not allow a differential analysis in each diagnostic group. 
Another drawback is that PM sub tests from the RMBT were administered only to children 
with ABI, impeding a direct comparison of performance with typically developing peers on 
these subtests. As suggested previously189,86, future research should include an evaluation of 
both retrospective and prospective memory, as well as an assessment of EF, in order to better 
understand memory functional impairment in children with ABI. Another limitation of the 
study is the small sample size in the typically developing healthy controls. To examine age 
effects and typical development of PM skills, a much larger sample size would be needed. 
This study does, however, support previous literature on typical PM development but future 
research should examine the age-effects in a much larger sample. 
Our study shows that PM is significantly impaired in children with ABI performing an 
ecological, close to real life cooking task including four simple PM tasks. Unfortunately, 
usual neuropsychological assessments of memory often do not explore PM, and focus mostly 
on episodic memory. Ecologically valid and sensitive tests of PM should be included in 
assessments of children with ABI, in order to better reflect actual impairment in everyday life 
and at school. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to perform intended activities 64. The 
majority of memory failures reported by adults are prospective in nature192. Children with PM 
impairment can fail to deliver important messages to parents, forget appointments, or fail to 
bring necessary items for planned activities. PM tasks require retrospective memory to 
remember the task, but depend on executive functions (EF) 65 for successful goal 
maintenance, retrieval and implementation at the right moment. At least three attributes are 
accepted as characterizing a PM task202: (1) a delay between formation of the intention and 
the opportunity to carry it out; (2) absence of an explicit reminder to carry out the task at an 
appropriate moment; (3) the need to interrupt one’s ongoing activity in order to carry out the 
intention.  
 
Although PM problems are reported as a major concern by the parents of children with 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) 87, there are surprisingly few studies that have evaluated PM in 
children with TBI (as opposed to adults with TBI, on which there is an extensive body of 
existing research 65,203,204). Ward et al. 205 found that children with TBI had poorer PM than 
their uninjured peers, and that this may be attributable to worse executive functioning, 
especially if the PM task is cognitively demanding. Recently, a real cooking task (Children’s 
Cooking Task120,121) has been used to explore PM in children with acquired brain injury181: it 
showed a striking impairment in PM, with older (14-20) children with brain injuries 
performing close to young (8-10) healthy controls. Further, children with acquired brain 
injury were not helped by non specific cues. McCauley et al.85,189,194 used a monetary 
incentive to increase children’s performance on an event-based PM task consisting of asking 
the examiner for points (exchangeable for dollars or for pennies) before each new 
neuropsychological test. Children with severe TBI were impaired on PM. Motivation (dollars 
versus pennies) influenced PM performance of controls and of children with chronic severe 
TBI85, while it had no effect on children with subacute severe TBI189,194. However even the 
chronic severe TBI group performance remained significantly below the low-motivation 
condition performance of controls.  
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Limitations of these studies were that they used either a biased sample of children with TBI 
(recruited from patients needing rehabilitation) or, for the one prospective study194, children 
early after TBI. Therefore the frequency and degree of PM impairment after severe TBI in the 
long term is unknown. This is particularly needed information because PM can impair 
functional memory and daily life even more than retrospective memory87, but most patients in 
clinical practice (and even in research) are assessed only on the latter while PM is not 
included in expertise or rehabilitation assessments. 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate long term PM outcome, after childhood severe TBI, 
using short novel ecological tasks of PM in a prospective longitudinal cohort. 
METHODS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were a cohort of children with severe accidental TBI (defined as Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS) score of 8 or lower and/or an Injury severity score126 > 16), aged 0-15 years at 
the time of inclusion and recruited between January 2005 and December 2008 at the pediatric 
neurosurgical intensive care unit of Paris 5 University “Necker Enfants Malades” Hospital, 
and assessed at seven years post inclusion for PM prospective memory (PM). By the seven 
year testing the cohort contained therefore both children and young adults. Exclusion criteria 
at the time of cohort recruitment were: children with no vital signs upon admission, children 
with non-accidental head injury, previous history of diagnosed neurological, psychiatric or 
learning disorders. A group of controls was recruited at the seven year follow up point, 
matched individually (in terms of age, gender and parental education) with the TBI group. 
This study is part of a larger study, which was approved by the Paris ethic committee CPP VI. 
PM TASKS 
Three ecological tasks of PM were developed for the study. Because PM performance is 
influenced by motivation85, by the ecological features of the task (meaningful task versus 
exercise type task, home versus laboratory context)206 and by delay66 between formation of an 
intention (PM instructions in this case) and the target situation, the tasks were designed to 
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vary on these three factors. Further, because standard tests administered to the cohort were 
numerous and time-consuming, the PM tasks had to be short and not disturb the other tests. 
For these reasons, time-based PM tasks were not used because children would have invested 
attentional resources into time monitoring rather than the on-going testing.  
Low-motivation, ecological context, ecological task, long delay: the letter TASK 
Individuals received an envelope with the address of the hospital and were asked to send to 
the hospital a short note on the next day it rained in the place they live. The letter had to 
contain four pieces of information: name of the participant, date, place and a mention of rain. 
The participant was also told than even if s/he forgot to send the letter the first time it rained, 
s/he could still do it later on, the important thing being to send the letter at some point. 
Instructions were given twice to the child during the testing and the examiner checked if the 
individual had understood and encoded the instructions. The task was not explained to 
parents, but parents were warned the child had a task to do when s/he was at home and that is 
why s/he had an envelope for the hospital and that they were not to help him/her. Data from 
the letter task was treated as categorical (success or failure) in relation to two components: (1) 
sending the letter with all adequate information (which comprised a retrospective memory 
component - the letter content - as with most PM tasks of daily life) and (2) sending the letter 
irrespective of content (which assessed the prospective component of PM, as the child had 
only to remember the intention to send a letter). 
High-motivation, ecological (meaningful) task, non ecological context, medium delay 
task: the amusement park prize-draw competition. 
At the beginning of the testing, individuals were told they could enter a prize-draw 
competition to thank them for participating in the study. The examiner showed them a colored 
entry sheet that mentioned the draw. They were told that they could enter their name for the 
draw only at the end of all tests. The prize was two entries for an amusement park of their 
choice. At the end of the testing (6-7 hours after the instructions for the children with TBI and 
2.5-3 hours after the instructions for the controls who had less tests to complete), the 
examiner said “ok, we have finished all the tests, well done”. If the participant did not ask 
spontaneously to enter the draw, the examiner made discreetly visible the colored competition 
entry-sheet so that it came into the participant visual space but without giving it to him/her. If 
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the participant did not react to this visual cue, the examiner used a verbal nonspecific cue: 
“did you want do to something else before leaving?”. If this was not enough, the participant 
was reminded explicitly s/he could enter his/her name for the draw competition. Data from 
the draw competition PM task was treated as ordinal: 3 points were awarded for individuals 
succeeding without cues (individuals asking spontaneously to enter the competition at the end 
of testing); 2 points for individuals needing the visual cue only; 1 point for individuals 
needing the verbal cue and zero points for individuals needing an explicit reminder to enter 
their name for the draw. 
On the competition entry-sheet the participant was instructed to add his/her name and 
telephone number. In addition, there was an instruction to read and to tell the examiner which 
amusement park s/he would like to go to if s/he won, and to fold the completed sheet in two 
for the draw box. These tasks did not constitute PM tasks as they could be carried out 
immediately, but tested the child’s ability to follow through a series of task instructions.  
Low-motivation, exercise-type, non-ecological, short delay (retrieve-execute): post-
it/faces task 
In the last task, the delay was short. For this task, we used two existing tests as the on-going 
task: the NEPSY-2 affect recognition subtest and the Bordeaux Faces Test, which were 
included in the social cognition evaluation protocol (PECS-B)207. In the adult version and 
most items of the child version, the individual had to name an emotion by looking at a face. 
Colored post-its were placed on some pages of these tests. The individuals were told to 
remove all the post-its apart from the pink ones throughout the task, but only after they had 
stated the emotion, not before. There were 9 post-its to remove (and 4 pink post-its to leave), 
placed in pre-determined position on nine of the 39 (children version) or 40 (adult version) 
pages of the test. The instruction to take off only post-its of certain colors was meant to 
increase task difficulty and prevent the individuals from automatizing post-it removal without 
effortful processing.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Individuals with severe TBI participating in the study were compared to individuals lost to 
follow-up, by Mann-Whitney tests on GCS Score, coma length, age at injury, and one-year 
post injury intellectual quotients and executive functioning. Further, Chi squared was used to 
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compare participants for language spoken at home, gender and parental education (defined as 
high if above high school or low if high school and below). The same tests were used to 
compare the participating severe TBI group to the controls on age at testing, parental 
education, gender and language spoken at home. Controls and individuals with TBI were 
compared for categorical data (fail/success in sending the letter with all adequate information, 
fail/success in sending the letter irrespective of content) using chi squared analysis. Effects 
size was calculated by odds ratios. The draw competition PM ordinal data was analyzed using 
Mann-Whitney test. The Post-it task yielded a score of number of post-its taken out which 
was analyzed between groups using Mann-Whitney tests because score distribution was not 
normal, and effect size was calculated using r =
𝑧
√𝑁
 and interpreted according to Cohen’s 
guidelines208. Additionally, among each group (TBI and controls), adults’ performance was 
compared to children’s’ performance using Mann-Whitney test or Fisher’s exact test. 
RESULTS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Eighty-one children were included at the acute stage of TBI between January 2005 and 
December 2008. Sixteen children died during acute care, leaving 65 children entering the 
follow-up. By seven years post-injury, 26 were lost to follow-up, leaving 39 patients (aged 7-
22, mean: 15 years; 64% boys) tested for PM.  
Individuals remaining at 7 years follow-up had an initial coma length of 6.4(SD: 5) days; 
initial GCS of 6.5 (SD=1.4, range 3-8) and were aged 8.9 years (SD=4.5, range 0-15) at 
injury. 56% of them used French exclusively at home, and 54% were from low parental 
education background. Individuals remaining at 7 years follow-up did not differ significantly 
from those lost to follow-up on these parameters, nor on their one year post-injury intellectual 
quotients and executive functioning (see chapter 1 for details on cognitive abilities at one and 
two years post injury).  
Most individuals (26) were still children at the time of the study but 13 had become young 
adults. 37 controls were recruited (two controls could not be recruited within the time frame 
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of the study). There was no significant difference between the TBI and the control groups on 
gender, age at testing, parental education, and language spoken at home. 
PM TASKS 
Letter task – Overall, 56 % of participants sent a letter. Individuals with TBI failed 
significantly more on both the prospective and the retrospective component of the task. One 
letter contained weather and date information but no name and therefore it could not be 
identified to which individual it belonged. If an individual had sustained a TBI he was 2.6 
times more likely to forget to send the letter and 3.7 times less likely to send a letter with all 
required information. Results are presented in Table 1.  
Table 3.1: Results of PM tasks 
 Individuals with 
severe TBI  
Controls  
Letter Task 
% individuals who succeeded to send 
the letter with all information 
required 
20% 49% χ2(1) = 6.68, 
p=0.01* 
% individuals who succeeded to send 
a letter, irrespective of adequate 
content 
44% 68% χ2 (1) = 3.96, 
p=0.047* 
Prize Draw Competition 
% individuals who spontaneously 
entered their name for the draw 
28% 27% U=660,  
z=-0.07,  
p= 0.94 
 
% individuals who needed visual 
cues to enter their name for the draw 
19% 14% 
% individuals who needed verbal 
cues to enter their name for the draw 
31% 46% 
% individuals who needed an 
explicit reminder to enter their name 
for the draw 
22% 13% 
Post-it Task 
% individuals who totally forgot to 
take out the post-its 
36% 13% χ2(2) = 8.43, 
p=0.015* 
% individuals who remembered to 
take off all required post-its 
28% 60%  
% individuals who remembered 
partially to take off post-its 
36% 27%  
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Amusement park prize-draw task - There was no significant difference between controls 
(Mean Rank =37.16) and individuals with TBI (Mean Rank = 36.8) in the prize-draw 
competition (U=660, z=-0.07, p= 0.94). 
Post-it Task- Individuals with TBI remembered to take out significantly less post-its (Mean = 
5.06, SD = 4.07) than their matched controls [Mean = 7.35, SD = 3.07, (U=420.5, z=-2.87 , 
p= 0.004, r=0.34)]. There was no difference between groups in taking post its too early. Apart 
from one control who took out all four pink post its, individuals  respected the rule of leaving 
the pink post its equally well in the TBI and the control group (p = 0.16). 
CAPACITY TO FOLLOW THE 5 INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER THE 
DRAW  
When entering the amusement park draw competition, individuals with TBI managed to 
follow less instructions (fill in name, read instructions, fill in table with phone number, state 
the amusement park they would like to go to, fold the participation sheet for the draw) than 
controls (mean in controls = 4.2, mean in TBI group = 3.7; Mann-Whitney U=452.5, z= -2.20, 
p= 0.028, r=0.26). 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND INJURY EFFECTS 
None of the PM tasks was influenced by parental education, initial GCS or coma length. In 
the whole sample, individuals whose parents had higher education (Mann-Whitney U=789, 
z=2.28, p=0.023, r=0.27) and who spoke exclusively French at home (Mann-Whitney U=377, 
z=-2.34, p= 0.019, r=0.28) followed more instructions.  
AGE AT TESTING EFFECTS 
Children performed poorer than young adults on the Post-it Task, irrespective of injury status 
(in the TBI group: Mann-Whitney U=210, z=2.61 , p=0.009, r=0.38; in the typically 
developing controls: Mann-Whitney U=237, z=2.69 , p=0.007, r=0.44).  
On the prospective component of the letter task (sending a letter irrespective of content), there 
was a trend for adults to preform better than children in both groups (Fisher’s exact test = 
0.068 in the TBI group and 0.084 in the typically developing controls group). 
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There was no difference between younger and older participants for the prize-draw 
competition and the overall letter task. 
DISCUSSION 
Across the large age span of 7-22, individuals with severe TBI systematically recruited for a 
longitudinal prospective follow-up showed significantly poorer PM seven years’ post-injury 
than matched controls in two PM tasks. Their performance on a high motivation PM task did 
not differ from controls. Younger children performed generally poorer on PM tasks, except 
for the high motivation task (amusement park draw). However, although individuals with TBI 
managed to retrieve and implement their intention of entering the draw (PM success), they 
were significantly poorer than controls in following detailed instructions. The ecological task 
consisting of sending a letter on a rainy day, showed significant differences both in its PM 
component (sending the letter irrespective of adequate content), and the overall task (sending 
the letter containing all adequate information). 
This is to our knowledge the largest cohort of severe childhood TBI. Most cohorts usually 
include heterogeneous samples of children with a range of TBI severity, where severe TBI are 
usually relatively few19,71,162. It is also to our knowledge the first cohort study that assessed 
PM. The prospective longitudinal nature of this this study was expected to capture more 
positive outcomes compared to retrospective studies based on the inclusion of patients in 
rehabilitation73,163 ; nonetheless PM impairment appeared significant and should raise 
awareness about frequent PM deficits, that are not explored by usual memory tests used in 
children136 and that should be given more attention.  
Our result are consistent with previous publications on both developmental67 and clinical 
samples85 that showed that deficits in PM performance may be reduced under high motivation 
conditions. The lack of age effects in the high motivation condition may have been due to an 
unequal degree of motivation, as the experimenter noted that younger children seemed more 
enthusiastic about the prize-draw, while some young adults and adolescents appeared less 
interested (one did not even want to enter the draw). An unequal motivation effect was 
probably also present for the letter task, which was designed to be a low motivation condition: 
children aged 7-10 seemed very proud to have a letter to write and post and many parents 
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reported the enthusiasm of their child for the task. Also, we cannot exclude that parents 
helped their children with the letter task, because young children are not expected to send a 
letter of their own and it may have seemed natural for their parents to help them despite the 
examiner’s explanations.  
Whether PM improves with age is still a matter of debate. Small children as young as two can 
succeed in PM if motivation is high (remind their Mum to buy them sweets)67. Age effects 
that have been documented in the literature may be entirely attributable to factors such as: (1) 
unequal difficulty of the on-going task, allowing less attentional resources to PM tasks in 
younger children; (2) retrospective memory component; (3) motivation. When taking these 
into account, age effects of PM are typically small68. This is in line with our findings, as the 
prize-draw competition showed no difference between age groups.  
Implications: There is now more evidence that PM is a common sequelae of childhood severe 
TBI85,87,181, also at long-term. When assessing sequelae post TBI, the evaluation should 
include an assessment of PM in addition to classical episodic memory assessment. When PM 
is found impaired, interventions should aim at using high motivation tasks/incentives for most 
essential PM tasks of daily life, in order to help individuals with TBI with most important 
goals. However other methods should also be considered (e.g. pager, alarms), given the 
frequent overall PM impairment.  
Limitations: The tasks used are not validated, their relative difficulty was not explored and 
therefore the differences observed between the high and low motivation tasks may be due to 
the task difficulty and not the motivation factor per se. Most tasks generated categorical or 
ordinal data that did not allow assessment of PM impairment severity. In the prize-draw 
competition, delay between instructions and opportunity to carry out the intention (entering 
the draw) was unequal between control and TBI groups, which may have disadvantaged the 
individuals with TNI who, further, were more tired by a longer assessment than controls. 
However, on this task there was no difference between groups. For the other tasks the delay 
was the same.  
The post-it task could be argued to reflect rather a dual task (dependent more on working 
memory ability than prospective memory), as the target (non-pink post-its) were relatively 
frequent (9 targets out of 40 pages), while other experimental laboratory PM tasks tend to use 
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less frequent targets (e.g.: 2 out of 1348, 1 out of 20187) but not always (e.g.: 3 out of 1064). 
Probably, the higher the number of target stimuli, the more the task relies on working 
memory, because the frequent target acts as a constant reminder of the intention and is 
therefore kept in the attentional focus of working memory92. On the other hand, if the target is 
infrequent, as the on-going task proceeds, the intention drops progressively to lower 
attentional levels. Further, dual task performance is more about switching between two 
activities while PM more about delaying an intention until a favorable moment to execute it is 
encountered. Our post-it task may have better assessed PM if the target stimuli were less 
frequent. Further, because children had to switch between facial recognition, post-it removal 
and pink post-it inhibition of removal, the task evaluated probably both working memory and 
PM.  
Conclusions: PM is impaired in individuals at long-term after severe childhood TBI. High 
motivation conditions may enhance PM. 
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CHAPTER 4: SELF-AWARENESS 
ASSESSMENT DURING COGNITIVE 
REHABILITATION IN CHILDREN WITH 
ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY: A 
FEASIBILITY STUDY AND PROPOSED 
MODEL OF CHILD ANOSOGNOSIA 
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INTRODUCTION 
Metacognition is the conscious knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes as well as the 
processes involved in consciously monitoring and regulating one’s ongoing actions 51. Thus 
metacognition refers to the awareness of one’s own cognition and is used in the context of 
normal functioning. The concept of awareness/self-awareness (or more usually lack of 
awareness), on the other hand, is usually used in the context of pathology and refers to the 
awareness of one’s deficits, including cognitive deficits. As such, awareness can be viewed as 
metacognition applied to difficulties in cognitive functioning.  
Awareness and metacognition have been defined in many ways and there is little agreement 
among neuropsychologists, psychologists, developmentalists and education researchers as to 
the exact nature and limit of the two concepts. In developmental psychology, metacognition is 
thought to comprise metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills. Metacognitive 
knowledge is defined by Flavell as knowledge about one’s own cognitive strengths and 
limitations, including factors that may interact to affect cognition52. The concept of 
metacognitive skills, refers to the voluntary control of cognitive processes including 
prediction, planning, monitoring and evaluation of behaviors.  
Many models of awareness and metacognition have been proposed for adults 209. Two models 
of awareness/metacognition are particularly useful: (1) Crosson’s model 210 that offers a 
pragmatic classification of awareness levels linked with efficient compensation which can be 
proposed in each level and (2) Toglia and Kirk’s comprehensive model of awareness after 
brain injury 211.  
Crosson’s model has an hierarchical structure, although this hierarchy has never been 
confirmed empirically212. At the base of awareness is intellectual awareness. Intellectual 
awareness comprises three sublevels: (a) the basic understanding that a deficit exists, (b) the 
recognition of a common thread in the activities the patient is impaired in, (c) the implications 
this has. On-line Awareness (also called emergent awareness) refers to the ability to 
recognize a problem while performing an activity. Emergent awareness is crucial to 
rehabilitation as patients who do not realize that a problem is occurring will not recognize the 
need to correct it and /or to initiate compensation. Anticipatory awareness is the highest level 
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of awareness in Crosson’s model, and is defined as the ability to anticipate that a problem will 
occur as a result of some deficit, and take some action to prevent that problem occurring.  
Toglia and Kirk’s comprehensive model of awareness after brain injury views the relationship 
between different aspects of metacognition and awareness as a dynamic process rather than as 
a series of hierarchical levels. It clearly differentiates between knowledge and beliefs related 
to one’s self (i.e. metacognitive knowledge that pre-exists and is stored within long term 
memory) and knowledge and awareness that is activated during a task (i.e. on-line awareness 
which Toglia and Kirk define as “the ability to monitor performance “on-line”, within the 
stream of action”) 211. Metacognitive knowledge is what one brings to a task, whereas on-line 
awareness involves ongoing evaluation of performance within the context of a task 213211. 
Metacognitive knowledge and on-line awareness are distinct functions and have been found 
not to be correlated  in adults with brain injury 214. 
Although Crosson’s and Toglia and Kirk’s models offer two distinct frameworks to study 
awareness, we argue they are complementary and that their combined use allows a better 
understanding of patients’ difficulties: (1) Crosson’s Intellectual awareness corresponds to the 
metacognitive knowledge of Toglia and Kirk’s model; (2) Crosson’s emergent awareness 
corresponds to on-line awareness of Toglia and Kirk’s model (and comprises metacognitive 
“skills” from the field of developmental psychology); (3) anticipatory awareness is the 
behavioral manifestation of good metacognitive knowledge and good on-line awareness. 
Hereafter, the terms of awareness and metacognition will be used interchangeably, postulating 
that they have the same underlying construct, irrespective of its application to pathology or to 
normal functioning. Correspondence between the models and vocabulary used in 
developmental psychology are summarized in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Correspondence between Crosson’s and Toglia and Kirk’s model and 
Developmental psychology terminology 
 
 
 
Impaired awareness/metacognition, sometimes also termed “anosognosia”, is a common 
phenomenon described in children who have sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI) 81,82,83. 
However it results from a combination of organically based unawareness (due to brain injury) 
and simple developmental immaturity83 present in typically developing children as well. 
Metacognition is known to be poorer in younger children. Even typically developing children 
are not “fully aware”: they may have some basic intellectual awareness about things they 
cannot do that their parents can, however they are not able to fully understand the 
consequences of their cognitive limitations in recognizing a problem when it is actually 
happening, or predicting a problem will occur as a result of some developmental immaturity. 
Children only gradually come to gain awareness over the entire span of developmental 
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years83. This has been mainly studied in relation to memory (termed meta-memory) in 
typically developing children who show gradual development of metamemory throughout 
childhood 59,60,61,62,63 and in the field of learning disabilities54,215,55,216. Nelson and Narens 
proposed a comprehensive model of metacognition in metamemory 217 where metacognition 
is described as the interplay between two levels of information processing (an object-level 
processing and a meta-level processing) that interact with feedforward and feedback control 
and monitoring loops . A neural description of the model has been proposed by Shimamura218.  
To the best of our knowledge metacognition in relation to other cognitive functions, and 
especially executive function (EF)/complex task management in daily life, has not yet been 
explored. Here we will focus on metacognition for executive functions and complex task 
management in children with TBI because EF deficits are a frequent and disabling 
consequence of TBI 6,69and because TBI outcome is strongly predicted by executive 
functioning level122.  
Although metacognition is poor in young children, it has been shown to be even poorer in 
children who have sustained a brain injury 81,82,83,219,220,221. However, to date, objective 
measurement of awareness in children with TBI is scarce (see Wales et al. 222 for a review) 
and most studies evaluate single metacognitive skills such as prediction, evaluation and 
confidence of performance 223,224,84,225,226. Conversely, Beardmore et al. reported the use of the 
“Knowledge Interview for Children” (KIC)81, a semi- structured interview related to twelve 
areas of knowledge about TBI (coma, story of the accident, brain functioning…) and ten 
potential areas of difficulty (attention, fatigue, memory, behavior…). Interview of the child 
and the parents yields an Awareness Discrepancy Index, by summing the number of items 
endorsed by the child’s parents but rejected by the child. Children reported significantly less 
problems than their parents and demonstrated extremely limited knowledge about TBI. The 
SAND-C (Subjective Awareness of Neuropsychological Deficits Questionnaire for Children) 
is a self-report instrument in which children are required to estimate their neuropsychological 
functions227, however self-report is not compared to parental judgment and as such is not a 
measure of anosognosia if used alone. 
Josman et al. evaluated children with TBI in relation to metamemory 224and categorizations 
skills 228 with three types of self-awareness measures (1) intellectual awareness –termed 
general awareness by the authors (e.g.: “have you noticed any changes in memory?”), (2) self-
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prediction (of task difficulty228; “how many pictures will you remember ?” 224) and (3) self-
estimation of performance after the task. General awareness questions were not fully 
understood by the children and therefore not recommended. Prediction was difficult in both 
healthy children and children with TBI, self-estimation was significantly less correlated with 
actual performance in brain-injured children than in typically developing ones 228, and 
children with brain injury overestimated their memory performance 224. Similarly, in Hanten 
et al. 84,225 and Crowther et al. 226 studies, children who had sustained a TBI had poor 
estimation of their memory span and overconfidence in performance when compared to 
healthy children and children with mild TBI 84, suggesting impaired metacognition. The 
scarce literature assessing awareness in children with brain injury explores metacognitive 
skills such as prediction and evaluation, using assessments performed in structured, un-
ecological environments. Questionnaires of intellectual awareness (KIC, SAND-C) proposed 
to date are not domain specific and do not specifically explore awareness of executive 
functioning.  
The use of metacognitive training is a practice standard in adults with deficits in executive 
functioning 114. Adult metacognitive training programmes, such as Goal Management 
Training (GMT) 229 have begun to be used in children200. GMT is mostly known for its 
algorithm “STOP! - Define the main task – List the steps –Learn the steps – Do it - Check” 
that can be used to train specific tasks 230. However, the full GMT version 99 is a truly 
“metacognitive” training in that GMT encourages patients to think about their cognitive 
failures, to identify factors promoting or preventing these failures and to reflect and monitor 
how their thoughts may drift away from the main goal and switch to “automatic pilot”. When 
used alone, GMT group training 231,99 does not offer a repetitive intensive practice of EF and 
monitoring skills, but rather teaches and prompts the patients to monitor their actions, to 
detect their cognitive slips and gain control over their actions, through a conscious and 
attention-demanding monitoring of their flow of thoughts and actions. The relatively short 
duration of the programme (7 x 2 hours of group training in adults, including GMT theory 
presentation and group discussions) does not allow automatization of monitoring and 
checking. Rather, it relies on patient’s awareness of difficulties and ability to actively 
implement the GMT algorithm in daily life, under conscious and ‘top-down’ control. 
Therefore, GMT in adults relies heavily on a patient’s awareness. A patient who considers 
that his/her cognition is efficient, will not easily engage in such an attention-demanding 
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programme aiming at improving cognition efficiency in an effortful way. Awareness (before 
treatment or acquired throughout the GMT programme) is a core factor for programme 
success. GMT programmes usually enroll patients with mild or moderate brain injuries with 
relatively preserved awareness or integrate an awareness intervention component before the 
GMT 118,119.  
As young children with brain injuries have impaired awareness because of developmental 
immaturity 83 added to the organically based awareness deficits due to their injury, 
metacognitive training programmes such as GMT may not be effective because the core factor 
for programme success – awareness – is missing. It is therefore crucial to evaluate children’s 
awareness when conducting a metacognitive training such as GMT. To our knowledge there 
is a lack of self-awareness measures for children. Tools used in metacognition developmental 
research 232,54,233,217 are not easily accessible or transferable to the context of rehabilitation 
(e.g.: use of event-related potentials)232. Furthermore, as cognitive rehabilitation of EF aims at 
understanding and improving daily life executive functioning in the natural context of the 
child, classically used measures of metacognition (Judgments of Learning - JoL; Ease of 
Learning judgments – EoL; Feeling of Knowing – FoK; during a word list learning, in an 
office-based un-ecological environment 217,59,60,61,62,63) are not clinically useful. 
The primary aim of this pilot study was to examine the feasibility of three ways of assessing 
awareness of executive dysfunction in children with a TBI during a rehabilitation programme 
based on GMT.  
 
METHODS 
This awareness study was part of a pilot study that tested an intervention based on a context-
sensitive pediatric Goal Management Training (GMT) combined with ecological activity 
practice. Details and effectiveness of the intervention are reported elsewhere 200. Children 
were taught metacognitive strategy use through discussion of stories in which story characters 
experience cognitive failures. Children were introduced to ideas of how those may be 
prevented, and were given practice at applying metacognitive strategies on paper-and-pencil 
exercises, then on ecological activities in the rehabilitation centre, and finally on real life 
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activities at home and school. The programme used a range of functional, meaningful 
activities including cooking. The training was administered weekly, for 15-20 hours over 4-6 
months. Because of the availability and time required by the intervention for the children 
included in this pilot study, it was not judged ethically possible to include typically 
developing children. Children included in the study had sustained a severe TBI at least two 
years earlier, had a documented dysexecutive syndrome, including executive functioning 
difficulties in daily life as reported by parents and school staff.  
Awareness was assessed using three different measures: two measures of metacognitive 
knowledge (intellectual awareness) and one measure of on-line/emergent awareness.  
The two measures of metacognitive knowledge (MK) corresponded to two different levels of 
Crosson’s intellectual awareness (see figure 4.1). The first measure assessed level (a) of 
Crosson’s intellectual awareness i.e. the basic understanding that a deficit exists. The second 
measure assessed levels (b) and (c) of Crosson’s intellectual awareness i.e. (b) the recognition 
of a common thread in the activities the patient is impaired in and (c) the implications this 
has. 
The first measure of MK (the basic understanding that a deficit exists) consisted of a 
discrepancy score using the “goal management training questionnaire”99 translated into 
French, simplified and adapted for children (see appendix 1). This questionnaire, based on the 
adult GMT questionnaire, is specific to goal management difficulties and ‘goal neglect’ 
(failure to take actions to achieve goals despite the intention to do so). It is however not 
validated and has no norms. Because poor reading skills and vocabulary might have 
influenced children’s responses, the questions were read to the child who answered orally. 
The questionnaire presents common executive failures that can happen at home, at school or 
during leisure activities (e.g. “Forgetting something that needed to be done at a certain time, 
running out of time because you got too caught up in something that you were doing, starting 
an exercise and realising once you’ve started that are not doing what was asked...”). For each 
of the 30 items of the questionnaire, the child had to report if the item was a problem for 
him/her. The questionnaire was answered during an interview with the child without his/her 
parents, before the intervention. The trainer provided age-appropriate examples for the items 
the child did not understand spontaneously. At the end of the intervention the same person 
who trained the child throughout the rehabilitation programme, answered the questionnaire as 
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well, based on what she witnessed of the child’s behavior during the intervention and based 
on contacts with parents and school. As the trainer had spent 15-20 hours with the child, it 
allowed her to observe carefully the child’s functioning. The questionnaire score of MK 
awareness was obtained similarity to the KIC81, from the number of discrepant items between 
the child’s rating of the questionnaire and the rating of the trainer. An item was judged as 
discrepant if the child responded it was not a problem, or a minor problem but the investigator 
thought it was a significant problem, obtaining a binary response for each item 
(aware/unaware). Potentially inversed discrepancies (the child thinking an item was 
problematic while the trainer responded it wasn’t) did not occur. Items not relevant (e.g. 
forgetting books in the school bag, when school bag is not prepared by the child) were 
excluded, as well as items the examiner could not judge reliably at the end of the intervention. 
The final score was a percentage of “unaware items” divided by the number of relevant and 
reliable items.  
The second measure of MK (the recognition of a common thread in the activities in which the 
patient is impaired and the implications this has) used stories contained in the pediatric GMT 
intervention200 , and was assessed throughout the intervention. In these stories, characters 
have a series of daily life problems related to their executive dysfunction (e.g. putting an 
essay to hand in at school into a sports bag instead of a school bag). Stories are age-
appropriate and consequences of the problems are emphasized (e.g. stress while looking in the 
school bag for the essay, feeling upset when finding the essay in the evening while getting 
dressed for football, getting a lower mark because the essay was handed in late…), as well as 
factors that contributed to the problem (e.g.: going to bed late because writing the essay at the 
last minute, being in a rush when preparing the school bag and the sports bag the next day). 
Use of PowerPoint slides with child friendly drawings, allowed children to follow the story 
without too much pressure on their working memory. The intervention contained a total of six 
stories, one every two weeks. At the end of each story, the child was asked “Do you think this 
could happen to you?” and it was followed by a discussion with the child about personal 
examples of cognitive failures and slips (called “Oops errors” in the intervention), 
implications and factors that contributed to these “Oops errors”, and similarities with the 
stories. The awareness deficit score was the percentage of stories the child thought would 
never happen to him/her, while the trainer saw similar events regularly happening to the child, 
divided by the total number of stories. A child who acknowledged that this kind of story could 
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have happened to him/her, but could not provide any personal examples of similar cognitive 
failures, was still considered as being aware on that story (i.e. providing personal examples 
was not mandatory to score as aware on a story). 
Emergent (i.e. on-line) awareness was assessed throughout the intervention by asking the 
child at the end of each session if s/he thought the exercise/activity had been difficult for 
him/her. Exercises could be office-set paper-and-pencil school type exercises or complex 
daily life tasks like real cooking. An awareness deficit was taken as a percentage of activities 
judged by the child as easy while s/he completely failed or required a lot of help to achieve 
the goal, divided by the total number of intervention sessions. On-line awareness assessment 
was conducted throughout the training, at the end of each session, with a total of 15 sessions. 
Children were also asked to identify “Oops errors” (cognitive slips) s/he had made during the 
exercise/activity, to qualitatively assess their on-line awareness.  
Because awareness measures (except the questionnaire) were embodied in the intervention 
program, throughout the 15-20 hours of training, it was not possible to obtain data from 
healthy controls who did not follow the intervention on those specific awareness measures. 
Although this was not intended to be part of the awareness assessment, we also report here the 
behavior of children during a pre-intervention test using cooking, the Children’s Cooking 
Task121,120 (CCT). In the CCT, children have to make a chocolate cake following a child-
friendly photo-cued recipe. Children repeated the test twice before the intervention (to obtain 
two baselines). Children were not asked about their performance on the CCT because it would 
have acted as a cue for subsequent CCT assessments. However as behavior gave the trainer 
some insight into children’s on-line awareness through error detection on task, and possibly 
anticipatory awareness on the second attempt to make a chocolate cake (for second baseline), 
trainer qualitative observations are reported. 
RESULTS 
Five children were initially included in the study. One child (YR) dropped out after four 
sessions. Children’s detailed medical history, neuropsychological assessments and overall 
intervention effect can be found in table 1. All children suffered a severe dysexecutive 
syndrome, especially on ecological measures of executive functions (Children’s Cooking 
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Task and questionnaires). Neuropsychological assessment showed relatively preserved or 
even normal episodic memory (see table 1- except for RK, in story recall which was poor 
probably due to attention rather than memory problems) therefore high anosognosia scores in 
the stories and questionnaire did not reflect a memory problem. 
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Table 4.1 : Demographic, medical and neuropsychological characteristics of the participants 
 YR  PB CS RK IP 
Sex Boy  Girl Girl Boy Boy 
Age at inclusion (years) 14  11 11 13 8 
 
 Medical history 
Age at injury (years) 2.5  2.5 6.5 7  5.5 
Initial GCS <7  6 4 3 6 
Brain imaging Unknown 
 
 Large right hemisphere 
hemorrhage and edema, 
right parietal depression 
fracture 
Cerebellar and right parieto-
occipital lesion with 
depression fracture 
Subdural hematoma with 
diffuse edema and 
pneumocephalus 
 
Brain stem hemorrhage, 
Diffuse subarachnoid 
hemorrhage 
Duration of coma (days) Unknown  Unknown 1 10 6 
Associated impairments, 
reported in medical records 
and previous assessments 
Severe behavioral 
disorders 
 
 Epilepsy absences treated by 
carbamazepine 
 
FSIQ 69. Impaired ToM and 
language pragmatics 
Spastic equinus foot 
Attention problems 
Left arm weakness 
ADHD 
Glasgow Outcome Scale 3 (severe)  2 (moderate) 3 (severe) 3 (severe) 2 (moderate) 
 
 Neuropsychological assessment 
WISC IV matrices 11  9 7 16 11 
WISC IV vocabulary 6  9 5 7 12 
BADS-C 6 part test  7  10 7 8 6 
CMS stories - immediate 9  8 8 4 8 
CMS stories- delayed 8  5 7 4 9 
CMS backward span Missing data  8 8 10 18 
CMS words list - immediate Missing data  9 12 12 14 
CMS words list - delayed Missing data  13 7 16 16 
Parents BRIEF T-score: BRI 63  71 87 95 57 
Parents BRIEF T-score: MI 68  82 76 79 56 
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Table 4.1 (continued): Demographic, medical and neuropsychological characteristics of the participants 
Parents BRIEF T-score: GEC 68  80 82 88 57 
Parents DEX-C : Z score 3,53  4,7 3,7 5,1 0,7 
CCT: Z-score Scoring impossible 
due to complete 
failure on task  
 
 
4,8 2,2 7,1 18,0 
 Effect of Intervention (Context-sensitive pediatric Goal Management Training) 
 Dropped out  Improved on EF 
questionnaires. No effect on 
cooking task.  
Improved on EF 
questionnaires. No effect on 
cooking task. 
Improved on EF 
questionnaires and 
cooking task. 
Adequate application of 
strategies on complex tasks, 
improved on cooking task, no 
effect on EF questionnaires 
Note: GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale score; ToM: Theory of Mind; FSIQ: Full Scale Intellectual Quotient; ADHD: Attention Deficit – Hyperactivity Disorder; 
WISC 234: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; BADS-C: Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children; CMS150: Children’s 
Memory Scale; BRIEF 144, 145: Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functions; BRI: Behavioral Regulation Index; MI: Metacognition Index; GEC: Global 
Executive Composite Score. DEX-C 235: Dysexecutive questionnaire for children. CCT 120,121: Children’s Cooking Task.  
Neuropsychological test results are reported as standard scores, unless otherwise stated. For the CCT and for executive functions questionnaires, BRIEF and 
DEX-C, a higher score indicates greater impairment. The clinical cut-off score for the BRIEF is set at a T-score of 65.  
Paper and pencil tests of executive functions (EF) 236 and detailed effect of intervention are reported elsewhere200; all children had at least two out of three 
EF tests indicating impairment relative to controls (< 2SD below controls’ scores)200. 
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FEASABILITY 
Our method of awareness assessment showed good feasibility. For the first measure of MK, 
all children were able to understand the thirty-one items of the questionnaire when provided 
with examples. The maximum number of items per child the trainer could not reliably assess 
at the end of the intervention was two. For the second measure of MK (stories), children 
enjoyed GMT stories and could understand them easily. All stories could have happened to 
the children and were relevant. Children could identify no “Oops errors” in activities they had 
judged as easy, even when they had failed the task.  
AWARENESS SCORES 
Awareness deficit scores for each type of awareness are presented in figure 4.2. Higher scores 
indicate that children are more anosognosic/unaware, i.e. representing a deficit in awareness. 
Lower scores reflect better awareness.  
Figure 4.2 : Anosognosia/Awareness deficit scores for each type of awareness. 
 
Note: Higher scores indicate that children are more anosognosic/unaware, i.e. representing a 
deficit in awareness. Lower scores reflect better awareness.  
MK: metacognitive knowledge; YR, PB, CS, IP, RK: children’s initials  
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QUALITATIVE DATA 
CHILD 1: YR 
YR was 14. He had sustained a severe TBI at the age of 2.5 years (collision with a running 
child); he attended a special school but was excluded from school for half of the year for 
behavioral issues. YR dropped out from the intervention after 4 sessions. 
YR reported none of the questionnaire items as problematic, despite having been observed 
making frequent errors, resulting in a 100% awareness deficit score. As for pGMT stories of 
the modules he completed before he dropped out of the study (4), YR thought the characters 
must be “stupid” and such cognitive failures would never happen to him and never gave any 
example of personal ”Oops errors” in the story discussion, nor did he acknowledged he made 
mistakes or errors in the ecological intervention activities. An example is his performance on 
the CCT (Children’s Cooking Task) prior to the intervention: YR found the correct recipe 
easily, took a quick look at the ingredients needed, put all the eggs he could find on the table, 
all the baking powder (5 packets), added one spoon of chocolate and one spoon of flour and 
put it in the oven. At the end of the task, both the child and the examiner tasted the “chocolate 
cake” that was rather a baking powder-flavored omelet, provoking instantaneous tingling in 
the mouth. YR said: “I didn’t know it was so easy to make a chocolate cake. But next time I’ll 
put slightly more chocolate” and wanted to eat the remaining cake. After being shown that on 
the same page there were stepwise instructions and asked if he thought he had followed them, 
YR looked perplexed for a moment and said in a defensive voice “No, I didn’t but I’ve 
managed well anyway”. YR made it clear he was not interested in the training and that he 
needed no help. However he was very interested in the module that explained executive 
function impairment and spontaneously admitted “That’s exactly my problem”, suggesting 
some intellectual awareness but then returned to a contemptuous attitude for the training. 
Before he dropped out of the study, YR participated actively in the sessions, while affirming 
he participated only because his parents forced him and that he had no need for it.  
CHILD 2: PB 
PB was 11. She was a passenger in a motor-vehicle accident at the age of 2.5 years with 
severe brain lesions requiring immediate neurosurgical treatment. She attended mainstream 
school with a part-time school assistant. She had epilepsy absences treated by carbamazepine. 
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PB was intellectually aware of her impairment on nearly all items of the questionnaire. 
Indeed, she understood she had difficulties with some activities, (lowest level of Crosson’s 
intellectual awareness) and answered to most items in the questionnaire as “big, big problem 
for me”, but she seemed unable to understand the implications of her deficits (highest level of 
intellectual awareness). While enjoying the GMT stories very much (our second measure of 
MK), PB never acknowledged such things could happen to her. For example, she recognized 
she often forgets and loses important objects (at school, she is late half of the time because 
she realizes on her way to school that she didn’t take her schoolbag; she doesn’t give forms to 
be signed by parents to her mother, who then misses important school meetings). However 
these situations did not seem problematic to PB, and there was no emotional reaction when 
these failures were discussed in relation to the stories. PB regularly took examples of her 
highly organized mother’s rare executive failures as an excuse for her own frequent failures: 
“My Mum sometimes forgets her bag as well”. As for on-line awareness, she judged most of 
the activities as easy, even when she needed considerable help to manage them. She never 
recognized she failed an activity and it was thus impossible to convince her that the training 
could help her. In the CCT, on her first attempt to make a chocolate cake she forgot the 
baking powder. On her second attempt, she focused on not repeating the same error and 
managed a beautiful looking cake, containing the baking powder, but this time missing sugar. 
While still unable to acknowledge the need to compensate for EF dysfunction at post-
intervention testing, she was reported to have made significant progress on parental and 
teacher post-intervention questionnaires (see 200) and parents were highly satisfied with the 
intervention, reporting that she understood her brain functioning better. 
CHILD 3: CS 
CS was 11. She had sustained a TBI when a soccer goal post fell on her head at the age of 6.5 
years, with mainly cerebellar and right parieto-occipital lesions. She attended a special school 
and a mainstream school part-time. Her intellectual quotient was on the lower limit of normal 
and she had impaired theory of mind and language pragmatics described in her previous 
rehabilitation reports. CS was aware of most problematic items of the questionnaire i.e. basic 
intellectual awareness. In our second measure of MK (stories), CS acknowledged all of them 
could have happened to her. However her behaviour indicated that she often simply “guessed” 
that she was expected to say “yes, that story could have happened to me” and she could not 
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provide any personal example of a similar “Oops error” in the discussion that followed the 
stories. She couldn’t evaluate her performance “on-line“ during or after activities, did not 
express awareness of “Oops errors” after the tasks and always thought activities were easy 
and that she did well, although she failed or needed much help on most tasks.  
CHILD 4: IP 
IP was 8 at the beginning of the training. A television had fallen on his head at the age of 5.5 
years. He attended mainstream school with a part-time school assistant. He was diagnosed 
with ADHD, with symptoms that had probably started prior to the TBI. Very protected by his 
carers, who confronted him as little as possible with his difficulties (e.g.: managing his 
schoolbag preparation), he had few opportunities to notice that he was impaired and lacked 
knowledge about the consequences of his TBI. All three measures of awareness showed a 
moderate awareness deficit, with highest unawareness for on-line awareness. Very few 
examples of personal “Oops errors” could be obtained from IP and most of these were not 
appropriate. On his first attempt to make the chocolate cake, he used a small coffee bowl 
instead of the required salad bowl: after pouring in the sugar, the bowl was full, however he 
continued adding the other ingredients until the bowl was invisible and totally covered under 
a mountain of flour. He showed no manifestation of having detected this error and was very 
surprised when he looked at the photo of the next step of the recipe, depicting a half full salad 
bowl of cake mixture. He also had difficulty following the recipe steps and missed the step 
requiring to stir the mixture until it was smooth. He was very surprised that, once cooked, the 
“cake” had separated into white-flour and a black-oily layer. During training sessions, he 
alternated from great overestimations of his abilities (“I’m the most intelligent boy of my 
class, this exercise is just too easy”) to deep self-depreciation (“I can’t do it because I’m just 
too stupid”) and presented great emotional reactions to his performance, including 
inconsolable crying when he was failing a cooking recipe, inappropriate laughing, and rolling 
on the floor when he could not find a solution to a problem.  
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CHILD 5: RK 
RK was 13. He had sustained a motor-vehicle pedestrian accident at the age of 7. He attended 
part -time private schooling with school assistant part time private lessons. He presented with 
severe attention problems. Although 13 at the time of the study, his parents could never leave 
him at home alone, he was forbidden to enter the kitchen as he usually forgot to switch off the 
gas. RK was fully aware of his impairments on all three measures. He is the only child who 
actually acknowledged the utility of strategies taught during the intervention and used them to 
compensate for EF dysfunction post-intervention. However effects did not transfer to natural 
contexts and no change was reported by parents on post-intervention questionnaires 200. 
However he seemed unaware of his lack of cognitive flexibility. This was illustrated by a 
cooking episode at home reported by his parents. He decided to make finger biscuits (that he 
had practiced during the intervention) for his large family. He decided to multiply all 
ingredients by 5 (which would give over one hundred biscuits), because it would require 500 
grams of butter which is the usual size of butter packs found in shops. His parents tried to 
persuade him that this would be too much and that multiplying recipe quantities by two would 
suffice. He could not accept it, even though there was no problem with mathematical skills 
and he refused to make the biscuits at home with any other quantity. A whole intervention 
session focused on this problem without success.  
DISCUSSION 
All three methods of awareness assessment showed good feasibility. Apart for one child who 
presented complete anosognosia on all awareness measures (YR), children showed relatively 
preserved basic intellectual awareness but more difficulty in the higher order intellectual 
awareness and on-line awareness. Observation of the cooking activity on the CCT allowed an 
interesting insight into the children’s awareness and especially error detection.  
MEASURING METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE/ INTELLECTUAL 
AWARENESS 
Many ways of assessing awareness in adults have been described in the literature (see 
Ownsworth and Clare 116 for a review). Intellectual awareness is commonly assessed through 
discrepancy scores between the patient and a significant other’s rating on a questionnaire (e.g. 
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Dysexecutive questionnaire237, Patient Competency Rating Scale238,239, Awareness 
questionnaire240). Self-report versus test performance is another way of assessing intellectual 
awareness. Our approach was a discrepancy score approach but was close to the self-report 
versus test performance approach, as the therapist was the informant, and most items 
judgments were based on children’s actual behavior and performance throughout the sessions. 
The questionnaire was easily understood by all children and, as the informant was the 
therapist (taking into account interviews of parents and school staff), we probably managed to 
have a more objective informant report than when parents answer questionnaires alone. 
However, the questionnaire was long and items related to the content of the intervention 
(Context-sensitive Goal Management Training200), that focused on improving executive 
functions and prospective memory. This questionnaire would need to be shortened and 
simplified further if applied to cognitive rehabilitation outside GMT training context.  
Crosson’s levels of intellectual awareness proved useful in explaining PB’s dissociated 
intellectual awareness: excellent awareness of impairments on the questionnaire (lower level 
of intellectual awareness) but difficulty in recognizing common threads between activities she 
is impaired in (on the GMT stories) and total unawareness of the consequences of these 
impairments (highest level of intellectual awareness) when these were discussed during 
training sessions. The difference between the two levels of intellectual awareness described 
by Crosson: (1) knowledge of impairment and (2) implications of impairment is probably a 
key issue in research with children. PB could state her impairments well, but did not see the 
implications of them - and thus did not acknowledge the need to compensate for them. 
The GMT stories offered the advantage of presenting to the child both impairment and its 
consequences in an accessible story, with a visual support that lowers working memory and 
language demands. Through these stories of daily living, we hoped the child would 
understand the cognitive failure and its consequences and use it to recognize how cognitive 
failures may impact on home, school and leisure activities. Children found the stories fun and 
understood them easily, as opposed to more general questions that have been used to assess 
intellectual awareness in children 224,228. However, this approach for assessment of awareness 
requires intact theory of mind (ToM) skills. First level ToM is needed to adequately 
understand how the character thinks and feels in relation to the situation. Second level ToM is 
needed to understand what the character thinks the surrounding characters are thinking (e.g. a 
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story where a boy forgets the ball he was supposed to take to a football match with his 
friends, who become angry with him). Unfortunately we did not assess ToM in participants, 
nor did we ask control questions to check if the children had sufficient ToM ability to fully 
understand how the character is feeling. As children who sustain a TBI can suffer impaired 
ToM 11,241, such an assessment should control for ToM. A way to control for ToM would be 
to ask the child how the character is feeling instead of including this information in the text of 
the story. For example, CS, who was described in her medical reports as having poor ToM, 
had difficulty understanding the stories. She could not give personal examples of similar 
events, and struggled to understand how the reaction of characters in the story related to 
cognitive failures. She also did not appear to be aware of the consequences of the cognitive 
slips. However, she often answered that “yes that story could have happened to me”, relying 
on her knowledge that she often does things wrong and she simply “guessed” what she was 
expected to say. Therefore her story score seemed unrealistically good and therefore 
unreliable, probably because of her reasoning and ToM impairment. ToM has shown to be 
correlated to self-awareness 242 in adults and must be assessed if stories are used to assess 
metacognition. On the other hand, some authors proposed that metacognition and awareness 
reflect ToM about one’s own thoughts 243244, and that both rely on the same cognitive ability 
and common brain structures245. Another problem with using stories to assess awareness is 
that the measures can be biased by children’s incapacity to generalize the situations presented 
to other similar situations where the same cognitive failure can occur.  
ON-LINE AWARENESS 
MEASURING ON-LINE AWARENESS 
On-line awareness is difficult to assess. In the literature several approaches have been 
described: (1) think aloud protocols (the child is told to say aloud everything he/she is 
thinking 246; (2) video analysis of performance where the examiner looks for signs of error 
detection (verbalization, non word exclamation such as “oops!”, facial expressions, head-
shaking, manual gestures) in the patients behavior247; (3) forced on-task verbalization of error 
detection (e.g: patient instructed to say “hit” whenever he/she notices that he/she made an 
error)214; (4) event-related potential examination during task 248. Think aloud and forced on 
task-verbalizations are problematic in that they inevitably become a dual task paradigm and/or 
a prospective memory task: They require additional attention allocation to the task of showing 
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the examiner an error has been detected. Furthermore in both these approaches, as the patient 
is informed of being assessed/watched on his/her error detection skills, s/he is likely to focus 
on error detection rather than the task itself, and as a consequence provides an unecological 
(and thus inaccurate) measure of error detection capacity in daily tasks. Conversely, 
behavioral signs of error detection probably underestimate error detection, as very early 
detected errors and errors with little consequences are unlikely to be expressed by overt 
behavior, especially if the patient wants to appear successful. Event-related potential offers an 
alternative way of assessing error detection232. Following an error, an error-related negativity 
is registered, that has been argued to correspond to the unconscious (implicit) error detection, 
whereas conscious errors are followed by a positive deflexion 232. This post-error positivity is 
reliably associated with decreased on-line awareness of deficits 249 and was proposed as an 
electrophysiological indicator of on-line awareness in adults. Event-related potential studies 
suggest that a child may have no experience of making an error, either because s/he truly does 
not detect errors, or because implicitly detected errors are not brought to consciousness. From 
a rehabilitation point of view, it has consequences as to where to focus intervention: it seems 
illogical to try and make children consciously aware of errors they haven’t detected 
“electrophysiologically”, at a basic, unconscious level. From a developmental point of view, it 
is interesting to note that the error-related negativity that follows all errors (conscious or not) 
has been shown to increase with age, whereas the subsequent positive deflexion (present only 
for conscious errors) – marker of on-line awareness –, is stable with age. Although 
theoretically promising, event-related potentials are impractical to use during rehabilitation 
sessions and will probably remain a research tool rather than being used routinely for clinical 
purposes. 
TRULY “ON LINE” VERSUS “OFF-LINE” AWARENESS: PREDICTION AND 
EVALUATION OF TASK PERFORMANCE 
In our study we tried to find a way of assessing on-line awareness, without disrupting the 
ongoing task. Our measure of on-line awareness (responses to the broad question “Was the 
task difficult for you?” and post-task error recollection) had the drawback of requiring 
preserved memory of performance, as children were asked the question only after the task. It 
relied on post-task evaluation, rather than “truly on-line” error detection and was therefore 
rather a measure of “off-line” awareness. The term “off-line “ metacognition/awareness has 
104 
 
been proposed by Desoete 54 in her study of metacognition in math problem-solving. Off-line 
metacognition includes both prediction (of difficulty, of time required to complete the task) 
and post-task evaluation of performance. Emergent/on-line awareness can be considered to 
comprise truly ”on-line” awareness (error detection, monitoring of performance during the 
task) and off-line awareness (immediately before and after a task). Off-line is included in on-
line awareness because it is activated within the context of a specific situation or task and 
involves judgments about one’s abilities and limitations in relation to the current situation. 
Furthermore a complex task such as cooking is a series of subtasks and therefore predictions, 
error detection and monitoring and evaluation are continuously needed throughout the task: as 
such off-line awareness is needed throughout the task.  
PREDICTION OF PERFORMANCE AND ANTICIPATORY AWARENESS 
The exact distinction between prediction of performance and anticipatory awareness is 
unclear in the literature and therefore the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Our 
view is that prediction of performance is a skill, which can be prompted and is cognitive in 
essence. Anticipatory awareness is the behaviour that results from spontaneous, correct 
prediction of task difficulty and of self-capacity to deal with the task. Anticipatory awareness 
is very difficult to capture in an assessment because it is a behaviour rather than a measurable 
cognitive function. Anticipatory awareness is expressed when the potential for a problematic 
situation/task arises in daily life. All attempts to capture anticipatory awareness in an office-
based interview or assessment are unecological, because asking the patients how they 
perceive their ability in a hypothetical situation provides a prompt for awareness and assesses 
intention of behaviour. It does not reflect actual behaviour in such a situation, in daily life, 
and in the patient’s usual environment. Most assessments termed “anticipatory awareness” 
assessments are really “off-line” prediction awareness measures (e.g.: asking the patients : 
“how do you think your performance on the task might affect your ability to live 
independently, work and have fun?” 212; or predicting memory span214).  
In our study, none of the three measures of awareness served to assess prediction or 
anticipatory awareness. However qualitative observation of children’s behaviour gave some 
insight into their anticipatory awareness, especially on their second attempt on the CCT. For 
example PB, who had only very basic intellectual awareness, could predict she might forget 
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baking powder again and thus concentrated on adding the baking powder on the subsequent 
CCT attempt. 
Anticipatory awareness probably has different levels as suggested by PB: she could anticipate 
she would forget the baking-powder (lower level of anticipatory awareness, in this case 
“baking powder-specific”), but could not generalise this anticipatory awareness to other 
ingredients she might forget (higher level of anticipatory awareness, “ingredient-specific”), or 
to the anticipation that she may forget not only ingredients but whole recipe steps, switching 
on the oven (highest level of anticipatory awareness), or even more broadly that she is very 
disorganised irrespective of the type of task (generalised anticipatory awareness , in other 
activities such as cooking in general, do-it-yourself, homework…).  
DETECTING ERRORS ON-LINE AND ERRORLESS LEARNING 
Another issue for our measure was the help given to children on the tasks. For unfamiliar 
tasks such as cooking, the considerable help provided by the trainer probably seemed natural 
to children and – with the help received – the task might be perceived as “easy”. On-line 
awareness can probably be experienced only if a patient is allowed to struggle on task, which 
was not the case during the intervention, as our first aim was to train children in novel 
complex task management, and only secondly to assess awareness. This issue is particularly 
important as some authors advocate errorless learning for patients with dysexecutive 
syndromes230. Classically, errorless learning has been used in patients with memory deficits: 
Errorless learning is based on the assumption that explicit memory for errors is impaired, 
whereas implicit memory is not, meaning that errors are primed, and so are more likely to be 
repeated. In errorless learning instructions, the aim is to try to prevent patients from making 
errors during the learning process. However it has also been proposed to use errorless learning 
in patients with a dysexecutive syndrome without memory deficits. In those patients, errorless 
learning is based on the assumption that the error-monitoring system is defective 250251, 
whereas implicit memory is not, yielding a memorisation of the undetected error. In errorless 
learning patients are not given the opportunity to detect their errors because errors are 
prevented by the therapist. It is possible therefore that this could impair the development of 
on-line awareness by ensuring success on tasks at all times and offering no opportunity for the 
error-monitoring system to be trained/used. Therefore error-based learning has been proposed 
to improve self regulation in adults with ABI252. Error-based learning may be useful in 
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helping children to develop their on-line awareness through error detection, but this must be 
considered carefully and evaluated for children with severe episodic memory impairments, 
who may not remember the error they detected and therefore may profit more of an errorless 
learning approach. It would be interesting to include an assessment of awareness (and 
especially on-line awareness) in trials comparing errorless and error-based learning.  
STEPS REQUIRED FOR CORRECT POST-TASK EVALUATION 
Post-task evaluation was influenced by different factors in our study, and not only error 
detection ability. Qualitative analysis of on-line awareness measures, based on the 
performance of the five children on the ecological training activities and on the Children’s 
Cooking Task lead us to propose a series of steps necessary for adequate post-task evaluation, 
(where error detection is only the first step). Figure 4.3 presents examples of children’s (real 
or hypothetical) verbalisation for each step, corresponding to a situation where the child is 
aware. In our view, a child must go through all the steps to truly experience the difficulty of 
having trouble with a task (i.e. on-line awareness). We suggest that to understand a child’s on-
line awareness deficit in rehabilitation, each required step should be assessed separately (see 
bottom line questions in figure 4.3). 
The consecutive steps are: (1) Errors must be detected and brought to consciousness (see 
previous section on measuring on-line awareness); (2) Even if the error has been consciously 
detected on-tasks, a child may have no memory of having performed poorly on the task 
because of episodic memory impairment (she/he does not encode performance on the task in 
episodic memory or does not encode it as an error or cannot access the memory). Even if an 
error is detected and remembered after the task, children may (3) not appraise the 
consequences/implications of the errors and therefore not interpret them as errors (errors with 
little consequences, or unknown consequences or corrected errors not being considered as 
errors) resulting in a very positive self-evaluation of performance; (4) neglect the main goal of 
the task. These last two factors are probably extremely important in children, as they tend to 
focus on things that went right or that were fun, rather than on errors which are thought of as 
minor details. All children had so much fun trying to make a chocolate cake in the CCT, that 
even totally failed cakes were given a positive appreciation by the child who made them: IP 
did not know that not mixing the liquid and the flour would result in an inedible cake. He 
could not make a connection between the cake consistency and his omission of mixing the 
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ingredients (erroneous appraisal of consequences of the error). YR was pleased with his 
‘baking-powder omelette’, although he acknowledged he was supposed to follow the recipe 
steps to make a chocolate cake (neglect of main goal); (5) For some children, in spite of 
adequate recognition of within-task errors, there is an inability to relate these apparently 
unique errors to previous similar experiences, nor to anticipate potential future situations 
where the same problems are likely to occur, impeding the child to generalize his/her on-line 
experience.  
It is worth noting that a child’s evaluation of his/her performance may be biased by some 
form of denial (i.e. the child detects, remembers, correctly appraises the consequences and 
places them in the context of the task goal but denies the error occurred, has consequences). 
Pure denial is rare in children83 but is often the explanation for behaviour that might in fact be 
caused by awareness deficits 83. In Beardmore et al. Study 81, emotionally-motivated or 
defensive denial (operationalised as a negative/avoidant coping style) was not supported as a 
contributor to the child’s poor metacognitve knowledge.  
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Figure 4.3: On-line awareness steps required to arrive at an adequate post-task evaluation 
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THEORY OF AUTOBIOGRAPICAL METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUISITION BASED ON ON-LINE EXPERIENCES 
We hypothesize that metacognitive knowledge is constructed from on-line awareness 
experiences, that will progressively allow the child to construct a sense of his/her own 
cognitive abilities, through the construction of semantic and autobiographical memories of 
task performance and difficulties. In the same way that children’s development of 
autobiographical memory 253 is related to the understanding of their own mental states in the 
past 254,255, we postulate that self-awareness is related to the memory and understanding of on-
line awareness experiences in the past.  
Let’s first take the simpler case of an adult. Dirette 117 suggests that awareness of cognitive 
deficits develops through “aha” moments, particularly in functional activities (e.g. being 
aware that one cannot drive from the actual experience of driving, rather than having been 
told you cannot drive) and familiar places (cooking at home rather than in the rehabilitation 
centre). When an adult is told that s/he is not able to drive, s/ he may gain some general self-
knowledge about his/her driving capacity, however this will remain a very theoretical 
knowledge, which we will call “semantic” metacognitive knowledge (MK). To be truly aware 
of his/her driving difficulty, s/he needs his/her own experience of performing poorly in 
driving, with preserved on-line awareness of making errors to support self-appraisal of 
driving capacity. If on-line awareness is intact, it is the actual experience of being conscious 
of driving dangerously that will allow him/her to truly internalise knowledge of his/her 
driving abilities, make it his/her own, store the “trying to drive” episode in his/her 
autobiographical memory and acquire MK that has “autobiographical” characteristics, 
including the phenomenological details accompanying the experience of having difficulty on 
the task (e.g. feeling anxious, hearing the horns). 
Young children acquire most MK from adult reminders and feedback (“put it in your 
schoolbag or you’ll forget it”, “you’re very disorganised”). Eventually a child who has been 
told for years that s/he is disorganized (like PB in our study), will acknowledge s/he is, 
gaining some basic semantic intellectual awareness (or semantic MK), by storing the 
information “I am very disorganised” in his/her semantic memory. However this semantic 
MK will remain a fact, without a link to an episodic sense of self.  
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From a developmental point of view, semantic MK precedes on-line awareness 52. With age, 
children become increasingly conscious of cognitive capacities, strategies for processing 
information, and task variables that influence performance 256 and have more attentional 
resources to devote to on-line monitoring/error detection. As on-line monitoring skill becomes 
more efficient, children’s on-line awareness increases and allows them to be aware of having 
difficulty with a certain task (following the steps described in the previous section). 
Progressively, memories of correctly appraised performance are stored in memory resulting in 
increased MK, that does not rely solely on what the child knows because s/he has been told by 
his/her parents (basic semantic MK) but on his/her own experience, with all the 
phenomenological details accompanying this experience (e.g. feeling anxious when realising 
school bag is missing, smelling the burnt cake). Therefore the memories of these correctly 
appraised experiences, which the child will truly remember, will allow full awareness 
(comprising both semantic and autobiographical components) and will hopefully be retrieved 
and used to anticipate future problems (anticipatory awareness) in similar situations (see 
figure 4.4). However, because autobiographical memory matures gradually throughout 
childhood 253, a unique experience of failure will probably not be stored or retrieved as clearly 
as in adults. Children may recall for example that they enjoyed cooking, and what they 
managed well, rather than remembering their difficulties in planning on-task and the 
strategies they used to overcome difficulties. 
Conversely, for younger children, most MK will be gained from external information and 
their MK will essentially rely on the “semantic” awareness (see fig 4.4). In our view 
autobiographical MK/intellectual awareness develops gradually, along with the development 
of autobiographical memories, and young children should not be expected to have complete 
intellectual awareness. However it is worth noting that younger children may still exhibit 
anticipatory awareness, based on their semantic MK: They may not have lived the experience 
of being impaired (or developmentally immature) on a task, but may rely on what their 
parents taught them (“don’t cross the street on your own”) and on their semantic general 
memory (e.g.: children don’t drive cars).  
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Figure 4.4: Autobiographical awareness mediated by on-line experience model. We 
hypothesise that the relative importance of different inputs varies with developmental age 
 
 
Our theory could explain the dissociation in the MK scores in the discrepancy questionnaire 
score and GMT stories. The questionnaire assessed basic knowledge of functioning, which 
can be qualified as the “semantic” MK/ intellectual awareness about self and was probably 
mainly acquired by repetitive comments of adults (parents, teachers…). Stories on the other 
hand, especially when they elicited pertinent examples of personal cognitive failures in the 
autobiographical memory, relied more on autobiographic MK/ intellectual awareness, by 
cueing the children on consequences of the cognitive failures and phenomenological details 
developed in the story (how the character felt, what were the circumstances… ).  
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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POOR AWARNESS IN CHILDREN 
It is often said that ‘It takes a whole life to know oneself’, reflecting that even for adults, 
being fully aware of one’s strengths and weaknesses is challenging. Children with brain injury 
might have specific deficits that impact on their functioning, but these are set in the context of 
(1) having cognitive functions that are constantly developing, (2) being supported by parents, 
teachers and others to carry out new tasks (so not necessarily having the experience of 
difficulties) and (3) having limited attentional/executive resources that make monitoring and 
reflecting on performance difficult 256. Thus it might be said that being self-aware is a 
challenge for everybody, but for children it is particularly difficult and hence for children with 
brain injury it is major problem 81. 
In our study, children’s awareness was influenced by many factors. For the youngest (IP), a 
lack of knowledge about his impairments due to a lack of confrontation probably explained 
much of his unawareness. Reassurance and help from parents assured success on tasks but 
also contributed to his lack of awareness. However, IP’s emotional responses to failures, 
suggest that such a non-confrontational reassurance may not be appropriate, even for children 
as young as 8. Another factor is the type of activities children are confronted with: for most 
children, it appeared obvious that they would be given help if they attempted to cook a cake 
and therefore judged the task easy, because adult help was inherent to the task at their age. 
For YR, part of his unawareness was probably due to a denial of his impairment or at least a 
wish to hide any difficulty. 
Awareness is probably easier to gain for some cognitive functions than others, and from our 
data, cognitive flexibility seemed to be the most difficult cognitive function to gain awareness 
of. This was illustrated by RK who showed excellent awareness on all measures, who 
frequently talked about his memory and planning difficulties, but who could not acknowledge 
his cognitive rigidity. Questionnaires and stories did not include aspects of cognitive 
flexibility and it would be a valuable addition for further development of awareness 
assessments in both children and adults. For example, it would be interesting to see whether 
RK would react to a story where a character shows a difficulty with cognitive flexibility (such 
as RK’s own relating to quantity of cooking ingredients). However being aware of one’s own 
cognitive rigidity and detecting it on task is, in itself, something that requires cognitive 
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flexibility; therefore awareness of cognitive flexibility deficit is probably, by definition, 
incompatible with such a deficit.  
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is not possible to determine from our data if the children had more impaired awareness than 
healthy children, as we did not include healthy controls with whom to compare awareness 
scores. Developmental studies are needed to explore awareness in healthy children, without 
which literature lacks a reference to normative standards and degree of awareness impairment 
in our clients who suffered a TBI cannot be precisely determined.  
Awareness is multicomponential, and different components have different importance 
depending on the child’s age (e.g. autobiographic awareness is not expected before late 
childhood/adolescence). Each component should be assessed separately to truly understand 
where the child’s foundation of unawareness deficit lies.  
Figure 4.5 summarises the awareness components that are easily measurable separately. Real 
cooking seems a feasible, fun and ecologically valid way for studying on-line awareness 
(please refer also to figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.5: Proposed framework for awareness assessment 
 
Prediction and evaluation are important to assess but also to practice and should be included 
during activities at school and at home (refer to Ylvisaker 83 for details). For intellectual 
awareness, stories seem a particularly well-suited assessment because (1) children find them 
fun; (2) children understand them easily; (3) drawings lower working memory demands; (4) 
consequences and factors contributing to cognitive failures can be included in the story and 
elicit awareness of them. The story format however does not appear to be appropriate for 
children with severe reasoning or ToM deficits. Brain storming about personal examples of 
cognitive failures elicited by stories (or by another support including questionnaires) allows 
one to determine whether children rely on semantic awareness, autobiographical awareness or 
both for their responses. The remember/know paradigm and explicit requirement to provide 
phenomenological details can be used to differentiate between autobiographical and semantic 
awareness (see 253,257 for details about the paradigm referring to autobiographical memory). 
Assessing anticipatory awareness remains a challenge but is most likely to be valid during 
ecological activities at home, school or during rehabilitation activities using real life settings 
115 
 
and activities such as cooking, without prompting and without explicit knowledge of the child 
of being assessed.  
So far metacognition in children has been mostly explored in meta-memory research. As EF 
are the main problem for independent daily living, “meta-EF” studies (and especially “meta-
EF” in ecological settings) are urgently required before engaging children and teams in 
clinical and research programmes of metacognitive strategy training that rely on awareness, 
which may be recommended for adults but whose appropriateness for different stages in 
childhood are not yet established.  
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EF IN CHILDREN 
There is general agreement that there are three core executive functions (EF) 25,26: inhibition 
[inhibitory control, including self-control (behavioural inhibition) and interference control 
(selective attention and cognitive inhibition)], working memory (WM), and cognitive 
flexibility (also called set shifting, mental flexibility, or mental set shifting and closely linked 
to creativity). Working memory supports inhibitory control (you must hold your goal in mind 
to know what is relevant or appropriate and what to inhibit) but inhibitory control in turn 
supports working memory (by helping to keep our mental workspace from becoming too 
cluttered by suppressing irrelevant information from WM limited-capacity workspace. From 
these, higher-order EFs are built such as reasoning, problem solving, and planning 35. This 
model of EF in child development is summarised in the figure Intro.1 (see introduction 
chapter) 24. 
DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES IN SUPPORTING 
EF FOR CHILDREN 
It is essential that interventions are developmentally coherent. This is of prime importance 
when considering executive functioning. It is known that full myelination of the frontal lobes 
is not reached by 20 years of age 258 and corresponding executive function skills are still 
maturing in late adolescence and early adulthood 259. As such adult interventions for EF are 
unlikely to be beneficial to children, particularly if they require cognitive functions that would 
not be expected to have developed yet such as metacognition and self-awareness 260. Strategy 
use develops throughout childhood and as a result specific strategies that are effective for 
adults may not help children 261,261. 
Ideally, EF interventions should be implemented after core skills that may serve as 
prerequisites to EFs have sufficiently recovered, are supported as well as they can be or have 
naturally matured. The paediatric neurocognitive interventions (PNI) model is potentially 
useful as a framework for deciding priorities for intervention 262. In addition, a 
multidisciplinary approach is essential for children with moderate to severe impairment of EF 
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to ensure that interventions are appropriately considered within the context of the range of 
physical, cognitive and behavioural needs of the individual 263. 
Some core principles in relation to executive function interventions are emerging. For 
example, EF must be continually challenged, i.e. increasing difficulty level as soon as 
attainment is reached, to see improvement 264,265. Interventions may need to be long and 
intensive and this may be a major factor that impedes EF interventions in the literature so far. 
Increasing intensity and frequency is likely to require support in everyday settings, and 
Ylvisaker proposed that “targeting EF goals throughout the day in the context of everyday 
activities and routines is better than targeting these goals in highly specialized therapy or 
instructional periods.”266 (p243). 
Ideally, parents would be involved as often as possible 267–269 as they are the most present 
“cognitive coaches”, although involving families may be difficult, especially if parents 
themselves lack metacognitive skills 200. Working on parent interactions with their child 
before EF, is perhaps in some cases the first necessary step. Interestingly, parenting 
programmes such as “I-Interact” 270 have shown more effectiveness for low-income families, 
who may need support in optimising parent-child interactions.  
CURRENT PRACTICES IN EF INTERVENTIONS 
FOR CHILDREN 
Many strategies have been proposed to help children with executive dysfunction, and useful 
manuals of EF interventions have been proposed 271–275 however most of them have never 
undergone rigorous evaluation and do not necessarily acknowledge the importance of the 
child’s age and stage of development.  
There is a lack of validated methods for EF rehabilitation in children outside WM 110–113,276. 
For most approaches there is the difficulty of a lack of generalisation and transfer to everyday 
contexts 277. In current clinical practice, four key approaches are used to help children with 
their EF difficulties, though each has its limitations: 
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(1) Providing environmental support and compensatory aids (e.g. use of electronic prompting 
devices 278,279– though only a restricted number of situations lend themselves to such an 
approach;  
(2) Training component EF skills (i.e. working memory, inhibitory control, cognitive 
flexibility). -Use of easily commercialized games (e.g.: Jenga ©, Highlights ©) that target EF 
269 or computerized trainings are a way for training component EF skills 106,280,105,281. There is 
some evidence in the literature to support the use of external delays to inhibit a prepotent 
response, an approach commonly seen in ADHD intervention manuals 282, which has been 
shown to be effective in typically developing children as young as 3 years 283. In addition, 
there is an emerging evidence-base to support cognitive flexibility training through cognitive 
remediation therapy for adolescents with anorexia nervosa 284. If it is possible to train 
component skills in children with a brain injury, transfer and generalisation to other functional 
daily life situations would need to be demonstrated and the importance of integrating these 
components into a holistic programme considered.  
(3) Training children on specific goals (e.g. preparing their schoolbag). For children with 
severe EF deficits, who often have a range of associated difficulties (and who are often 
excluded from trials) it has been proposed that such goal-focused rehabilitation, aiming at 
improving specific tasks (rather than improving global EF) may be a reasonable option 200. 
(4) Providing children with metacognitive strategies applicable to a variety of everyday 
situations. Whilst this is effective in some adults after TBI 114,285, there is little evidence that 
metacognitive training is effective for children with a dysexecutive syndrome post TBI 
81,200,286 , although research on children with other primary difficulties following brain injury 
suggests it may be a useful approach for some 108,287. Strategies are usually defined as 
deliberate, goal-directed mental operations that are aimed at solving a problem 288. Although 
younger children may not produce a strategy spontaneously, they can be trained to use a 
strategy and enhance their performance as a result 288. By definition strategies are effortful to 
use and children who use a strategy (especially a new one) may not have enough mental 
resources 288 and especially WM space left to devote to solving the problem at hand and, as a 
result, the strategy may not improve their performance. This phenomenon is however short-
lived in typically developing children. It is still not clear if this is also the case for children 
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whose EF and metacognitive abilities have been compromised by a TBI and if metacognitive 
training can be an effective approach for them. In Krasny-Pacini et al. study 200, children were 
happy to try the metacognitive strategies on paper-and-pencil tasks but showed no consistent 
application of strategies in the meaningful, more complex concrete activities (e.g.: cooking, 
route finding). The same finding has been reported in the study by 286: making the 
intervention fun was identified as being useful, whereas the “Goal-Plan-Do- Check” strategy 
and promotion of good strategy use were not. Contrary to adults, Metacognitive Strategy use 
may not be the best rehabilitation approach for young or severely dysexecutive children. For 
children who may benefit from strategies, they need to be simple, concrete, and repeatedly 
practiced in order to be successful, unlike adults (with mild EF dysfunction) for whom 
providing the strategy may be sufficient.  
PROMISING APPROACHES  
Although evidence for effective EF interventions is scarce, a number of promising approaches 
have been published that emphasize (1) the necessity of a context-sensitive approach (with an 
important body of work by Marc Ylvisaker, Timothy Feeney and collaborators; (2) the 
necessity of prolonged interventions to show benefit; (3) the importance of involving 
children’s “everyday people” (e.g., teachers, parents, school assistants) for obtaining an 
intervention effect; (4) the necessity of practicing EF on ecological, meaningful tasks rather 
than office-based generic exercises.  
Promising interventions using self-regulatory or metacognitive approaches focusing on 
functional task performance have been published as pilot studies in children with ABI : (1) 
“Goal-Plan-Do-Review”289–291, contextualized within the routines of everyday life 292–294; (2) 
“Goal Plan Do Check” 286 used in Cognitive Orientation to Daily Occupational Therapy-CO-
OP 295; (3) “Stop, State your Goal, Split Task into subtasks, Do it, Check” 200 adapted from 
Goal Management Training 98; (4)”Nature Planning Representing Monitoring”287. Feeney and 
Ylvisaker’s approaches offer the most robust and positive findings, using well-designed 
single-case experimental designs and replication studies.  
In Feeney and Ylvisaker’s “Context-sensitive support”, the intervention was delivered by 
school staff under the supervision of a consultant. The students were given a graphic “map” 
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that represented the general sequence of activities from an executive function perspective: 
Goal (i.e., “What are you trying to accomplish?”); Identification of difficulty level (i.e., “Is 
this going to be hard or easy?”); Plan: (i.e., “How do you plan to get this done? What do you 
need? What are the steps? How long will this take?); and Review (i.e., “What were you trying 
to accomplish? How did it work out? What worked for you? What didn’t work? What was 
easy? Difficult?”). 
Case studies have also been published using similar approaches: Glang et al. 296 reported 
generalization to school functioning of an educational approach, “Direct Instruction”, that 
utilizes task analysis, modelling and shaping. Suzman et al. reported positive gains after a 
self-instruction and metacognitive strategy multi-component package 297. 
Ylvisaker’s work remains a primary resource for clinicians 294 and much of the research 
described above is based on these fundamental concepts. For Ylvisaker, “the goals of 
environmental EF interventions are to help children (1) know what they are good at and what 
is difficult for them; (2) know that there are special things that can be done when tasks are 
difficult; (3) make plans for getting things done: (4) pay attention to how well they are doing; 
(5) try a new approach if they are not successful. […] The overriding goal for a rehabilitation 
program is to create a culture within which there is developmentally appropriate focus on EF 
throughout the day”266 (p 242). The goal of EF intervention is to improve executive behaviour 
in everyday life. Any activity can be used to promote EF including the following aspects: (1) 
choice of goal; (2) a decision about how easy or difficult it will be to accomplish the goal; (3) 
Development of a plan; (4) Coaching in problem solving and strategic thinking as issues arise; 
(5) a quick review of the goal, the plan, and accomplishment at the end; (6) a summary of 
what worked and what didn’t work, of what was easy and what was difficult. Initially 
children’s participation may be minimal and adults may need to model, conversationally, 
most or all components of the routine. 
PROBLEM-SOLVING INTERVENTIONS IN 
CHILDREN WITH ABI 
The work of Shari Wade and colleagues 270,298–300 using development of web-based problem-
solving interventions suggests that different interventions supporting EF may be required at 
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different ages. Following a pilot study in 2005 using a family problem-solving intervention301, 
they further divided their interventions into a parenting programme (I-interact, 270 for children 
aged 3-9 years who were showing behavioural difficulties (i.e. poor self-regulation and 
inhibitory control), and a teen online problem-solving (TOPS) programme which has been 
demonstrated to be effective across a number of studies of adolescents with TBI 299,299,300,302 
as well as an early intervention for adolescents in the form of counsellor-assisted problem-
solving (CAPS, 298,303. These problem-solving interventions involve sessions including EF 
related themes (Implementation, monitoring, and goals; Problem solving) as well as modules 
targeting behavioural issues (Self-management, Staying positive, Verbal and nonverbal 
communication, Controlling behaviour/handling crises…). Supplemental modules are used 
according to family needs (e.g.: Sleep, Pain, Social skills, After high school, Sibling issues). 
Following Ylvisaker’s principles of ecological validity, the program empowers the families as 
well as training some components of EFs.  
EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 
FOR DYSEXECUTIVE CHILDREN IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL PATHOLOGY 
“Unstuck and On Target”304 is an EF intervention used in children with autism spectrum 
disorder without intellectual disability that targets flexibility, big picture thinking and 
planning, delivered at school in 28, 30-40 minutes sessions and integrating trainings for 
teachers and parents, that showed superiority to social skills training on EF and generalization 
to social skills 268 
The positive effects of stimulant medication (e.g. methylphenidate) on inhibitory control are 
reported in children with ADHD 305 as well as for healthy individuals 306. However, evidence 
for efficacy of non-pharmaceutical interventions in ADHD is less robust, although there has 
been limited evidence supporting the use of peer and parent tutoring, strategy training and 
self-monitoring, for students with ADHD 307. There is also some preliminary evidence to 
support the use of executive function coaching for college students with ADHD: this 
approach “provides support for the development of skills, strategies, and beliefs needed to 
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manage executive function challenges. Coaches use specific types of questions that model 
reflective thinking and prompt students’ ability to plan and carry out their goals” 308. 
In younger children, Halperin et al. 309 have assessed the feasibility of an early intervention 
programme training executive, attention and motor skills (TEAMS) for preschool children 
with ADHD. The intervention aims to enhance inhibitory control, working memory, attention, 
visuospatial abilities, planning, and motor skills and initial results indicated significant 
improvements of ADHD symptoms. 
INTERVENTIONS THAT HAVE PROVEN TO BE 
EFFECTIVE FOR CHILDREN’S EF 
DEVELOPMENT OUTSIDE BRAIN CLINICAL 
CONDITIONS 
Contrary to ABI literature where few interventions on EF have been published and most have 
not proven to be effective because of methodological insufficiency, there is more abundant 
literature on interventions promoting EF in mainstream school children. 
Special curricula used at school (e.g.: “Tools of the Mind” 310, “Montessori” 311, “PATHS: 
Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies”312, “Chicago School Readiness Project” 313,314) 
provided by regular but trained and supported teachers have been reported to promote EF 
development in mainstream school children (see 315 and 316 for a review). However, a recent 
review of the literature suggests that although there is a strong correlation between EF 
performance and school success in typically developing children, there is little evidence to 
suggest a causal link 317.  
Physical activity has a body of well-designed literature that shows its effect on cognition 318–
321 and especially EF. Physical activity 319,322,323, cognitively challenging sports that develop 
strategy such as tennis 324, and traditional martial arts 325 are examples of physical activity that 
has shown to improve EF, independently of metabolic related changes. The value of aerobic 
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exercise in improving executive functions, and specifically inhibitory control, is also being 
increasingly reported in children with ADHD 323.  
As concluded by Diamond “Stress, loneliness and not being physically fit impair prefrontal 
cortex function and EFs. The best approaches to improving EFs […] will probably be those 
that (a) engage students’ passionate interests, bringing them joy and pride, (b) address stresses 
in students’ lives, attempting to resolve external causes and strengthen calmer, healthier 
responses, (c) have students vigorously exercise, and (d) give students a sense of belonging 
and social acceptance, in addition to giving students opportunities to repeatedly practice EFs 
at progressively more-advanced levels. The most effective way to improve EFs […] is 
probably not to focus narrowly on these alone, but also address children’s emotional and 
social development and children’s physical development”315. 
CHALLENGES, CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Clinicians working with children need to consider multiple factors, in particular the typical 
development of and/or damage to underlying skills that support executive functioning. In 
addition, it is likely to be important to assess and intervene in relation to core EFs (i.e. 
working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control) before trying to address higher-
order and later maturing skills such as reasoning, planning and problem-solving. Ensuring that 
interventions are age appropriate in terms of typical development (i.e. not rehabilitating a skill 
that is not expected to develop until a later age) is crucial.  
The evidence-base for interventions supporting executive functions is growing and spans a 
diverse range of fields including education, learning disabilities, cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience and developmental psychology. Interventions are recommended in many books 
and with varying degrees of theoretical and research underpinnings. Developing systematic 
approaches such as single-case experimental designs, to evaluate recommended approaches is 
important both for clinical governance and the development of the research field. 
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As described above behavioural approaches and environmental modifications have the most 
robust evidence to support their use in children with neurodevelopmental disorders and ABI. 
However, they require systematic implementation and support and training for staff, parents 
and carers. They can therefore be costly both in terms of time and money, and generalisation 
is not typically anticipated with these approaches. 
From a clinical point of view working with executive function impairments in children is 
extremely challenging and needs to acknowledge the significant burden that these difficulties 
can have on families and schools. Interventions need to ensure that they don’t further stress 
the systems that the child is trying to operate within, and programmes need to make sense and 
appeal to families and schools, so that they can accommodate them within their daily lives.  
An important step forward would also be developing and using outcome measures that truly 
test progress in EF, and transfer and generalisation, e.g. that have good ecological validity and 
allow controlling for test-retest effect, as the whole purpose of EF tests is to prevent lapses 
and promote conscious, novel and effortful processing. Also rather than testing children on 
isolated components of EF, more open-ended and ecological tasks should be used 180. 
Questionnaires should be used in association with performance-based testing to assess 
intervention impact at school and at home: the BRIEF 144 is probably the most useful for EF. 
CONCLUSION 
Many EF intervention manuals/materials for neuropsychologists are commercialized, with 
few demonstrating scientifically validated effectiveness: neuropsychologists should be careful 
and alert parents to expensive, ineffective or unproven interventions. 
There appears to be a need for interventions to be lengthy, repetitive, challenging, and fun. 
Therefore, implementation at school during a whole year (or more) could be the best format. 
Involving teachers and parents is a key component for success, possibly by the increased 
repetition it involves.  
Given the research available so far, it seems unethical to diminish children’s after-school 
leisure (sports, music...) to the profit of adult-type cognitive rehabilitation sessions as the 
former has shown positive effect on EF development and the latter is still at a research stage 
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in children. “Training may even lead to negative effects if the activities it displaces are more 
beneficial than the training itself”264. 
Given the scarce literature on EF rehabilitation in children with ABI, more collaborations 
with specialists of other developmental disabilities (e.g. ADHD, autism) is needed with the 
aim of adapting existing effective EF interventions from these conditions to children with 
ABI rather than adapting adult ABI EF interventions to children. The latter carrying a high 
risk of being developmentally inappropriate, irrelevant or ineffective.  
There is more evidence to encourage collaboration of neuropsychologists with school, 
training of school team and of parents in EF than to engage children in EF intervention 
decontextualized from the school and home environment 277,326. 
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CHAPTER 6: GOAL MANAGEMENT 
TRAINING FOR REHABILITATION OF 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF 
EFFECTIVNESS IN PATIENTS WITH 
ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The inability to be organized and to develop efficient strategies for completing everyday tasks 
is one of the most common and persistent sequelae following acquired brain injury. Such 
difficulties impede patients’ ability to function independently in daily life. They relate to 
executive functioning impairment, arising from damage to the frontal lobes or to circuits that 
include frontal structures 327. The term executive functioning (EF) refers to those integrative 
cognitive processes that support goal-directed and purposeful behavior and that are necessary 
to the orderly execution of daily life activities 328. These integrative functions include the 
ability to formulate goals; to initiate behavior; to anticipate the consequences of actions; to 
plan and organize behavior; to monitor and to adapt behavior to fit a particular task or 
context.  
The challenge for cognitive rehabilitation and particularly for EF interventions is to improve 
the ability to participate in meaningful activities through transfer and generalization. For 
example, if a stepwise strategy was trained in multitasking involving paper-and-pencil 
exercises at the rehabilitation center, it is hoped that the patient will use it in daily life tasks 
such as preparing a meal (generalization) at home (transfer).  
Presently, metacognitive approaches appear to have the best level of evidence in relation to 
improving EF 114,115,113. Metacognition (or ”thinking about your thinking”) includes self-
awareness, self-monitoring and self-control of cognition while performing an activity 113. 
Metacognitive approaches have negligible effect on underlying impairments compared to 
control interventions, but when activities and participation are the primary outcome measures, 
patients receiving metacognitive training improve significantly more than controls 113. 
Rehabilitation teams are therefore eager to administer metacognitive training and face the 
question of how and which form of metacognitive training to use.  
One of the best known and most extensively studied metacognitive approaches is Goal 
Management Training (GMT). GMT is a theoretically derived intervention for executive 
dysfunction intended to promote a mindful approach to completing complex everyday 
activities by raising awareness of attentional lapses and reinstating cognitive control when 
behavior becomes incompatible with intended goals 99. GMT rehabilitation comprises self-
instruction strategies, self-monitoring exercises, cognitive techniques aimed at improving 
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planning, prospective memory and cognitive control, mindfulness practice exercises, stories 
promoting discussion about executive dysfunction in daily life, and homework assignments to 
practice GMT (99 for more detailed description).  
Levine et al. 98 note that GMT was initially based on Duncan’s theory of “goal neglect”93,39,40 
which suggests that much of human behavior is controlled by goal lists and subgoals. 
Dysexecutive patients are impaired in the construction and use of such goal lists, resulting in 
disorganized behavior. Later authors 99 developed this theory further and referred to 
“sustained and vigilant attention theory” 94 as the theoretical model of GMT. Ongoing 
activation of the right frontal-thalamic-parietal sustained attention system is required to 
actively, endogenously maintain higher order goal states in working memory. When the 
sustained attention system is compromised, habits or environmental triggers may oppose and 
displace higher order goals, resulting in cue-dependent or distracted behavior. In GMT, easy-
to-grasp analogies are used to help patients understand these models, such as “checking main 
goal in the mental blackboard” to avoid “automatic pilot behavior” 231.  
GMT was one of the first EF interventions tested in a randomized controlled trial (RCT) 98. 
However, the intervention consisted of a single hour of instructions, which limits the 
translation of its findings in terms of clinical application and effectiveness 329). GMT was then 
developed further, different versions were published, ranging from a single session 98 to a 14-
hour GMT program ready for group rehabilitation in clinical settings 99. Cueing became a key 
feature of GMT to remind patients of their goals 95,97,96 and trigger GMT strategy use 330. 
It is not clear what defines GMT precisely as the GMT theoretical model has evolved and 
many different GMT interventions have been published, each using different outcome 
measures : attention impairment 99, prospective memory performance 97, multitasking ability 
95, daily life activities such as cooking 98. GMT use has even extended to non-brain injured 
patients 331,332,333,334. This makes it more difficult to specify the “active ingredients”335 of 
GMT programs and to summarize on what it is effective and for whom.  
Nevertheless, GMT is manualized 231 and uses detailed PowerPoint slides supporting group 
sessions, workbooks and easy-to-find materials. It is therefore easy to use and easily 
reproducible for clinicians who have little experience in metacognitive training. As such 
rehabilitation teams may want use it to satisfy Cicerone’s practice standard of metacognitive 
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training for EF rehabilitation114. However, there is limited evidence of superior effectiveness 
of GMT compared to other metacognitive training formats 113. Recent literature suggest that 
interventions using GMT combined with other training methods are more effective than 
GMT-alone interventions 336,119,118. Furthermore it remains unclear if interventions using 
GMT aim at improving impairments (like the diminution of attentional lapses as suggested by 
GMT authors 99) or participation. Finally, not much is known about the best dose of treatment 
and for which patients GMT is more effective. 
Kennedy 113 provided a very complete review of metacognitive rehabilitation studies through 
2004, including 2 early GMT papers 9895 but did not conclude as to how and which form of 
metacognitive training to use. Since the period covered by Kennedy’s review, GMT has been 
the subject of ongoing research and it seems timely to review that research to determine 
whether GMT is useful and if so, in what form and for whom. Finally, there is no review to 
our knowledge that focuses on participation and ecological outcome measures as criteria for 
intervention effectiveness. 
The primary aim of this paper was therefore to review the evidence relating to the 
effectiveness of interventions using GMT. The question as to whether GMT improves 
executive function impairments and/or increases participation in everyday activities in 
patients with a dysexecutive syndrome following acquired brain injury was examined. 
Secondary aims were to determine the best treatment dose, best candidates for treatment and 
best delivery format, comparing evidence relating to the effectiveness of GMT delivered 
alone with GMT delivered in combination with other training methods/principles.  
METHODS 
Studies published up to December 2011 were sought from : Ovid MEDLINE, PUBMED, 
PsycINFO, ERIC, PROQUEST by searching the following items: (1) (brain inj* OR head inj* 
OR traumatic head inj * OR traumatic brain inj *OR stroke OR encephalitis) (2) 
(intervention* OR rehabilit* OR train* OR therapy) (3) (executive OR prospective memory 
OR metacognitive OR cognitive) (4) (goal management training OR goal neglect OR problem 
solving).The symbol * denotes database operators, which include truncations or possible extra 
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letters in the term to be included within the search. These four searches were then combined 
using ‘AND’. 
Inclusion criteria were (1) interventions using any version of Goal Management Training 
(GMT), entirely or partly, alone or in combination with another intervention OR Interventions 
acknowledging their link with Duncan’s theoretical model of goal neglect, (2) interventions 
conducted with brain injury patients, irrespective of type of injury or age, (3) group studies 
and single-case experimental design (SCED) studies or single case reports, (4) peer-reviewed 
journals, (5) articles written in English, French or Polish. Exclusion criteria were (1) 
Theoretical articles or description of programs with no specific intervention, (2) feasibility 
studies not including effectiveness data on EF (3) review articles, (4) articles that did not 
include participants with brain lesions.  
Four-hundred-and-twenty-nine papers were obtained from the computerized database 
searches. 359 were excluded on title alone, leaving 70 abstracts. A further 33 were excluded 
based on abstracts, and 18 on reading the intervention content in the full paper, leaving 19 
articles referrring to GMT in their description of the intervention studied. On reading the full 
19 original papers, a further seven were excluded for the following reasons: four papers used 
GMT in non brain injury samples: drug addicts, elderly, healthy adults334332337331. 
McPherson’s feasability study 338 used GMT for goal setting,without including effectiveness 
data on EF. Two studies of metacomponential approach 339 340 for problem-solving in adults341 
and children287 with ABI, referred once to Duncan’s goal neglect model but as a very minor 
part of the program, without sufficient explanantion of its use.Twelve articles published up to 
December 2011 remained for review.  
CLASSIFYING STUDIES: GMT PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE STUDY 
VERSUS GMT REHABILITATION STUDY 
Included studies were classified according to the initial aims of the study:  
-Four “Proof-of-principle studies” aimed at testing the potential effectiveness of a GMT 
principle or model. These studies typically used a single session of the GMT component 
being tested, without extensive training and without examining the long term effects or effects 
on participation in everday activities.  
138 
 
-Eight “Rehabilitation studies” aimed at testing GMT as a full multi-session rehabilitation 
intervention, assessing long-term outcomes, measuring effects on participation in everday 
activities, generalization and potential maintainance of effects.  
METHODOLOGICAL APPRAISAL OF INCLUDED STUDIES 
The criteria for the appraisal of articles were based primarily on the Consolidated Standards 
of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) guidelines 342 but extended, similarly to the methodology of 
Ross’s 110 systematic review on children’s cognitive rehabilitation. Items that are important in 
cognitive rehabilitation were added (e.g.: evidence of generalization of effects to untrained 
tasks, provision of data on brain injury severity, evidence of controlling for intervention 
duration). Furthermore, the nature of outcome measures used in each study was appraised 
with greater weight being given to studies that examined the impact of interventions on novel 
and ecologically relevant tasks.  
The other six CONSORT items were applicable only for group studies (exclusion criteria, 
power calculation, intention-to-treat analysis) whereas the review also included single-case 
studies, describing interesting GMT variations 330. Therefore, the six CONSORT items that 
were not applicable to single-case studies were replaced by items from the Single-Case 
Experimental Design (SCED) rating scale 343 (www.psycbite.com). The SCED scale is used 
for methodological appraisal of papers reporting interventions with single, or small N 
methods 343,344. In SCED, causality is obtained by sufficient sampling at baseline (minimum 3 
baseline assessments prior to intervention) and during intervention (sufficient sampling to 
differentiate a treatment response from fluctuations in behavior that may have occurred at 
baseline) and replication of the findings on another patient.  
As a result, nine questions based on CONSORT and 10 cognitive and EF rehabilitation-
specific questions were applied to all studies (see table 1). Additional questions were applied 
according to study methodology: six SCED-specific questions were applied only to single-
case studies and six additional CONSORT questions were applied only to group studies. 
Finally, each study was assessed on 25 questions, reported in table 1. With this rating method, 
well designed SCEDs could receive good ratings regardless of small number of patients. 
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Table 6.1: Methodological Quality appraisal of papers  
Score 1 if met, 0 if unmet or unable to determine 
CONSORT questions applied to all included studies 
1. Were specific hypotheses and/or 
objectives stated? 
2. Were the settings and locations where 
data was collected stated? 
3. Was there completely defined pre-
specified primary and secondary 
outcome measures? 
4. Were those assessing outcome blind 
to the treatment? 
5. Was the intervention described in 
detail? 
6. Were the characteristics of the patients 
clearly described? 
7. Did the results relate to the initial 
hypotheses? 
8. Was statistical analysis appropriate? 
9. Were data adequately described 
(mean, range)? 
 
Cognitive and EF rehabilitation-specific questions applied to all 
included studies 
1. Did the article specify the severity of brain injury and 
was the method of diagnosis appropriate? 
2. Did the injury occur at least 6 month ago (to ensure that 
effects were not a reflection of the recovery process)?  
3. Was there some kind of control for program intensity (to 
see if effect is specific of therapy or rather due to due to 
general cognitive stimulation)? 
4. Were main outcome measures untrained tasks (ie a 
testing tasks not having the same structure as tasks 
used during training)?  
5. Was generalization evaluated (to see if EF intervention 
effect generalize to other cognitive functions)? 
6. Were outcome measures ecologically valid (i.e. 
ecological tests like “multiple errands” tasks rather than 
improved neuropsychological paper and pencil tests)? 
7. Were effects observed in daily life activities (improved 
participation)? 
8. Did at least one of the EF tasks administered post 
intervention bear a novelty aspect challenging patient’s 
EF in a non routine situation (i.e. not the same task as 
pre-intervention as practice effect may decrease 
pressure on EF)? 
9. Were at least some of the measures standardized 
assessment tools? 
10. Were follow-up data collected at least 3 months after 
intervention (to see if effects were maintained post 
intervention)? 
CONSORT question applied only to group studies 
1. Was a power or sample size justified? 
2. Were the inclusion/exclusion criteria 
clearly stated? 
3. Was there a control or comparison 
group used? 
4. Were patients randomly allocated to 
groups? (1 also for well designed 
pseudo-random allocations) 
5. Were all patients included in the 
analysis? 
6. Was intention-to-treat analysis used if 
randomized (0 for non randomized)? 
Single-case experimental design (SCED) 343 questions applied only to 
single case studies 
1. Was there a clearly defined target behavior that the 
reflected cognitive function the intervention aimed at 
improving? 
2. Were sufficient baseline assessments conducted to 
ensure stability prior to intervention? 
3. Was there sufficient sampling during intervention to 
differentiate a treatment response from fluctuations in 
behavior that may have occurred at baseline?  
4. Was replication performed: (study on 2 patients at 
least)? 
5. Was Inter-rater reliability of the target behavior used in 
baseline and intervention assessed? 
6. Did the design allow examination of cause and effect? 
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Each item was awarded a score of 1 (if the criterion was met) and 0 if not met or if it was not 
possible to determine from information given in the article. Papers that met 75% of the 
methodological criteria were considered ‘high’ quality; those that were rated 50-74% were 
considered ‘moderate’ quality and those achieving less than 50% were ‘lower’ quality. When 
a single study was published in two papers336,345, it was assessed only once, conversely when 
a paper included two distinct studies it was assessed twice 98. Two reviewers rated the final 13 
papers. Individual disagreements were resolved by discussion between the reviewers 
CALCULATION OF EFFECT SIZE (ES) 
ES were calculated as a standard difference between means, using Hedge’s g 346 adapted by 
Morris and Deshon 347. Their approach has been used in important cognitive intervention 
reviews 115110 and was used here as the preferred procedure for ES calculation. Where scores 
were reported as Z-scores, without raw data from pre to post intervention 98336, effect size was 
calculated by subtracting control Z from intervention group Z, assuming pretest standard 
deviation (SD) were used for Z-scores.  
Equation 1 is the formula used for calculating ES in single group pretest-posttest designs: 
ES= (Mpost,exp - Mpre,exp) / SDpre,exp 
Equation 2 is the formula used for calculating ES in independent group pretest-posttest 
designs: 
ES= [(Mpost,exp - Mpre,exp) / SDpre,exp] - [(Mpost,com - Mpre,com) / SDpre,com] 
Where M is the mean, exp is the experimental group, com is the comparaison group, post is 
the posttests, pre is the pretest and SD is the standard deviation. 
ES was interpreted subjectively by Cohen’s rating 208: g<0,20 is a small ES; g = 0,20-0,50 is a 
medium ES; g>0,80 is a large ES.  
RESULTS 
The review included twelve studies. Four studies were “Proof-of-principle” studies, testing 
the potential effectiveness of a GMT principle or model and nine were Rehabilitation studies. 
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One proof-of-principle study 98 tested GMT’s “STOP-STATE your goal-SPLIT goal into 
subtasks-CHECK” cycle. Two proof-of-principle studies 95,96 tested the effect of content-free 
cueing on goal management and one study 97 examined both approaches (content-free cueing 
triggering GMT use in a daily life context). Eight studies were rehabilitation studies: one 
group study 99 and three case studies 98,330,348 tested GMT alone, whereas the other four 
studies 119,118,336,345,349 tested comprehensive EF interventions that relied heavily on GMT but 
that also included other approaches described in the literature for EF rehabilitation, which are 
not addressed by GMT. These include Problem Solving Therapy, Mindfulness practice, 
personal goal training and ecological activities. Table 6.2 gives a description of the 
interventions, of the methodology used and the methodological quality rating. Most samples 
included mixed injuries, mainly traumatic brain injuries, frontal tumors and strokes. Severity 
of injury was reported for most TBI patients and ranged from mild to extremely severe, but 
using different severity classifications. No classification could be used for severity 
classification of other types of ABI.  
Note: due to editing problems, table 6.2 (pages 142 to 144) appears here as published in 
Disability & Rehabilitation Journal. Page numbers and references in brackets correspond 
to those of the paper, not the PhD. For correct references see below: 
Levine et al. 2000 98–study 1  
Manly et al. 2002 95 
Fish et al. 2007 97 
Sweeney et al. 2010 96 
Levine et al. 2000 98–study 2 
Pachalska et al. 2000349 
Miotto et al. 2008 119 
Spikman et al. 2010 118 
Metzler-Baddeley et al. 2010 330 
Levine et al. 2011 99 
Novakovic-Agopian et al. 2011 336 
Chen et al. 2011 345 
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HOW ARE GMT INTERVENTIONS ADMINISTERED? 
Interventions testing GMT component principles were either as short as a single sentence 
before starting the test 95,96 (“you might find these periodic beeps useful in reminding you to 
think about what you are currently doing and your overall aims during the session”) or of 
short durations such as 1 hour98 or 30 min97. 
Interventions testing rehabilitation ranged from 5 hours 98 to 43 hours training 336 and were 
administered between once 99,119 and two-three times a week 336,118. Most studies were 
administered as individual sessions 98,97,330. Apart from three studies 99,119,348, all interventions 
included some individual sessions 345,336 or some adjustment of the program to the personal 
needs of each patient 118. 
Personal between-sessions homework is a key component of GMT rehabilitation and was 
used in most rehabilitation studies using GMT. Patients were instructed to apply at home the 
goal management strategies they had learned during the session 118,99,336,330. Homework 
included monitoring EF failures in daily life called “Slips”99, identifying factors that helped or 
not in everyday goal management performance 118,98, listing occasions on which participants 
used GMT strategies during the week 99, mindfulness practice assisted by an audio CD 345336.  
ARE GMT PRINCIPLES EFFECTIVE? 
The “STOP-STATE your goal-SPLIT task into sub-goals-CHECK” cycle was tested after a 
one-hour training in Levine et al.’s RCT 98. The “everyday tasks” used as outcome measures 
were paper-and-pencil tests: for example, proofreading consisted of underlining, circling and 
crossing out words that met certain criteria (e.g.: circle all numbers). The intervention group 
made less errors in two out of the three “everyday tasks” after intervention, but needed more 
time to finish the tasks. The outcome was examined just one hour after the session, so that 
effectiveness and generalizability to daily life activities of this GMT principle cannot be 
affirmed. Furthermore, patients practiced two of these tasks during the intervention session. 
The Content-free cueing principle has been tested in three studies. In two studies 9596, auditory 
alerts during a complex multi tasking activity reminded patients about their current goal. In 
Manly et al.’s Hotel task 95 patients had to do some of each of five “hotel employee” tasks 
(sorting conference badges, compiling bills, looking up telephone numbers…) as well as a 
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time-related prospective memory task (opening and closing garage door). Sweeney used a 
virtual reality “Removal task” 96 where the patient had to move around a storage unit selecting 
furniture as well as performing prospective memory tasks (visit the front door every five 
minutes, shut a particular door each time, label some furniture as “fragile”). In both studies, 
periodic alerts were introduced to the patients as a possibly useful way to remind them their 
overall goals but there was no training to ensure that patients linked the auditory cue with 
reviewing their goal. Conversely, Fish et al. 97 combined content-free cueing with a 30-
minutes GMT to help patients associate the word “STOP” with reviewing goals. Text 
messages reading “STOP” were sent to participants eight times throughout the day to remind 
them of their prospective memory goal (to make a phone call at a certain time). In all three 
studies the cues were not specific cues to trigger task switch (i.e. changing to another task or 
making the phone call immediately) as cues never occurred at a time when task switch would 
produce an optimal performance. Content-free cueing was effective on reminding patients of 
their goal and increasing task performance in Manly et al. 95, but not in Sweeney et al. 96. Fish 
et al. 97, who combined text alerts with brief GMT found evidence that the intervention was 
effective with a moderate to large ES. Overall, evidence is contradictory (no effect to large 
effect).  
IS GMT REHABILITATION ALONE EFFECTIVE? 
Levine et al. 99 report some positive results after a seven-week GMT training on the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART) test (a go/no go test consisting of withholding of key 
press to one of nine targets) 350. However this test is very close in format to one of the GMT 
training exercises that involves clapping to all targets (fruit) apart from one (pears) and thus 
reflects a near transfer of a learned skill rather than an effect on EF in daily life. There was a 
positive effect of GMT on the “Tower Test” which measures visual spatial planning: disks 
must be placed on dowels to match models of increasing complexity, with « rules » 
constraining the movement of the disk. The GMT group made significantly less rule 
violations on the tower test compared to the control group. However, there was no effect on 
self-rated Dysexecutive (DEX) Questionnaires relating to executive complaints in daily life in 
the GMT group and a statistically significant decrease in performance for the GMT group on 
the Hotel Task immediately after intervention when compared to controls. Proxy-rated DEX 
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questionnaires were not obtained in this study and the authors suggested that stability on the 
DEX may reflect an increase of patients’ insight.  
Two case-studies of low quality 98,348 make it difficult to examine cause-effect of GMT, as 
patients started the GMT rehabilitation five and four and a half month after their brain injury 
(encephalitis and cerebellum hemorrhage) and there was no multiple baseline collected to 
ensure that the results observed were not due to spontaneous recovery.  
WHAT ARE THE INGREDIENTS OF EFFECTIVE COMPREHENSIVE 
EF INTERVENTIONS USING GMT? 
Comprehensive EF interventions appeared to use one or more of the following elements in 
addition to GMT: (1) Problem Solving Therapy; (2) Ecological activities to promote transfer 
(3) Goal Setting; (4) Initiation facilitation. 
Problem-Solving Therapy (PST) was developed by Von Cramon for enabling patients to be 
more effective in breaking down problems, adopting a slowed down, controlled and stepwise 
processing approach in contrast to more impulsive approaches. The therapy was effective in 
office-set problem solving but there was no evidence on generalization to everyday 
functioning 351,352. Nevertheless, PST principles are easy to integrate to the GMT “STOP-
STATE the goal-SPLIT into subgoals cycle”. Before planning steps, patients are instructed to 
engage in the problem solving process of brainstorming for potential other solutions or means 
to achieve a current goal. PST was used in three studies 119,353,336,345 with good results. 
Ecological and daily life activities using GMT to promote transfer 
The necessity to include ecological and meaningful activities when training EF has been 
outlined and tested by many authors 266,354,355,356. In the articles reviewed, cooking activities 
were used by Levine 98 and Pachalska 349 as cooking is a complex, open-ended, ill-structured 
multi-tasking activity requiring EF performance 247,357,358. Levine’s patient reported less 
difficulties in cooking and examiners observed less problematic behavior during meal 
preparation but generalization to other tasks was not reliably assessed. Other ecological 
activities included bringing refreshments for the rest of the group following a budget and 
practicing stepwise goal management strategies to functional tasks of their choice 336,345. 
GMT principles 98,95 were combined ecologically and applied with success in a rehabilitation 
148 
 
case-study by Metzler- Baddley 330: a female with a craniopharyngioma was trained to use 
naturally occurring distractions at work (instead of the auditory alerts she was first trained on) 
as triggers to use GMT and refocus on present goal through the GMT “STOP-STATE-
SPLIT” cycle. The patient successfully returned to work using this technique. Similarly in 
Pachalska’s study 349, applying the learned strategies to one’s own professional activity was 
the final stage of a holistic program involving GMT.  
Goal-setting is a well known approach to increasing goal achievement in rehabilitation and 
other settings 359. Although causality cannot be determined, in the interventions showing the 
best results on participation assessment tools, participants were asked to choose personal 
goals to be achieved by the end of the intervention. Patients were trained to set goals 
realistically by practicing short-term goal setting in individual projects 118,98 (planning a meal, 
learning to use an organizer) and group projects 345,336. In Spikman’s study 118, control patients 
also had to set realistic goals for themselves even though the control intervention provided no 
specific training to achieve them (repeated computer exercises from CogPack). Controls 
progressed significantly towards their goals so that no significant effect was detected between 
intervention and control groups on Goal Attainment. This shows perhaps how powerful goal 
setting can be for enhancing motivation in rehabilitation and boosting effectiveness of an 
intervention on personal goals, irrespective of the intervention. It is worth mentioning 
McPherson’study, although it did not meet the inclusion criteria of this review: McPherson 338 
used GMT as a tool of informed goal setting and goal attainment in patients with TBI. GMT 
appeared “particularly helpful in providing a structured framework for error prevention in 
attempting goal performance”338, and all patients progressed towards their goals; however no 
effectiveness data relating to EF was collected as the aim of the study was to assess 
acceptability of GMT. 
Initiation facilitation was used in Miotto 119 and Spikman 118 to help patients who have 
difficulty in translating intention into action or initiative problems. They were instructed to 
link plans to an external device (mobile phone, alarm) or to a routine activity (lunch, morning 
hygiene) to prompt the first step of GMT strategy.  
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ARE COMPREHENSIVE EF INTERVENTIONS INCORPORATING 
GMT EFFECTIVE? 
Four papers report that complex interventions including GMT are effective, with medium to 
large effect sizes. These interventions were tested in randomized 118 or pseudo-randomized 
controlled trials 119,345,336.  
Miotto et al. investigated an Attention and Problem Solving (APS) Program 119, focusing on 
problem awareness and monitoring of actions, that teaches the patients to develop, initiate and 
implement a plan. The authors report significant effects of the intervention on the carer-rated 
DEX questionnaire and on the “Modified Multiple Errands Task” in which patients were 
asked to carry out a series of activities requiring planning, strategy, sequencing, monitoring in 
a shopping center with a given amount of money. 
Spikman et al.’s “multifaceted treatment of executive dysfunction” 118 used GMT and 
Problem Solving Therapy (PST), tailoring the intervention to patients’ specific goals. It was 
tested in a high quality multicentre single-blind RCT. The multifaceted treatment of executive 
dysfunction comprises three phases. First, improving awareness of executive deficits is 
enhanced by continually monitoring and evaluating performance during training, predicting 
performance and analyzing factors that did or did not help. Then goal setting and planning are 
trained, based on Ylvisaker’s work 266 and Sirigu’s scripts 360. Intended activities are 
formulated in terms of goals and steps, explicitly and concretely verbalized, put in the right 
order on worksheets, eventually leading the patients to apply the same strategy to real life 
goals, relying on GMT for execution and monitoring. Finally PST is introduced to address 
problems that might arise during task execution. The primary outcome measure was the Role 
Resumption List, a validated Dutch interview, which assesses changes in amount and quality 
of activities compared with premorbid levels in four daily life domains: vocational 
functioning, social interaction with proxies, leisure activity and mobility. The experimental 
group showed larger improvement than the control group, who received computerized 
cognitive training 361.  
“Goals training” is a 43 hour training in goal-oriented attentional self-regulation. It relies on 
GMT, Problem Solving therapies, “Mindfulness” and attention interventions for 
accomplishing individually-salient, self-generated and complex goals. Novakovic 336 reports 
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that the intervention group improved more on EF and attention tests than a control group 
receiving two hours of education. A transfer to memory and learning tests was present. 
However, the difference between the two groups on an ecological assessment (the “Multiple 
Errands Test”) was not significant. Chen 345 reports the fMRI results of this intervention on a 
cognitive task presenting images relevant or irrelevant to a goal: modulation of neural 
processing in extrastriate cortex was significantly enhanced in “goals training” whereas 
training effects within pre-frontal cortex depended on an individual’s baseline state.  
Overall, GMT combined programs were effective on participation with medium-large effect 
sizes on participation questionnaires (g = 0,49 – 2,14) when these were included, whereas 
GMT alone did not have a significant effect on questionnaires. 
DOES GMT REHABILITATION IMPROVE EF AT THE LEVEL OF 
IMPAIRMENTS? 
All studies that found an intervention effect on measures of participation failed to detect 
statistically significant intervention effect on impairments assessed by classical 
neuropsychological tests. In Miotto’s 119 and Spikman’s 118 studies, patients showed some 
progress on some neuropsychological impairments, but not significantly more after GMT than 
after the control intervention. This suggests that improvement on tests measuring impairment 
is not specifically due to the GMT intervention. This is consistent with Kennedy’s 
conclusions 113 regarding metacognitive strategy training. Conversely, in four articles 
336,345,348,99 relating to two studies, patients receiving the intervention improved on paper-and–
pencil neuropsychological tests, but not on more ecologically relevant tests of EF (Hotel Task 
99 and Multiple Errands Task 345,336) and the effects on measures of participation were either 
not detected 99 or not assessed objectively 345,336. However, patients generally reported using 
GMT strategies more than before the intervention 336.  
DO GMT EFFECTS GENERALIZE TO UNTRAINED TASKS AND 
DOES GMT REHABILITATION IMPROVE PARTICIPATION? 
Novakovic-Agopian et al. 336 reported an improvement on EF that generalized to tests of 
memory and learning, but this result must be interpreted with caution as the intervention 
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groups was highly stimulated by a 43 hour program whereas the control group had two hours 
education on brain injury.  
Carers 119,348 and patients 118 reported improvement on questionnaires of EF, on interview of 
role resumption 118 or reported subjective improvement in daily life 98,348,330 in most studies 
(except99,345,336). Improvement on questionnaires119,118,348 can be considered as a 
generalization effect and transfer to home-context activities but questionnaires are known to 
be influenced by many confounding factors other than intervention effectiveness 362. This was 
addressed in the studies of Miotto 119 and Spikman 118 as questionnaires of active group 
patients were compared to questionnaires of active control patients who received a time-
matched control intervention with participants being blind to which treatment was active. In 
both of these studies significant effects of the intervention were reported.  
GMT had a positive effect on EF “ecological” real-life tasks like the Multiple errands Task 
119, the Executive Secretarial Task 118 or test that are supposed to be close to daily life 
complex tasks, like the Hotel Task 95 and the Everyday tasks 98330 although the truly 
ecological value of these tests is uncertain.  
WHO CAN BENEFIT? EF DYSFUNCTION SEVERITY AND SELF-
AWARENESS 
GMT is often said to be more suited to less severely impaired patients. Heterogeneity of 
interventions, and of types of brain injuries in the reviewed studies does not allow any 
conclusion on which population is the best target for GMT. Most studies did not report on the 
severity of the dysexecutive syndrome and some did not report on TBI severity 336345. There is 
some, albeit limited, evidence that more severely impaired patients would benefit less 96.  
Awareness of impairments is thought to be essential for GMT success. Problem awareness 
was specifically trained in most interventions, often prior to GMT, as a key step before 
engaging the patient in the metacognitive training 119,118. The first few GMT modules 
emphasize awareness of “slips” during daily life and encourage patients to monitor them 
throughout the day. Monitoring EF performance “on task” and recognizing errors or even 
predicting them could trigger metacognitive strategies use 247,210.  
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DISCUSSION 
GMT TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS AND VALIDITY OF GOAL-
NEGLECT THEORY IN INTERVENTIONS 
At the present time there is insufficient evidence to support the application of GMT as a 
stand-alone intervention in patients with brain injury. Studies reporting effectiveness of GMT 
alone were either GMT proof-of-principle-studies 98,95,96 assessing the immediate effect of a 
cognitive strategy but not the effectiveness of use of that strategy in everyday contexts, or low 
quality case studies98,348,330. Levine’s RCT 99 is not sufficient to affirm that GMT administered 
alone is effective as a rehabilitation program because no effects were observed on EF daily 
life complaints and because two out of three outcome measures that reached statistical 
significance were similar to tasks used during GMT training.  
GMT’s theoretical model of goal-neglect was supported by Manly’s periodic alerts95 study 
but not confirmed in Levine ‘s 99 that used the same outcome measure nor in Sweeney’s 
study96 that used a novel virtual task. In the Fish et al study97, on days where patients received 
content-free cues on their mobile phones, prospective memory performance was better, 
emphasizing the important role of alerting in GMT effectiveness. No published studies have 
yet proven the generalizability of such cueing on patient-set goals and daily life tasks. 
MEASURING OUTCOME IN EF INTERVENTION STUDIES 
The issue of novelty 
An outcome measure needs to be novel to make significant demands on EF 166,165,93,167,22. 
Multi element tasks (requiring a patient to do at least some of each of n tasks included in the 
test in a set amount of time) are sensitive to executive dysfunction 363,364 and have a higher 
veridicality than classical neuropsychological EF assessments. However, their test-retest 
reliability tends to be low 365,366 perhaps because a patient who was overrun by time on first 
testing may remember to do some of each task the next time. In GMT training, patients are 
explicitly trained during GMT modules to manage multitasking in the same conditions as the 
tests used to evaluate their progress. When the trained task is repeated after intervention, its 
familiarity may make it less demanding on EF as it is likely to require the application of 
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learned knowledge and task-specific procedures which may have become automatic, rather 
than more general problem solving and goal management processes 36722. As the whole 
purpose of EF tests is to prevent lapses into automaticity and promote conscious, novel and 
effortful processing 165,22, apparent progress after EF interventions may not necessarily reflect 
changes in underlying executive processes. Even parallel forms of the same test 366 may not 
overcome the novelty problem. The content may be new but the format is not 367. 
With the exception of one study 118, all rehabilitation studies used the same task pre- and post-
intervention. This limits the opportunity to draw conclusions regarding the EF component in 
task success as a result of the intervention. Although it is natural to use the same test before 
and after the intervention, this may not be the best methodological solution for EF research 22. 
Spikman at al 118. overcome this issues in their trial as they administrated an ecological EF 
task (Executive Secretarial Task) only once, after the intervention and compared the results of 
the experimental group with controls that had a time-matched control intervention. This single 
administration made the task genuinely novel, though of course there was no direct 
comparison of pre-intervention performance. 
The issue of ecological validity 
As the primary aim of any cognitive rehabilitation intervention is to improve functioning in 
everyday life, the ideal is to use outcome measures that reflect everyday functioning.  
Some studies use measures that are clearly not similar to everyday life tasks but have been 
shown to correlate with performance on activities of daily living. For example, the SART task 
used by Levine et al. 99, is a computerized sustained attention task that consists of withholding 
key press to one of nine single-digit numbers targets. Although the SART has proven to have 
a good correlation with reported everyday attentional failures and performance 350, it has 
never been demonstrated that improvement on the SART is correlated with improvement in 
everyday functioning. Indeed, Levine et al. 99 found no improvement on a questionnaire on 
everyday cognitive failures after GMT while patients had significantly improved on the 
SART. 
Tests designed to be more ecologically valid such as the “multiple errands” format tasks 368 
369 offer a challenging, novel, open-ended, multiple goal context, and require multiple, 
innovative and higher level strategies. As such, they have the strongest verisimilitude to daily 
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EF requirements and offer a good approach to providing evidence for intervention 
effectiveness in daily life (for a review of useful tests assessing EF in intervention studies see 
Lewis et al 362).  
Another way of assessing EF in novel and challenging situations is to ask proxies how 
patients function in daily life with a specific focus on aspects of daily life that require EFs. 
This has been done through questionnaires or structured interviews such as Dysexecitive 
Questionnaire 99,348,119, Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 99,348 or Role Resumption List 118. A 
disadvantage is subjectivity in responses, especially when a patient and his/her family engage 
in a long, demanding rehabilitation protocol, something which might account for the progress 
seen in control patients’ questionnaires 118 when the control intervention is active and 
duration-matched.  
Measuring impact on neural processes 
Another approach to examining the impact of GMT is to investigate impact on brain 
processes associated with goal management. To date few paradigms are available to do this, 
but one example of an attempt to do this was that of Chen et al 345 who used a visual selective 
attention task in which only goal-relevant stimuli had to be selected for further processing (1-
back matches within the relevant category in a series of images composed of faces or scenes 
categories, with varying instructions as to which category is relevant). However, what is also 
needed is evidence that measures of EF or specific measures of processes related to goal 
management that can be used in the scanner environment also have validity in terms of 
measuring processes that impact on everyday functioning.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
One limitation of this review is that the quality appraisal method used has not been 
independently validated. The appraisal system was developed to capture important aspects of 
research investigating interventions for EF, with a clear focus on impact on improving EF in 
everyday life. As the same quality rating was applied to all studies, inevitably studies that 
were designed as ”proof-of-principle” studies scored lower than more substantial 
rehabilitation studies. Thus studies that might be considered to be equally strong as far as the 
individual aims of each study were concerned scored differently. Nevertheless, the primary 
focus of this review was to address the question of where the evidence is at just now in terms 
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of whether GMT is useful for improving functioning in the everyday lives of people with 
brain injury. In this case, using consistent appraisal system for all studies seems appropriate. 
 A second limitation was the lack of objective criteria to decide which outcome measures are 
truly ecological and not only called as such by authors. This issue was been emphasized in a 
recent review 180 and our review followed the same approach 
For as many studies as possible effect sizes were calculated. The possibility of a meta-
analysis was considered, but given the heterogeneity of specific interventions and outcome 
measures, and the level of variability in effect sizes, it was considered that an average effect 
size (even a weighted effect size) had the potential to be misleading. However, this does mean 
that at this stage in the development of GMT interventions it is not feasible to estimate an 
overall average effect size.  
Finally, the main difficulty in analyzing the results comes from the fact that in several studies, 
especially those who were most effective, GMT was only a part of a larger therapeutic 
program and so it is impossible to state to what extent GMT contributed to the observed 
effect.” Multiple baseline single case experimental designs, in which GMT and the other 
components of comprehensive programs are introduced sequentially might give some insight 
into the respective effectiveness of each compound. A controlled trial with cross-over with 
three groups similar to Miotto’s methodology for example would give valuable knowledge 
about the respective effectiveness of different compounds of GMT combined interventions by 
comparing a group receiving general cognitive stimulation, a GMT group and a group 
receiving Spikman’s multifaceted treatment of executive dysfunction. In any case, research on 
GMT should use ecologically valid outcome measures targeting participation rather than 
impairements, and where possible use objective, ecologically valid tests with parallel versions 
that ensure task novelty. More reflection is needed as to what constitutes a parallel version of 
an EF task: tasks that have the same format but differ in content may not be sufficient, but 
designing tasks that draw on the same EF processes but use quite different presentation 
formats is challenging.  
IMPLICATIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS 
GMT is a clearly defined, structured and manualized training which makes it attractive as an 
intervention for people with dysexecutive problems. To date, the evidence is insufficient to 
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justify a recommendation that GMT should be delivered as a stand-alone intervention. 
However, evidence is stronger that GMT may be a useful component of a more 
comprehensive intervention that includes using (1) Problem Solving Therapy, (2) focusing on 
patients’ own personal goals as part of the GMT program including use of daily life tasks as 
part of the training program and with use of between session homework to encourage 
generalization (3) using external cueing or prompting to remind support application of GMT 
strategies in everyday situations (4) an intensity of training sessions that is greater than 
weekly and a duration of more than 15 hours . When patients are unaware of their 
impairments, awareness intervention seems useful before beginning a GMT-based 
rehabilitation. 
Other approaches seem very promising but there isn’t enough evidence to support their use 
yet: using naturally-occurring daily life distracters as cues to apply GMT to the current 
situation 330, using GMT for brain injured children. 
The Attention & Problem Solving program 119 and the “Multifaceted Treatment of executive 
dysfunction” 118 programs offer the best evidence of GMT-combined effective intervention. 
Their comprehensively explained active ingredients, tested in well designed studies, can 
reasonably be recommended to rehabilitation teams in search of metacognitive strategy 
training effective on daily life EF for brain-injured patients. 
DECLARATION OF INTEREST: 
This paper was supported by “SOFMER (French Society of Physical and Rehabilitation 
Medicine)-IPSEN” and “Fondation Gueules Cassées” grants. The authors report no conflict of 
interest. 
  
157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
  
158 
 
  
159 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONTEXT-SENSITIVE 
GOAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING FOR 
EVERYDAY EXECUTIVE 
DYSFUNCTION IN CHILDREN AFTER 
SEVERE TBI. 
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Introduction 
Executive functions (EF) are a collection of related but distinct abilities that allow individuals 
to engage efficiently in intentional, goal-directed problem-solving actions20,21 through conscious 
and effortful processing22 and to adapt to new situations in the real world 23. Executive functioning 
(EF) deficits are a frequent consequence of traumatic brain injury (TBI) 6. TBI outcome is 
predicted by executive functioning level122. 
There is a lack of validated methods for EF rehabilitation in children 110,112,111, although some 
general rehabilitation principles have proven to be useful . Ylvisaker266 emphasized two 
principles : (1) the key role of parents and of all the ‘everyday people’ surrounding the child 
in the “cognitive coaching” of their child (See Braga267 and Wade299,300 for examples of 
family-delivered interventions in TBI); (2) the necessity of a “context-sensitive” approach277, 
embedded in functional routines of everyday life and using meaningful activities rather than 
decontextualized exercises.  
In current clinical practice, four types of approaches are used to help children with their EF 
difficulties, though each has its limitations: (1) Providing environmental support and 
compensatory aids (e.g. use of electronic prompting devices) – though only a restricted 
number of situations lend themselves to such an approach; (2) Training component EF skills 
(e.g. repeated exercises aiming at changing the brain’s working memory capacity for 
example) – though transfer to natural contexts and generalization to untrained activities 
effects of this approach have rarely been demonstrated277; (3) Training children on specific 
goals (e.g. if preparing a schoolbag is problematic, the child will be trained on this specific 
activity until the goal is achieved) – though generalization to similar goals in different 
situations (e.g. preparing a suitcase for holidays) is often not achieved; (4) Providing children 
with metacognitive strategies applicable to a variety of everyday situations–whilst this is 
effective in some adults after TBI114, there is little evidence that metacognitive training is 
effective for children with a dysexecutive syndrome post TBI16 , though research on children 
with other forms of brain injury suggests it may be a useful approach 108 287.  
Goal Management Training (GMT)98 is one of the most studied metacognitive training 
programs, of which many variants exist229. GMT includes self-instruction strategies, self-
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monitoring exercises, metacognitive strategies aimed at improving planning, prospective 
memory and hierarchical goal management, mindfulness practice exercises, stories promoting 
discussion about executive dysfunction in daily life, and homework assignments (See Levine 
et al.99 for a more detailed description). GMT was developed from Duncan’s theory of “goal 
neglect”39,40, which suggests that dysexecutive patients are impaired in the construction and 
use of “goal lists”, necessary for goal-directed behavior. They do remember the intended goal 
but tend to lose sight of it as they progress through a task leading to a prospective memory 
failure. Prospective memory (PM) (remembering to carry out intended actions) tasks require 
retrospective memory to remember the task, but depend on EF65 for successful goal 
maintenance, retrieval and implementation at the right moment. PM depends upon frontal 
lobe integrity185, with a key role for rostral prefrontal cortex (BA10)186. In typically-
developing children aged 6-12, performance on EF tasks such as planning and switching 47, 
working memory 48, and inhibition 49 is correlated with PM 50. PM problems are reported as a 
major concern for the parents of children with TBI 87. PM is impaired in children with TBI 
85,86 compared to children with orthopedic injuries, even after cues are given 188, and even 
under strong incentive conditions189. 
The primary aim of this study was to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of implementing 
a metacognitive training intervention, based on an adapted form of Goal Management 
Training (GMT) and on Ylvisaker’s rehabilitation principles, in three domains: (1) 
prospective memory performance, (2) complex cooking task management (3) daily executive 
functioning at home and at school. Secondary aims were to determine if the effects of such a 
metacognitive training generalize enough to help children to (1) achieve personalized, 
untrained, goals and (2) manage a demanding novel task that requires EF’s. 
METHODS 
PARTICIPANTS 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of Pitié-Salpêtrière University Hospital in 
Paris, France. Informed parental written consent and participation assent were obtained for all 
participants prior to initiating any procedure. 
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Inclusion criteria were: (1) severe TBI (initial Glasgow Coma Score lower than 9); (2) 
sustained at least 2 years previously; (3) children attending one of the two participating 
rehabilitation departments; (4) aged 8-14; (5) evidence of a dysexecutive syndrome on 
neuropsychological assessment performed at least two years post injury; (6) parental report of 
executive functioning difficulties in daily life. 
Exclusion criteria were: (1) diagnosed learning disabilities, neurologic or psychiatric 
condition prior to TBI; (2) severe intellectual disability; (3) insufficient French language level 
of the child or of his/her family. 
Characterization data included classical standardized tests from the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children (WISC-IV)234, from the Children’s Memory Scale150 and a French battery 
of EF for children: “Fonctions Exécutives Enfant” battery (FEE)236. FEE has a much larger 
normative data than any other EF test available in French. Each child participating in the 
intervention was compared to a sample of controls matched for sex, age and socioeconomic 
status from the FEE database, using Crawford’s method 370 with one-tailed probability371 
taking p<0.05 criteria for significance.  
INTERVENTION 
The intervention was inspired by Goal Management Training98 (GMT) but extended to follow 
Ylvisaker’s principles of involving “everyday people” in the child’s social network in the 
cognitive coaching of the child and using a context-sensitive approach prioritizing functional 
ecological activities.  
Prior to the intervention, parents participated in a two to three hour informal interview during 
which the following were discussed: 1) the child’s daily life difficulties at home and at 
school; 2) program content and key GMT concepts; 3) the need to apply the metacognitive 
GMT techniques at home and at school. An emphasis was put on the key role parents played 
for the success of the intervention. 
The intervention comprised of: (1) GMT theoretical modules and between session “missions” 
(promoting GMT use at home and at school); (2) practical modules in which children 
practiced GMT content in meaningful activities; (3) an “everyday people cognitive coaching 
guide”. The materials included PowerPoint slides, a workbook, posters for home and school 
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use, mission sheets and the cognitive coaching guide. The 15 modules (theoretical modules+ 
meaningful activities) of the intervention required 15-20 hours to be completed, and were 
administered individually over a four to six-month period on a weekly basis, either in a 
rehabilitation centre or at home.  
(1) Theoretical modules were derived from the adult GMT PowerPoint Manual 99 developed 
by Levine, Robertson and Manly, that has already been used (with minor changes) in 
children372. A new, shorter, colourfull version was created for the intervention to make 
materials child-friendly, age-appropriate, enjoyable and simpler. For example, “slips” 
(referring to slips of attention) became “Oops errors”. “To Do lists” and the “mental 
blackboard” were combined in a unique “note book” concept in order to explain to the 
children how a real paper note book can help them not to overwhelm their “mental notebook”. 
Discussion about EF failures in daily life was triggered through illustrated stories relating to 
school and leisure activities. In each module we included a prospective memory task to be 
performed during the session (e.g. when you see a slide with X you do Y) to encourage 
discussion about PM failures at the end of each session. The content-free cue “Look into your 
mental notebook” was used as a prompt when children failed PM tasks. Throughout the 
training period children had to complete “mission sheets”, inspired from GMT between-
session assignments. These were of three types, introduced progressively: 1) monitoring Oops 
errors, their consequences and factors influencing their occurrence; 2) listing occasions on 
which the child used a metacognitive strategy of his/her own or from the program with 
success; 3) identifying situations where a stepwise processing approach can be used in order 
to manage a goal (preparing the school bag, preparing a sandwich).  
(2) Practical modules served to practice GMT content in meaningful activities (Ylvisaker’s 
Content-sensitive principle): cooking of various meals, route finding, searching for 
information, poster making, photo ordering. This was an explicit generalization training that 
was aimed to show the children that GMT metacognitive strategies are applicable to many 
situation in life where their EF impairment may impede success, and to promote the use of 
these strategies to personal (present and future) goals and untrained activities355. The activities 
involved planning, strategy generation, following steps, and monitoring of actions. Difficulty 
increased as children progressed in the program. Similarly to the theoretical modules, the 
meaningful activities contained naturally occurring prospective memory tasks to allow 
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discussion about PM difficulties in real activities (e.g. checking regularly if the first set of 
finger biscuits is cooked while preparing the next). The trainer guided the children when 
needed, using non-specific prompts and general cues. Explicit help was only given if these 
were not sufficient. At the end of each activity, the child was invited to review his/her 
performance using the “mission” sheets, identify Oops errors and any effective strategy that 
had helped in the task, and to think about situations in real life where the same kind of 
strategy may be useful. The child always took the ‘product’ of his/her activity (e.g. crepes) 
home to increase motivation from the praise s/he received at home. Moreover, the ‘product’ 
was expected to remind the parents about the child’s program. 
(3) To encourage transfer to the child’s natural contexts, we tried to involve the child’s 
‘everyday people’ as cognitive coaches for their child. Everyday people were parents, 
teachers, school assistants and any adult the parents identified as a potential cognitive coach 
(baby-sitter, student helping the child with homework). A letter presenting the program was 
sent to the child’s teacher and school assistant (SA), explaining briefly TBI executive 
problems and their implications, and asking the teacher and the SA to participate by applying 
GMT at school. The intervention content was not explained orally. We asked for a contact e-
mail and a telephone contact to discuss the child’s difficulties and set realistic goals on goal 
attainment scales. The letter was sent a second time after one month as the first yielded few 
responses, so we had responses from at least one school staff member per child. Other 
potential ‘everyday people’ identified by the parents were sent a similar letter. Twice a month 
all ‘everyday people’ who agreed to participate received one chapter, two-pages long, of a 
“Cognitive Coaching Guide” that was created for the intervention. The guide was colorful, 
using the same drawings, diagrams and analogies as the theoretical modules, explaining the 
rehabilitation content and suggesting how to apply metacognitive strategies at school and at 
home. The intervention was organized in a way that each metacognitive strategy was (1) first 
introduced during a theoretical module, (2) then practiced on a meaningful activity and (3) 
lastly introduced to everyday people. They were sent the corresponding chapter of the 
coaching guide that described the activity for which the child had already practiced the 
strategy, and suggested other activities to which it could be applied (see supplemental digital 
data for examples). Through this guide, everyday people were encouraged: (1) to use non-
specific prompts for PM failures (“look into your mental note book”) rather than specific 
instructions (“you need to feed the dog”) or negative sentences (“you’ve forgotten to feed 
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your dog again!”); (2) to promote strategy generation instead of giving the solution to their 
child, consistent with Ylvisaker’s aim of “helping the child to become a strategic thinker”266; 
(3) to prompt and help the child to fill in his/her “mission sheets” regularly; (4) to practice 
goal identification (“state your goal”) and stepwise processing in daily activities (preparing 
schoolbag, table setting). Parents were explicitly asked to go through the metacognitive 
strategies of the cognitive coaching guide and to sign the child’s GMT workbook every week. 
The ‘everyday people’ were not requested to participate in the rehabilitation session, but were 
advised that the therapist was available if they had any questions. 
Examples of the type of exercices used may be found in supplemetntal data 7.1. 
Supplemental data 7.1: Examples of how metacognitive strategies were applied and used in 
theoretical modules, meaningful activities and suggested activities for everyday people.  
Metacognitive 
strategy  
Theoretical module 
exercise 
Meaningful activity Cognitive coaching guide 
(proposal of situations the 
strategy can be applied to):  
“Stop and State your 
goal”  
Multi-element tasks with 
changing aims (do some of 
each sub task OR earn as 
many points as possible) 
Cooking biscuits from a recipe 
containing prompts (cartoon 
character showing a stop sign) 
to stop and state what the goal 
of the step is before proceeding 
State your goal before 
beginning a school exercise. 
Use the cartoon character 
whenever the child starts an 
exercise without 
understanding the aim 
instead of telling him/her 
s/he read it wrong.  
“Write the steps” Imagining you prepare a 
sandwich 
Mathematical problem 
Scripts about organizing a 
birthday party 
Preparing a cake from an 
unordered recipe, presented 
without steps and without 
details about cooking procedure 
School essay preparation 
Organizing homework for 
the week 
Planning a party/ an outing 
with the family 
 
QUALITATIVE DATA ABOUT THE PROGRAM 
Throughout the sessions, the therapist recorded (1) how the child reacted to the intervention 
content; (2) if the metacognitive strategies were easily understood and used; (3) if the child 
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seemed aware of his/her EF difficulties during discussion and performance of meaningful 
activities; (4) if the “mission sheets” were filled-in between the sessions. 
STUDY DESIGN 
Intervention effectiveness was assessed in two ways: (1) A Single-Case Experimental design 
(SCED)344,373, with repeated ecological measurement of prospective memory was used to 
monitor progress throughout the intervention; (2) pre-post measurement of EF with two 
baseline assessments 4-8 weeks apart (B1 and B2), and three post-intervention assessments: 
immediately after the intervention (R1), and at three (R2) and six months (R3) to assess 
maintenance of effects. Baseline was expected to be stable as children had sustained their TBI 
at least two years earlier, minimizing chances of spontaneous recovery during the study. The 
pre-post measurement served to capture the key issues of EF rehabilitation, namely: (1) EF 
performance in ecological tasks; (2) transfer of training effects to natural contexts; (3) 
generalization to untrained tasks; (4) need for novelty for a task to truly test “executive” 
functions.  
OUTCOME MEASURES 
Repeated measures of prospective memory (PM) performance - SCED design: We monitored 
the effectiveness of the program through a weekly score on a time-based PM task. The PM 
task was inspired by the Fish et al. phone call task 97 that has recently been used in children 
374. Three times a week, children had to look up the day’s Saint on a calendar (e.g. 24th June is 
Saint John’s day), and send it to the therapist at an agreed target time, either as a text 
message, an e-mail or a phonecall. The child was awarded three points if correct information 
was given within one hour of the agreed time, two points if within the day, one point if on a 
different day and zero points if the child completely forgot about the task. The retrospective 
memory component was controlled for by checking at each session that children remembered 
the task and agreed times. Parents were given the timings in case the child wanted to check 
the target time. To encourage use of mental strategies, children were asked not to use cues 
such as alarms, or pre-programmed text messages. Parents were instructed not to give any 
cues or help to complete the task. The three target days and times were chosen individually 
for each child with the parents before the first assessment to ensure: (1) that the child was 
easily available for the task (i.e. not during school time or leisure activity); (2) that it didn’t 
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disturb family routines (e.g. bedtime); (3) that the time didn’t correspond to a regular activity 
that could act as a cue (e.g. TV show); (4) that timings respected the following common rules 
for all the children: non-consecutive days, one week-end day and two school days, except the 
day of the intervention and different target time on each of the three days. As in Fish et al97, 
days when the tasks had not been performed for another reason than PM failure, were not 
used in the analysis (medical appointment at target time, no internet connection during a 
week-end outing); therefore the total score was expressed as a percentage of total possible 
points that week.  
“Children’s Cooking Task” (CCT) – pre-post ecological measurement of EF: As the aim of 
this study was to improve EF in daily life, assessment included an ecological180 test of EF, 
called the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT)120,121. In the CCT, children have to prepare a real 
chocolate cake and a fruit cocktail following a structured, photo-cued, child-friendly recipe 
contained in a cookbook including distractors. The task has been shown to be highly sensitive 
to executive dysfunction in TBI as it is novel, challenging, open-ended, and requires multiple 
goal management and innovative higher level strategies to succeed. The Children’s Cooking 
Task (CCT) has good inter-rater and test–retest reliability, high internal consistency, as well 
as good discriminant and concurrent validity120. It can be performed from the age of 8. 
Scoring is based on the number of errors, including omissions, additions, commentaries, 
substitution and estimation errors. Normative data is not yet available. Therefore raw scores 
were used to track individual child changes. The number of errors in CCT made by each child 
was compared to the number of errors made by age matched healthy controls, extracted from 
unpublished data375.  
Questionnaires – pre-post measurement of EF in natural contexts: Ultimately, the aim of any 
cognitive rehabilitation intervention is to allow a transfer of learned skills to the natural 
context of the child266, and this was particularly important to assess because metacognitive 
training aims at providing children with strategies they can apply to many tasks in their 
natural context. This was assessed through two questionnaires of EF: (1) the Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Functions (BRIEF) questionnaire144, 145, completed by both parents 
(transfer to home-context) and teachers (transfer to school-context); (2) a cognition subscore 
derived from the Dysexecutive Questionnaire for Children (DEX-C)235 that was completed by 
parents only. The BRIEF assesses eight domains of executive functioning in the real world, 
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which give together a Global Executive Composite (GEC) score. Higher scores correspond to 
increased EF difficulties in daily life. A T-score superior to 65 is defined as the clinical range. 
The BRIEF has large normative data for children aged 5 to 18, high internal consistency146, 
good validity 151 and good test-retest reliability146 although parent-teacher agreement is only 
moderate146. It is the most commonly used questionnaire of executive functions and seems to 
be sensitive to deficits in executive functioning in children with TBI 151,153,71,14. Its 
relationship with common EF cognitive tests is however inconsistent. DEX-C is a 20 item 
questionnaire, probing four broad areas of EF difficulties (emotional/personality, 
motivational, behavioural and cognitive) and is part of the “Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children” 235. Higher Z-scores correspond to increased cognitive 
difficulties relating to EF. DEX-C has less evidence regarding psychometric properties235. 
However the cognitive subscale of DEX-C completed by parents has a high correlation with 
the (Children’s Cooking Task) CCT score120, and therefore this subscale together with the 
CCT were expected to detect improvement in cognitive EF impairment, which the BRIEF 
might not capture.  
Goal Attainment Scaling (GAS) – pre-post measurement of generalization (metacognitive 
strategy use in untrained tasks): GAS376,377 was used as a generalization measure to assess if a 
child who has applied metacognitive strategies to meaningful activities in a rehabilitation 
setting is capable of applying those strategies to untrained tasks that are judged to be 
problematic for him/her by his/her everyday people. EF-related problems reported by the 
child, parents and school staff served to elaborate personalized goal attainment scales (GAS) 
for each child. These GAS goals were not trained specifically but children were repeatedly 
encouraged to apply metacognitive strategies to daily life. We also used “general” GAS for 
metacognitive strategy use and GMT application (see table 7.3 in results section). Themes of 
“general” goals were similar for all children, but the initial levels and expected outcome levels 
were specific to each child, taking into account children’s age and possibilities. The detailed 
procedure for goal selection, GAS elaboration and GAS levels adjustment are described in 
supplemental data 7.2. GAS scores were used to calculate a global T-score for each child, 
using Kiresuk’s formulae (see 376, 377 for details of GAS methodology). A T-score of 50 meant 
that the goals were overall attained as expected, and > 50 that goals were attained better than 
expected.   
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Supplemental Data 7.2: Writing procedure for GAS 
Writing procedure for general GAS corresponding to metacognitive strategy use and GMT application 
Eleven general GAS items for metacognitive strategy use and GMT application to daily life were created. These 
were sent to parents, teachers, school assistants and any other “everyday people”. For each item, everyday 
people had to circle the level corresponding best to the child’s actual performance relating to the goal, ranging 
from -2 (worse performance they could imagine) to +2 (best expected performance), 0 corresponding to the most 
likely performance expected after intervention.  
E.g.: « XX (child name) writes on his own initiative things he/she might forget to do in a single and well-
identified note-book or planner (excluding homework he/she is explicitly asked to write down by the teacher)» 
 -2 : never 
-1 : sometimes but it is not regular or functional enough to rely on it 
0 : Writes down important things to be done but you need to emphasize/repeat it is an important thing to 
remember to do 
+1 : The important things are written without you telling the child it is important to remember 
+2 : Writes all the things and without you telling the child to remember to do so 
The answers to this first GAS questionnaire allowed readjustment of the scales, through the following rules: (1) 
Scales scoring +1 or +2 pre-intervention were removed as the performance for the item was satisfactory without 
intervention and the item was therefore not a goal to attain. (2) Scales that scored 0 were reformulated in order to 
have the pre-intervention level corresponding to -1 by fixing a more challenging 0, +1 and +2 scores (this was 
particularly the case for older children). (3) Scales scoring -2 or -1 were not reformulated, in order to capture a 
possible worsening in performance for those having -1 as the preintervention level. Therefore the initially 
identical scales were readjusted according to the child’s present performance relating to each metacognitive 
strategy use goal. 
In order to fulfill the unidimensionality criteria, some goals relating to strategy use were split into two goals 
(e.g.: effective use of a paper note-book to compensate for PM failures was split into (1) writing down the things 
one might forget to do; (2) remember to look into the note book to perform the intended action). These goals 
were considered important goals by the researchers but did not take into account the personal goals of the child 
and his everyday people.  
Writing procedure for personal GAS corresponding to EF-related problems reported by everyday people. 
Two to seven additional personal GAS per child were created based on parents’, teacher’s and school assistant’s 
concerns. Goals were selected after analyzing the BRIEF and DEX-C questionnaires and after a one- to two-hour 
interview with parents and a phone interview with the teacher and/or school assistant. The first author created the 
GAS scales in a written form and sent them to the person the goal had been proposed by. The first answers to 
these personal GAS allowed, if needed, to reformulate the levels according to the same procedure as for the 
general GAS described above. .  
All the scales, including those reformulated were sent again to the everyday people in order to check that the 
initial level had been worded correctly and corresponded to -2 or -1 prior to intervention. This personalized 
second GAS set of answers was used to calculate a pre-intervention T-score and to measure outcome at R1, R2 
and R3. Because the procedure required writing, reformulating and double checking for initial level, only one 
baseline could be calculated for GAS.  
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“Christmas biscuits task” – measurement of adaptation to novelty, performed once only at the 
end of the intervention: EF outcome measures need to be novel to really capture EF165,166. 
When the same task is repeated after intervention, it is more “familiar”, which can make it 
less demanding on EF367,118. Familiarity effects increase when patients are tested on several 
occasions (as it is the case in our design for CCT). To get a “purer” EF measure post-
intervention118, we developed a parallel form of the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT) for 
assessment at R3, involving the same number of steps and ingredients but requiring different 
types of ingredients and procedures. This version has no established psychometric properties. 
Children had to bake “Christmas biscuits”. Whilst both tasks required cooking, as children 
were not experienced cooks, a new recipe could not be viewed as a familiar task.  
CONTROLLING FOR CONFOUNDING FACTORS.  
At the beginning of the program everyday people were not informed of exactly when the 
intervention component would commence: from the first interview onwards all children were 
seen weekly, whereas the intervention started only 5-8 weeks later. We hoped to control in 
this way for parent’s enthusiasm for a novel rehabilitation program, which was expected to be 
reflected by an improvement between B1 and B2 in this study design. The intervention effect 
was measured comparing post intervention results (R1, R2 and R3) to the second baseline 
(B2), as this was considered a “purer” baseline eliminating the enthusiasm and novelty effect. 
Inconsistent answers to the BRIEF questionnaire were detected by computing the 
inconsistency score described in the BRIEF manual (a score >9 being a threshold to consider 
the questionnaire unreliable because of contradictory answers on special items serving to 
assess consistency of answers). Furthermore, the intervention did not significantly change the 
amount of time spent in rehabilitation: all children had already been attending the outpatient 
department for half a day a week for many years (including sports, group games and group 
discussion to promote socialization and language pragmatics for PB,CS,RK; analytic 
psychotherapy for PB, paper-and pencil neuropsychological exercises aiming at improving 
attention for IP) therefore the effect of the potentially confounding factor of time spent with 
therapist was considered likely to be negligible. 
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EXTERNAL INVESTIGATOR POST-INTERVENTION INTERVIEW  
After the intervention, an external interviewer, who had neither been involved in the 
rehabilitation nor the research team called all the everyday people involved in the program. A 
structured interview focused on how they perceived the program, their views on applying 
cognitive coaching at home and at school, clarity of the cognitive coaching guide, how 
children reacted to the intervention and if they thought their child had improved in various 
domains (autonomy, school results…) even if it was a domain not included in GAS and 
questionnaires. The interview contained embedded questions aimed at quantifying how much 
the everyday people participated in the cognitive coaching and at checking if they understood 
the concepts that were explained to them in the cognitive coaching guide. They were asked 
for examples of metacognitive strategies they could recall, situations they applied them to, 
and were asked how often they managed to go through the child’s workbook together, and if 
GMT posters had been hung at home. Feedback from the child was obtained informally from 
the first author conducting the intervention, because answering to an unknown external 
investigator on the phone was considered age-inappropriate.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND EFFECT SIZE (ES) CALCULATION  
The Saint’s day task (SDT) PM scores were visually analyzed on time series graphs 
comparing baseline (weeks 1-4), with intervention (weeks 5-18). A two-standard deviation 
band (2SDB) was determined for each child based on the standard deviation of the four 
baseline points. Gottman and Leiblum’s criterion was used: the probability that two 
consecutive points fall outside the 2SDB is < 0.05. (see for details 344). Trends were detected 
by celeration lines, using the Split Middle Trend line procedure344. To obtain the magnitude of 
effect, the “nonoverlap of all pairs” (NAP) method was used 378, through SPSS software. For 
the other outcome measures, an intervention effect size (ES) was calculated for each child 
from B2 to R1, R2 and R3 as a standard difference between T-scores divided by 10 for the 
BRIEF and as a standard difference between Z-scores for the DEX-C Cognition scale. For the 
CCT, ES was obtained by dividing the score difference by the standard deviation of all five 
CCT scores of the child. Furthermore, because the CCT inevitably has a practice effect as the 
recipe becomes more known, which could account for improvement throughout the trials, we 
readjusted ES by subtracting the practice effect of each child (score change between B1 and 
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B2 being considered as the practice effect for that child). ES were interpreted subjectively 
with reference to Cohen’s guidelines208: 0.2 = small; 0.5 = medium; 08 = large. 
RESULTS 
Five children, aged 8 to 13 years met the inclusion criteria (PB, CS, RK, IP, YR). All had 
sustained severe TBI at an early age, three to eleven years before the study and had a highly 
complex family situation. All had specialized schooling, either attending a special support 
class or having a school assistant. Characteristics of the participants are summarized in table 
7.1. All children had a severe dysexecutive syndrome on paper-and-pencil EF tests (see table 
in Supplemental Data 7.3), on CCT (see B1 and B2 scores in Figure 7.2), and (apart from 
child IP’ BRIEF score) on EF-questionnaires (see B1 and B2 in Figures 3 and 4). In contrast 
they were not impaired in reasoning abilities (apart from CS) or retrospective memory (see 
table in Supplemental Data 7.4).  
One child (YR) dropped out of the study after 4 sessions. YR seemed to be unaware of his 
impairments, and decided that he no longer wanted to be involved in any rehabilitation. His 
challenging behavior (see Table 7.1) and school absconding were the main issues at the time 
of the study. He was however included in this pilot study initially because it was hoped that 
an intervention focusing on meaningful activities might be accepted by YR in contrast with all 
the other rehabilitation and school support he refused. 
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Table 7.1: Characteristics of the participants 
 PB CS RK IP YR 
Sex Girl Girl Boy Boy Boy 
Age at inclusion (years) 11 11 13 8 14 
TBI mechanism MVA (passenger) Fall of metal bar on 
the child’s head 
MVA (pedestrian hit 
by car) 
Fall of furniture on the 
child’s head 
Collision against running 
child 
Age at injury (years) 2.5 6.5 7  5.5 2.5 
Initial GCS 6 4 3 6 <7 
Brain imaging Large right hemisphere 
hemorrhage and 
edema, right parietal 
depression fracture 
Cerebellar and right 
parieto-occipital lesion 
with depression 
fracture 
Subdural hematoma 
with diffuse edema 
and pneumocephalus 
 
Brain stem hemorrhage, 
Diffuse subarachnoid 
hemorrhage 
Unknown 
 
Duration of coma (days) Unknown 1 10 6 Unknown 
Time since injury (years) 9 5 6  3 11 
Schooling Ordinary school + part-
time SA 
Part-time special – 
part-time ordinary 
schooling 
Part -time private 
schooling with SA, part 
time private lessons  
Ordinary school + part-time 
SA 
Special schooling 
Excluded from school half 
of the year for behavioral 
issues 
Associated impairments, 
reported in medical 
records and previous 
neuropsychological 
assessments 
Lack of awareness 
Epilepsy absences 
treated by 
carbamazepine 
 
FSIQ 69 
Impaired ToM and 
language pragmatics 
Moderately spastic 
equinus foot 
Attention problems 
Left arm weakness 
ADHD Severe behavioral 
disorder 
Lack of awareness 
 
 
 
 
Table continues 
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Table 7.1 (continued): Characteristics of the participants 
Glasgow Outcome Scale 2 3 3 2 3 
Family structure Monoparental Parents separated 
geographically, 
Sister followed-up for 
a transplant  
Large family (10 
siblings) 
Monoparental family 
Father in prison 
Primary caregiver: cousin 
 
Two parent household 
Parental education (years) father : 14 
mother : 15 
father : 11 
mother : 11 
father : 22 
mother : 15 
father : 7 
mother : 11 
father : 4 
mother : 17 
Note 1: MVA: Motor Vehicle Accident; GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale score; SA: School Assistant; ToM: Theory of Mind; FSIQ: Full Scale Intellectual Quotient; 
ADHD: Attention Deficit – Hyperactivity Disorder  
Note 2: Full names of traditional paper and pencil tests: WISC: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; BADS-C: Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive 
Syndrome for Children; CMS: Children’s Memory Scale 
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Supplemental Data 7.3: Childhood Executive Function Battery (FEE) raw scores for 
participants and their age-, sex- and socio-economic status-matched controls. 
 Processing speed 
(Stroop part 1: 
color naming in 
seconds) 
Inhibitiory Control  
(Stroop 
interference condition: 
number of 
uncorrected errors) 
Flexibility 
(Barre-Joe **: 
time in 
seconds)  
Planning 
(Labyrinths: 
number of errors) 
PB 105* 3 405* 5* 
Controls (n= 9)  77,56 ± 10,50 1,11 ± 1,17 264,11 ± 57,20 0,9 ±1,00 
CS 103* 6* 356 5* 
Controls (n= 7)  70,4 ± 39,29 1,33 ± 2,07 338,29 ± 
175,54 
0,7 ± 0,73 
RK 83 4* 380 8* 
Controls (n= 
14)  
71,50 ± 10,14 1,00 ± 1,30 248,14 ± 51,03 0,9 ± 1,63 
IP 99 4* 613* 7* 
Controls (n= 
13)  
100,38 ± 35,88 1,46 ± 1,51 416,83 ± 95,96 1,2 ±1,28 
YR 69 15 314* 19* 
Controls (n= 
14)  
71,50 ± 10,14 1,00 ± 1,30 248,14 ± 51,03 0,9 ± 1,63 
*p<0,05 
** Barre Joe consists of crossing 46 “Joe” characters on an A3 sheet containing 240 similar characters differing 
only by leg and arm position  
 
Supplemental data 7.4: Standard scores for traditional paper and pencil tests 
 WISC IV 
matrices 
WISC IV 
vocabulary 
6 part 
test 
BADS-C 
CMS stories 
- immediate 
CMS 
stories- 
delayed 
CMS 
backward 
span 
CMS words 
list - 
immediate 
CMS 
words 
list - 
delayed 
PB 9 9 10 8 5 8 9 13 
CS 7 5 7 8 7 8 12 7 
RK 16 7 8 4 4 10 12 16 
IP 11 12 6 8 9 18 14 16 
YR 11 6 7 9 8 Missing 
data 
Missing data Missing 
data 
Note: WISC: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; BADS-C: Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children; CMS: Children’s Memory Scale 
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Qualitative data about the program. The intervention appeared to be feasible to implement 
and it was reported that children enjoyed it, especially the meaningful activities and stories 
used in the theoretical modules. Most GMT concepts were understood by the children, 
although examples of personal cognitive failures were difficult to obtain. Interestingly, 
children seemed to consider the metacognitive strategies as exercises to practice rather than 
something that could be applied to other tasks. As such, they would use the strategies on 
theoretical modules (e.g. pausing regularly and stating the goal while sorting cards with an 
embedded PM task) but were reluctant to apply them to more complex and ecological 
activities such as cooking, judging the strategies as an additional task per-se and 
demonstrating no consistent application of strategies in the meaningful activities. Only the 14 
year-old RK, probably the most aware and the most impaired in daily life, actually engaged 
with the techniques and used them whenever he noticed task similarities. CS seemed to 
understand only a few GMT concepts and metacognitive strategies. IP and PB seemed to lack 
awareness of impairments and reported not finding the intervention useful, but found the 
program was fun and they participated willingly.  
Repeated PM measures. The Saint’s Day Test was performed by 3 children. IP, aged 8, did 
not complete the task as he was not familiar with mobile phones, did not know how to use the 
internet and making a phone call to an unfamiliar person was not age-appropriate. YR 
dropped out of the study. Weekly PM score changes over time are shown in Figures 7.1a, 7.1b 
and 7.1c. During baseline, none of the children reached a score of 50%. Using a two-standard 
deviation band (2SDB), all children showed statistically significant progress, as all had at 
least two consecutive points outside their 2SDB. The best progress seemed to be made by PB. 
Unfortunately, when her performance was reaching 100% on week 12, she lost the charger of 
her mobile phone and her parents did not replace it until the end of the study giving only a 
medium effect (NAP = 0.47 [0.12-0.81]). CS began to make progress on the SDT only by 
week 8. She maintained performance until school holidays (week 17) when her performance 
dropped momentarily to 0 (overall medium effect; NAP = 0.74 [0.50-0.98]). RK had a very 
variable performance but a strong effect of intervention (NAP = 0.87 [0.713-1]). The use of 
the following strategies to manage the task were reported by parents and/or children: stopping 
all activity up to one hour before the target time and watching the clock (RK), using cues such 
as the view of her computer (CS).  
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Figure 7.1: Saint day task (SDT): prospective memory score changes over time 
Note: The vertical line correspond to the beginning of the intervention. Arrows correspond to 
split –middle celeration lines. Dashed lines correspond to +2 and -2 standard deviation band 
 
 
Figure 7.1a: 
Child PB 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1b: 
Child CS 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1c: 
Child RK 
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Complex Cooking Task Management: Ecological EF test “Children’s cooking task” and 
its parallel form (“Christmas Biscuits”). All children were very impaired on the Children’s 
Cooking Task (CCT), scoring from 3 (CS) to 25 (IP) standard deviations below age matched 
controls. RK and PB required help from the examiner to finish the task, IP completed the task 
with nearly 200 errors, and failed the task. CS’s errors were mainly commentaries/questions 
on every action she undertook but she successfully finished the task. 
Figure 7.2: Number of errors in the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT) changes over time 
 
*age-matched controls, n= 8 to13 per child 
Note: B1 and B2: first and second baseline assessments; R1, R2, and R3: assessments 
performed at 0, 3, and 6months postintervention. In the CCT, errors include action errors as 
well as commentaries/questions. 
 
Changes in the number of errors from baseline to post intervention and follow-up for each 
child are presented in Figure 7.2. During baseline, all children showed some practice effect 
between B1 and B2. After intervention, PB increased number of errors. Interestingly, she was 
so focused on not repeating the errors from her previous trial, that she often skipped whole 
recipe steps, and thus forgot more ingredients/steps throughout the trials. Furthermore, from 
trial to trial, PB seemed more confident each time, and stated how well she knew the recipe 
and how easy it would be. For CS, the decrease of errors from B2 to R1 had a small effect 
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size (see table 7.2). Conversely, RK and IP significantly decreased the number of errors after 
the intervention with large effect sizes, RK showing a performance similar to controls after 
intervention and IP improving from 25 to 6 SD compared to controls. RK clearly used the 
metacognitive techniques taught in the intervention while performing the CCT (checking he 
finished a step before moving to the next, saying “Stop!” and thinking before adding a new 
ingredient…). Effects were totally maintained at 3 and 6 months for RK whereas effect 
progressively diminished at 3 and 6 months for IP. However, when using a completely 
different and unknown recipe at R3 (Christmas Biscuits) all children returned to their initial 
number of errors. 
Table 7.2: Outcome measures Effect Sizes (ES) comparing B2 to R1, R2 and R3 
 ES at R1 ES at R2 ES at R3 
Children’s Cooking Task 
PB -1.15 -2.90 -2.90 
CS 0.33 1.09 0.76 
RK 1.42 1.35 1.59 
IP 1.31 1.16 0.30 
Parental BRIEF 
PB 0.5 0.2 0.1 
CS 0.9 1.3 0.4 
RK 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
IP 1.2 0.8 1 
DEX-C Cognition Score 
PB 1.33 2.00 2.33 
CS 0.67 1.00 1.33 
RK 0.67 0.00 -0.67 
IP* 2.00 1.67 1.84 
IP compared to B1* 0.67 0.33 0.50 
Cohen’s rating of effect size: 0.2 = small; 0.5 = medium; 0.8 = large. 
*Because IP’s DEX-C Cognition Score at B2 was deviant (see figure 4), we also report here ES 
comparing post intervention outcomes to his best baseline score (B1) 
Note: R1, R2, R3: assessments performed at 0, 3 and 6 months post-intervention; BRIEF: Behavior 
Rating Inventory of Executive Functions; DEX-C: Dysexecutive Questionnaire for children  
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Transfer to natural contexts. At baseline, all children but one (IP) scored in the clinical 
range (T-scores > 65) for Global Executive Composite (GEC) scores on parental and teacher 
BRIEF questionnaires. Transfer to home-context: All parental scores were consistent 
(inconsistency score < 9). Immediately after the intervention 3 children (PB, CS, IP) showed a 
decrease on parental BRIEF scores (see figure 7.3), reflecting possibly less executive 
dysfunction in daily life at home. Effect sizes are reported in Table 7.2. All but one child (IP) 
showed a decrease on DEX-C cognition sub-scores (see figure 7.4) between the two baselines 
that was considered to be the enthusiasm effect we had expected due to intervention novelty. 
However, the decrease was accentuated much further after the intervention for all children 
and continued to decrease at three- and six-month follow-up for PB and for CS with large 
effect sizes (2.33 for PB and 1.33 for CS, see table 7.2). Transfer to school-context: Teacher 
BRIEF scores remained stable for RK and CS, were unreliable for PB and for IP 
(inconsistency index >9), meaning it was not appropriate to draw any reliable conclusions on 
EF in the school context for these children, although PB’s BRIEF seemed to show significant 
improvement. PB was reported to have made excellent progress at school on school academic 
reports. 
Figure 7.3: Parental BRIEF questionnaire changes of GEC Tscore over time. 
 
Note: GEC indicates Global Executive Composite. 
B1 and B2: first and second baseline assessments; R1, R2, and R3: assessments performed at 
0, 3, and 6 months postintervention. The horizontal line represents the clinical cutoff score of 
65.  
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Figure 7.4: DEX-C Cognition subscore change over time. 
 
Note: B1and B2: first and second baseline assessments; R1, R2, and R3: assessments 
performed at 0, 3, and 6 months postintervention. DEX-C indicates Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire for Children. 
 
Generalization: Goal Attainment Scaling and post intervention interview.  
There was a high rate of missing GAS data. GAS could not be developed in collaboration 
with RK’s school everyday people because he attended school very rarely in that period. GAS 
goals were developed with IP’s teacher and school assistant but post intervention GAS forms 
were handed to IP who lost them (as school closed for 2 months after R1, new forms could 
not be obtained). CS’s teacher, with whom the goals were developed, changed after R1, 
explaining missing data for R1 and R2. Overall, GAS scales were obtained for at least one 
“everyday person” per child (see table 7.3). We were only able to agree on personal goals 
with one child (RK). The other three viewed the goals proposed by their everyday people as 
not problematic or not important.   
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Table 7.3: Personal and general GAS goals 
Examples of personal GAS goals corresponding to EF-related 
problems reported by everyday people (only the goals and not the 
full Goal Attainment Scales are reported) 
 
Examples of general GAS goals 
corresponding to metacognitive 
strategy use and GMT application 
(only the goals and not the full Goal 
Attainment Scales are reported) 
PB - mother :  
-to forget taking antiepileptic drug less often 
-to lose fewer objects  
-to be flexible enough to change strategy if the first strategy does not 
work 
-to brainstorm for possible solutions before rushing to start a task or 
school exercise 
PB – school assistant: 
-to hand-in homework on time/not so late 
-to remember to give routine weekly documents to her mother 
-to remember non-routine one-off items (e.g. bring money for 
excursion, ask parents to sign the excursion form..)  
  
CS – mother: 
-to estimate if a school exercise will be hard or easy before beginning 
-to check school work for errors before handing it in 
-to check she has understood what she is supposed to do before 
beginning a task  
-to ask questions if she is not sure she understood what she is 
supposed to do 
CS – teacher : 
-to accept the need to check her work when she is prompted to do so 
-to estimate the difficulty of exercises/tasks 
  
RK – both parents and the child: 
-to be able to tidy up his room (without the need for someone to tell 
him in which order to do it) 
-to be less stressed about his prospective memory problems 
-to be able to perform an instruction made of 3 consecutive tasks 
(e.g.: “drink your milk, empty the dish washer and get ready to go 
out”). 
  
IP – teacher and school assistant: 
-to be able to prepare schoolbag alone 
-to write down information/instructions from teacher without being 
prompted by school assistant  
-to remember to check agenda to see what needs to be done 
-to be aware of one’s “Oops” errors 
(attentional slips) 
-to detect “Oops” errors as they occur 
-to stop and think before beginning a 
new task  
-to formulate a task’s main goal 
before beginning a task (e.g. school 
exercise, home activity..) 
-to write down the things one might 
forget to do 
-to remember to look in the note 
book to perform the intended action 
-to follow a series of steps that are 
given to perform a task, finishing 
each step before moving to another 
-to split complex tasks into steps and 
substeps 
-to check a task/exercise before 
moving on to another 
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All children progressed towards their goals at R1 (see figure 7.5). However, only one of the 
GAS scores (IP’s) reached the expected goal attainment level (T-score of 50). During the 
external interview at the end of the study, PB’s mother reported significant daily life benefits 
of the program: PB forgot her antiepileptic drugs much less often (by linking her breakfast 
orange juice with remembering to take her medications), was less often late at school and 
made important progress at school allowing her to continue schooling in an ordinary class 
with a school assistant rather than going to special education as had originally been planned. 
These last two improvements were not captured by the child’s GAS scores because these were 
unanticipated positive outcomes. Some positive outcome was reported for IP by his main 
carer, which was consistent with a GAS score that reached 50. Parents reported some general 
progress in well-being at R1 for RK and CS. Most children carried on cooking after the 
intervention and RK was for the first time allowed to be in the kitchen alone by his parents. 
Parents reported that children’s self-esteem increased because they could make a meal for the 
family. 
Figure 7.5: Goal Attainment Scaling T-score evolution over time. 
 
Note: R1, R2, and R3: assessments performed at 0, 3, and 6 months postintervention. 
 
Participation of everyday people. Overall, the level of participation of the everyday people 
was very low. Mission sheets were very rarely filled in. Only RK’s parents asked for feedback 
after the intervention. In interviews, parents, teachers and school assistants all reported that 
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the intervention was fun for the child and that metacognitive techniques “were useful”. 
However, when asked to provide examples of metacognitive strategies contained in the 
“Cognitive Coaching” guide they had received, seven out of ten everyday people recalled less 
than half of the strategies. Moreover, examples of strategy use were not always appropriate. 
Between-session assignments (including the simple task of helping the child to detect and 
write in a table when an “Oops error” had occurred) were never or rarely done. Concrete 
intervention content was much better followed than the abstract demand of “cognitive 
coaching”: one school assistant (PB’s) regularly used the paper notebook to compensate for 
PB’s constant PM failures relating to school goals (bring sports clothes, get a form signed), 
one mother (CS’s) started to cook with her daughter. Several parents reported that using the 
term “Oops error” helped to lower family’s tension to the child’s cognitive failures and some 
began using the term with their other children and themselves. All parents reported being 
generally too busy to apply the cognitive coaching at home. Teachers reported the children 
did not use the strategies at school, but had not prompted the children to do so. Both teachers 
and school assistants tended to emphasize the behavioral, attentional and “lack of effort” 
problems at school as the key problem for the child and did not consider metacognitive 
strategies use as a priority for the child. A lack of knowledge about TBI was identified with 
children’s difficulties not being seen as cognitive (“he does not try to pay attention”, “he has 
no friends”).  
DISCUSSION 
The “Context-sensitive GMT” intervention comprised of (1) an adapted Goal Management 
Training (GMT), (2) metacognitive strategies practice through meaningful activities, (3) a 
“cognitive coaching guide” for the child’s everyday people. The program was feasible to 
implement and apparently enjoyable for children. However, participation of everyday people 
was limited. Children significantly improved on the Saint Day Task (time-based prospective 
memory). EF performance in the ecological Children’s Cooking Task (CCT) improved in two 
children. Three children showed a decrease on parental BRIEF scores reflecting possibly less 
executive dysfunction in daily life at home. All children decreased their cognition DEX-C 
sub-score, suggesting that parents perceived improvement in cognitive EF impairment. There 
were some indications of generalization to untrained tasks in all children, but not sufficient to 
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achieve the expected level of achievement in EF-related GAS goals. When presented with a 
truly novel task (the parallel version of CCT- “Christmas biscuits”), all children dropped to 
their initial level of performance indicating a lack of generalization. Intervention effects 
persisted at three-month follow-up and were partially maintained at six-month follow-up. 
One reason why participation was low for everyday people was that families had difficult 
situations to deal with (see Table 1), leaving little time for the cognitive coaching of their 
child. The chronic phase of TBI may not be the optimum time for new cognitive coaching 
practices to be taught to parents and others, as many habits have already settled. The cognitive 
coaching guide, although simply explained, was abstract and everyday people were not 
involved in direct training sessions, as opposed to other programs 267,286,269. The cognitive 
coaching guide was rarely used by the teachers and school assistants. It is not entirely clear 
why this was, but one possibility is that the relatively limited contact with the investigators (a 
phone call before and after the study and the rest through a written guide) was not sufficient 
to engage them in the intervention contrary to other school-delivered interventions 290. This is 
clearly an important issue for future studies and for clinical interventions that depend heavily 
on a child’s everyday people for success. It is probably easier to engage school staff when the 
interventions are aimed at responding to their needs (especially managing behavior problems 
such as those reported in Feeney and Ylvisaker studies290,289). In everyday clinical practice, 
frequent contact with the child’s everyday people (especially school staff) is often not feasible 
and so examining whether written information (such as our cognitive coaching guide) can 
facilitate intervention support from these everyday people is an important research question.  
The prospective memory (PM) performance might have improved because the task became 
familiar and routine. However, previous studies with adults using a similar design did not 
show an improvement of performance with time97. Furthermore, children performed so poorly 
and with so much variation from week to week (very rarely giving the Saint day within one 
hour of the target time) that no possible routine could have been established. We could not 
control for the performance of the ongoing task (activity the child was doing at the target 
time). It has been emphasized that PM performance needs to take into account performance in 
the ongoing task as well as the PM performance because PM paradigms can be considered as 
a dual task paradigms65. As such it is possible that PM performance increased at the expense 
of ongoing activities. For one child (RK), his parents actually reported that he stopped all 
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activity up to one hour before the target time, watching the clock in order to perform the task 
(but often actually forgot the task anyway). Pausing activity to avoid missing an important 
phone call appointment may be considered an effective strategy in real life, albeit not for an 
hour beforehand.  
Although ratings on the parental BRIEF questionnaire improved, better scores may not have 
been due to improvement in EF. Rather, it is possible there was some bias in questionnaire 
responses. For example, parents were involved in the training and their responses may have 
reflected a desire to be perceived as good cognitive coaches. Furthermore, the “home-school 
cognitive coaching” guide may have increased carers’ insight into the child’s difficulties, 
meaning that even if improvements in behavior had occurred these were balanced out with 
greater awareness of difficulties on the part of the carer. These issues could perhaps explain 
why the other outcome measures (CCT, GAS) were not consistent with BRIEF scores (e.g. 
the BRIEF scores of CS and PB decreased but they did not improve on the CCT and whilst 
RK made best progress on CCT there was no corresponding decrease in BRIEF scores). 
However, it is possible that metacognitive strategies are effective in a time-limited task such 
as the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT) but impractical in the context of daily life’s constant 
attentional demands, as it is an effortful, top-down process. This may explain why RK made 
good progress on the CCT, but did not apply the metacognitive strategies in daily life so that 
parents did not notice a real change in everyday life post-intervention. Alternatively it may be 
the case that parents and other everyday people may not have had sufficient training to enable 
them to support the children to implement the strategies in everyday situations consistently. 
Furthermore, differences between objective measures and improvements reported by parents 
and patients have been frequently noted362,65. Correlations between parental BRIEF scores and 
EF classical tests151,153 and with the CCT 120 are typically small so the BRIEF might not have 
captured the children’s progress. However, all children significantly improved on the DEX-C 
cognition scores at R1, including IP and RK, which is consistent with earlier finding that the 
number of errors in CCT and DEX cognition subscales are highly correlated 120 in both 
adults357,379 and children120 and might be a better measure of the children’s executive progress 
than the BRIEF.  
For PB it is difficult to explain the contrast between consistency of improvement on DEX-C 
Cognition subscore, GAS, qualitatively reported generalization, parental BRIEF – and the 
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increased number of errors on CCT. This should however be interpreted with caution because 
all improvements were based on subjective informant reports, mostly of her mother. As PB 
seemed to have very poor awareness according to the therapist, the intervention might have 
improved her awareness rather than EF, which would explain perceived improvement in her 
natural contexts but not on objective measures of EF (CCT). Nevertheless, she is the child 
who seems to have benefited most from the intervention, with lasting effects at six months. 
This was unexpected as lack of insight is known to impede patients from actively engaging in 
rehabilitation 116 and is a factor of poorer outcome. Indeed, PB never found the sessions 
“useful”, but only “fun”. In the absence of awareness, her motivation did not seem to be to 
overcome her difficulties (perceived as non problematic) but rather to enjoy herself during the 
sessions, and through that enjoyment some implicit learning may have occurred. In children, 
enjoyment may be more important to an intervention’s success than awareness and our 
intervention seems to have fulfilled this requirement. As Bjorklund noted, “Trying something 
new may be a goal into itself, and the fact that it does not improve performance may be 
relatively unimportant to children” 288. This may be why children were happy to try the 
metacognitive strategies on paper-and-pencil tasks but showed no consistent application of 
strategies in the meaningful activities. The same finding has been reported in Missiuna’s 
study286 of cognitive strategy training in children with TBI: making the intervention fun was 
identified as being useful, whereas the “Goal-Plan-Do-Check” strategy (that is similar to 
GMT) and promotion of good strategy use were not. Considering together the evidence of 
ours and Missiuna’s studies (both on very small samples), it seems that strategy use does not 
come easily to children with more severe TBI and therefore may not be the best rehabilitation 
approach for them. In any case, strategies need to be simple, concrete and repeatedly practiced 
in order to benefit those children. 
Usually, elaborating a goal attainment scale (GAS) serves to focus rehabilitation on that goal. 
Such goal-focused rehabilitation is indeed an effective approach. However this presents a 
methodological challenge for EF-research: when a task is trained, its familiarity may make it 
less demanding on EF as it is likely to require the application of learned knowledge and task-
specific procedures (which may have become automatic therefore not “executive”), rather 
than more general problem solving and goal management processes 165,367. On the contrary, 
daily life is full of EF-demanding tasks that require conscious, novel and effortful 
processing22,165, without lapses into automaticity. Apparent progress after a goal-focused 
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training may not necessarily reflect changes in underlying executive processes needed to face 
daily life. Conversely, our aim was to improve children’s ability to cope with new, EF-
demanding situations. As an outcome measure needs to be novel (therefore untrained) to 
make significant demands on EF166,165, personal GAS goals were not trained, to keep GAS as 
a generalization measure of EF. However, in future studies it would be more pertinent to 
divide child’s goals into a trained set of goals (and corresponding GAS) and an untrained set 
of goals (and corresponding GAS) and then to focus the intervention on training the former 
while using the latter as an ecological generalization measure. In such an approach, main 
issues would be to match GAS sets for level of difficulty, child's interest and level of priority 
as seen by everyday people who participated in goal selection. Furthermore for GAS aiming 
at measuring generalization, it would be important to control how much explicit linking to 
these goals is done during the intervention. The intervention would probably be more 
effective if it combined goal-focused rehabilitation and general metacognitive training. 
Elaborating two sets of GAS has already been proposed by Schlosser380 in the concept of 
“control goals”. This could have supported further the finding of our study that children could 
be trained effectively in a meaningful task such as making a chocolate cake (CCT) by 
combining metacognitive training and repeated cake baking but could not be trained to 
manage a new untrained recipe (Christmas biscuits). More broadly, in rehabilitation research, 
using two sets of GAS would make of GAS methodology both a powerful motor for 
achieving meaningful goals by focusing intervention on them and a pertinent measure of 
generalization. Future research should also focus on other goal-setting procedures: we did not 
manage to agree on EF goals with the children in our study, whereas in Missiuna’s study286 , 
children were able to self-identify goals using a more framed and age-appropriate goal setting 
system than GAS, which could be used in future studies. However, children in Missiuna’s 
study286 had sustained mild to moderate TBI and were probably less impaired. Goal setting 
requires some basic level of awareness, which children with severe TBI often lack. Lack of 
awareness was identified for all children in our study except RK and seemed to be the main 
reason why goals could not be identified by the children. Besides, in Missiuna’s study, 
children were allowed to choose any goal (e.g. learn a new sport) whereas we purposefully 
retained only EF-related goals. More in-depth assessment of awareness would bring valuable 
contribution for research on goal-setting procedures.  
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The intervention was able to improve one particular prospective memory task performed in an 
ecological setting (SDT), it allowed some children to perform better in a cooking task (CCT) 
and it resulted in some gains in daily executive functioning. However, this metacognitive 
training did not allow enough generalization effects to reach expected levels in EF untrained 
personalized goals or to manage a novel complex EF-demanding task. The aim of providing 
children with meta-cognitive strategies applicable to "any" situation in life is an ideal goal but 
is perhaps not feasible: children’s ability to cope with new, EF-demanding situations of daily 
life may not be possible to improve with training in case of severe impairments. In those 
severe cases, a repeated, goal-focused rehabilitation using activities that are meaningful to the 
children, and not focusing on explicit generalization training, may be a more reasonable 
therapeutic option (see 286 for an example of effective goal-focused intervention in a small 
sample of children with TBI). It should also be emphasized that GMT targets more 
specifically the PM aspects of EF-demanding tasks and much less problem-solving abilities. 
This study supports a recent review229 in adults which concluded that GMT is probably more 
effective when combined with other interventions targeting other aspects of EF such as 
problem solving and initiation (see 119,118 for examples of such interventions in adults).  
Limitations of previously published studies included: insufficient assessment of 
generalization381, of specific effects on EF382,267, lack of objective cognitive performance 
measures (using questionnaires only as the outcome measure)299, use of problem-solving tasks 
that lack ecological validity297, lack of demonstration of EF difficulties prior to intervention374 
or lack of multiple baseline or follow-up in pre-post designs383,286. Others focused mainly on 
the behavioral aspects of the dysexecutive syndrome290,300. This study is to the best of our 
knowledge the first study that explores whether metacognitive training generalizes and helps 
children to adapt and manage a novel EF-demanding task and to achieve untrained goals. Of 
course the small sample of this study does not allow to draw general conclusions about the 
program efficacy. Our results must be interpreted with caution, especially because we 
included the most challenging population for this pilot intervention, which may have limited 
its effectiveness i.e. children with severe EF impairment and with three known major factors 
of poorer outcome12,14,71,77: (1) severe TBI; (2) sustained at an early age; (3) in non-optimally 
functioning families (similarly to Corbett’s GMT372 that targeted children from low socio-
economic background in Cape Town with little success). Those children are usually excluded 
from protocols286 and adult interventions using GMT usually target patients with moderate 
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and mild TBI99,119. As this study demonstrates the feasibility of the program for a particularly 
complex group of children, it would be helpful to replicate this study with children who have 
sustained a moderate TBI and children who may have more access to everyday people for 
providing cognitive coaching. On the other hand, in the clinical setting, it is precisely children 
with severe TBI and complex family situations that are most needy of intervention and future 
research should focus on this group, in spite of its challenges.  
For clinical use, the intervention may need further adaptation: the program may benefit from 
being longer to allow the children to integrate each strategy before practicing a new one, 
everyday people should be supported further to participate in the sessions, in a similar way to 
that used in Braga’s study267. Cognitive coaching should be presented through concrete 
activities to be done at home and at school rather than general concepts and advice. The 
intervention should be more closely embedded in the family life in order to improve family 
participation without adding an additional family burden384,385. Not all families are willing 
and/or capable of engaging in a family-delivered program385 and evaluating how to predict 
this prior to intervention would be of benefit to service providers. Direct contact with school 
staff is needed. The impact of parental metacognitive knowledge, skills and beliefs on 
outcomes in family-delivered interventions would also be a valuable component of future 
studies.  
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CHAPTER 8: METACOGNITIVE 
STRATEGY USE IN CHILDREN WITH 
SEVERE TBI 
INTRODUCTION 
In daily life our behaviours often implicitly reflect metacognitive knowledge. We act in ways 
that reflect that we are aware of how our cognitive processes work, and their limitations: 
double checking a bill, writing “to-do” lists when planning a week-end trip and reviewing if 
we have met all our goals for the day before leaving work, are examples of use of 
‘metacognition’. We know that we might have made an error in the bill; we know we might 
forget one of the steps to make the week-end trip successful and we know we might have 
forgotten one of the tasks we were supposed to do at work that day. Through experience, we 
acquire knowledge about our cognition and implicitly learn how to overcome cognitive 
failures before they actually happen.  
We know from developmental literature that older healthy children use strategies more often, 
select more effective and efficient strategies and perform better than younger children, but 
even young children use some strategies that reflect knowledge of their cognition288. 
Although younger healthy children don’t usually produce strategies spontaneously (termed 
“production deficiency”), they can be trained to use a strategy and enhance their performance 
as a result 288. They will, however, often fail to generalize a trained strategy to a new task, 
reverting to their nonstrategic ways 261. Conversely, other children will use a strategy but it 
will not improve performance (termed utilization deficiency) because of the effortful nature of 
strategies: children who use a strategy (especially a new one) may not have enough “mental 
resources”288 and especially working memory (WM) space left to devote to solving the 
problem at hand. Furthermore children’s lack of awareness that a strategy is not helping, and 
generally poor metacognition, may mean they fail to recognize that the extra effort they are 
applying isn’t benefitting them 386. Children who practice strategies eventually get good at 
192 
 
them, and their performance improves. As utilization deficiency is short-lived, teaching 
strategies to children is an effective process in healthy children.  
METACOGNITION AND TBI 
Since Price described two patients with frontal damage acquired early in life whose lack of 
“insight and foresight” (i.e. metacognition) resulted in severe behavioral problems 43, a 
number of studies have shown metacognitive impairment in children with TBI 
81,82,83,219,220,221,84. 
Literature has shown that adults with TBI are less able to detect their errors than controls in 
multitasking activities 247 but once detected, they are able to correct them just as well as 
controls. However, patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) tend to repeat errors they had 
detected and corrected, while controls rarely repeat errors after they have corrected them 
once247. It has been proposed that inability to self-generate feedback could be a reason why 
patients with TBI are described as poor at learning from their errors.  
The use of metacognitive strategy training is a practice standard in adults with executive 
functioning deficits 114, however there is no evidence for effectiveness of metacognitive 
training for children with a dysexecutive syndrome 110,113,111. Since Vytgotsky’s 387and 
Luria’s388 exploration of problem-solving, metacognitive strategies have been proposed to 
help children in problem solving: Talking aloud to solve a problem 387, “Goal-Plan-Do-
Check”389 286 “Stop and Think” are most well-known examples. Authors advocate 
metacognitive strategy use in children presenting with developmental coordination 
disorder295,389, specific learning disabilities such as math problem-solving 390, and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 269 with successful results. The few studies that have 
explored metacognitive strategy use in children with TBI showed more equivocal results. The 
“Goal-Plan-Do-Check” strategy (that is similar to Goal Management Training) and promotion 
of good strategy use were not identified as being useful 286.  
Most metacognitive strategies described in the literature have not been validated. Evidence for 
their age-appropriateness is lacking. Many questions have not been addressed: From a 
developmental point of view, from what age is a child able to learn to use a particular 
metacognitive strategy, irrespective of brain injury status? Are brain injured children capable 
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of understanding, learning and using a metacognitive technique efficiently, while they are 
specifically impaired in EF-related functions including metacognition? Can metacognition 
(and especially metacognitive strategy use) be trained in children who have suffered a TBI? 
And from which age?  
The aims of this study were (1) to investigate metacognitive strategy use after specific 
training (2) to identify possible candidate factors impeding successful metacognitive strategy 
use. 
METHODS 
This study was part of a larger pilot study that tested an intervention based on a context-
sensitive Goal Management Training combined with ecological activity practice. Details and 
effectiveness of the intervention are reported elsewhere (see chapter 7)200. The training was 
administered weekly, for 15-20 hours over a 4-6 month period. As already described in 
chapter 7, children were taught metacognitive strategies through discussion of stories where 
characters presented cognitive failures (see table 8.1), introducing how those may be 
prevented. Then they performed exercises, first without, and then with, a metacognitive 
strategy as a “proof” of its usefulness, initially on paper-and-pencil exercises, then on 
ecological activities in the rehabilitation centre and finally on real life activities at home and 
school (see table 8.2 for an example).  
The program used a range of functional, meaningful activities. It was consistent with Toglia’s 
recommendation 355 of using several settings to increase metacognition. Metacognitive 
strategies used in the training were developed from Goal Management Training and included 
the following metacognitive strategies to help children with planning, successful step-
following, and carrying out prospective memory intentions: “Stop! What am I doing?”, “I 
make a plan”, “STOP! I state my goal!”, “I split the task into sub tasks”, “I check the step is 
finished before proceeding”, “Stop! Am I Following my plan?”, “Make a to do list”, “I write 
it down in my paper notebook”, “I check my paper note book”, “I look into my mental note 
book” (the paper notebook is taken as an analogy of the “mental” notebook bearing 
prospective memory intentions in one’s mind). The children also learnt to recognize and 
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identify factors influencing the occurrence of “Oops errors” (attentional gaps, action slips, and 
prospective memory failures) and to prevent its reoccurrence.  
TABLE 8.1: Examples of situations and stories used as examples in the training 
Daily life problems related to executive 
dysfunction:  
e.g. putting an essay to hand in at school 
into a sports bag instead of a school bag.  
Consequences of the problems:  
e.g. stress while looking in the school bag 
for the essay, feeling upset when finding 
the essay in the evening while getting 
dressed for football, getting a lower mark 
because the essay was handed in late… 
Factors that contributed to the problem: 
e.g.: going to bed late because of writing 
the essay at the last minute, being in a rush 
when preparing the school bag and the 
sports bag the next day 
Story illustrating “Being side-tracked from your goal”: 
“Gavin was playing football with his friends in the field near his 
house, but half through the match, the ball became stuck in a 
very tall tree and they couldn’t get it down!!! As all his friends 
wanted to finish the game, Gavin suggested he go and get his 
own football at home that was close by. So he went home 
assuring his friends he’d be back in 5 minutes. 
As he got home, he began looking for the ball when the phone 
rang, so he answered the phone: it was his cousin John from 
America. He told Gavin that his parents were planning a holiday 
in Montgolfier in the United States and that Gavin was invited 
to go with them!!!  
He got so excited by the trip that he completely forgot about the 
match, the ball and about his friends!!! His friends had been 
waiting for him to arrive with the ball for an hour… and finally 
came to his house angry!” 
 
Table 8.2: Example of a series of exercises introducing the metacognitive strategy “STOP! State your 
goal” 
Exercises first without a metacognitive strategy Do some of each task (word finding, card sorting, 
identifying differences between two images, number 
trail) 
Strategy introduced “I want you to say aloud to yourself: “My main goal 
is to do something from each of the tasks”. I then want 
you to write this in your mental notebook 
To try and help you, I am going to say “STOP!” from 
time-to-time. When I say “STOP!” all I want you to 
do is to think about what’s on your mental notebook 
and whether you are on track to achieve that goal.” 
Exercises with a metacognitive strategy as a “proof” 
of its usefulness on paper-and-pencil exercises 
Do some of each task (different content of previous 
tasks but same format and goal). 
Exercises with a metacognitive strategy as a “proof” 
of its usefulness on ecological activities in the 
rehabilitation centre 
Route finding and completing a series of missions 
(find out the length of the swimming pool, get an 
appointment in another department, find out the name 
of the doctor on duty, find a telephone number…) 
Exercises with a metacognitive strategy on real life 
activities at home and school 
Set the table for family evening meal: activity 
proposed to parents in a “cognitive coaching guide”, 
with explanation of the mental notebook and of the 
“STOP” cue. 
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The program used a range of functional, meaningful activities. It was consistent with Toglia’s 
recommendation 355 of using several settings to increase metacognition. Metacognitive 
strategies used in the training were developed from Goal Management Training and included 
the following metacognitive strategies to help children with planning, successful step-
following, and carrying out prospective memory intentions: “Stop! What am I doing?”, “I 
make a plan”, “STOP! I state my goal!”, “I split the task into sub tasks”, “I check the step is 
finished before proceeding”, “Stop! Am I Following my plan?”, “Make a to do list”, “I write 
it down in my paper notebook”, “I check my paper note book”, “I look into my mental note 
book” (the paper notebook is taken as an analogy of the “mental” notebook bearing 
prospective memory intentions in one’s mind). The children also learnt to recognize and 
identify factors influencing the occurrence of “Oops errors” (attentional gaps, action slips, and 
prospective memory failures) and to prevent its reoccurrence.  
Children included in the study had sustained a severe TBI at least two years earlier, had a 
documented dysexecutive syndrome and had executive functioning difficulties in daily life as 
reported by parents and school staff (see chapter 7).  
Three types of tasks were used to assess children’s use of metacognitive strategies after the 
training: the Six-part test from the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome in 
Children (BADS-C)235 and the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT)120,121,201, administered before 
and after the intervention, and the Organization Task, designed for this study (see below for a 
detailed description) administered after the intervention only. The assessment did not focus on 
traditional scoring of the tasks but on the strategies children used to earn a good score and the 
effectiveness of those strategies.  
(1) In the Six-part test, children are instructed to do some of each of the six tasks in a set 
amount of time, respecting the rule of never doing two tasks of the same colour consecutively. 
As such it is very similar to some of the exercises used in the training. The Six-part test is a 
validated and normed test of EF, which is considered more ecological than typical EF tests, 
although it is still a paper and pencil test, performed in an office-based context. 
(2) The CCT is a truly ecological EF test, validated for children with TBI but it does not have 
norms. In the CCT, children have to prepare a chocolate cake and a fruit cocktail following 
structured, photo-cued, child-friendly recipes contained in a cooking book along with 
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distracter recipes. Each recipe comprises numbered step-by-step instructions with a picture for 
each step, however each step can contain more than one action (e.g.: add the sugar, the vanilla 
sugar and mix). Not all instructions are stated, in order to assess children’s adaptability to the 
context (e.g.: use a straw to open and empty a carton of apple juice into a glass). The 
necessary ingredients and utensils are assembled on a table with the instruction sheet and the 
cookbook, along with distracter utensils (e.g. small bowl next to the needed mixing bowl) and 
distractors ingredients (e.g. salt next to the sugar). Children are instructed to perform the task 
with no commentary and to behave as if they were alone, not asking the examiner for help. 
The task has been shown to be highly sensitive to executive dysfunction as it is novel, 
challenging, open-ended, uses a real life context, food and utensils, requires multiple goal 
management and innovative and higher level strategies in order to succeed. It can be 
performed from the age of 8. CCT scores include the number of “errors”, and qualitative data, 
errors being defined as omissions, additions, substitutions – sequence errors, estimation errors 
and commentary-questions. Table 8.3 shows examples of behaviours counted as errors, taken 
from the sample of the five children in the study.  
Table 8.3: Examples of participants’ behaviours counting as errors in the CCT 
Commentaries 
and questions 
-asks to stop the recipe because the pastry is not as it should be on the 
photo (PB) 
-tells the examiner a knife is missing (RK) 
-says “That’s so easy! I’m so intelligent” (IP) 
Omissions -does not add sugar (PB) 
-does not mix the pastry as stated at the end of step three (CS) 
-adds two glasses of flour instead of three (PB) 
Additions - walks around the table thinking about what to do (RK) 
- adds ingredients presented on the table but not required in the recipe 
(YR) 
-cleans each object every time he uses it (RK) 
Substitutions – 
sequence errors 
-starts with the wrong recipe (first recipe of workbook) (RK) 
-uses a small bowl instead of a salad bowl (IP) 
-does step three before step two (CS) 
Estimation 
errors 
-adds flour to a small bowl already full of sugar (IP) 
-adds all the sparkling water to the glass with water flowing out of it (RK) 
-adds all the baking powder without counting how much is needed (YR) 
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(3) The Organization Task was a multi-element task, designed for the study in which the aim 
is not to do something of each task as in the Six-part test but to earn as many points as 
possible in five minutes. Children were given a list of 12 tasks (e.g. sorting cards, learning 
word lists, circling verbs and colour names in a text, building blocks towers, performing 
simple calculations). Each task varied considerably in the time needed to complete it (5 
seconds to 3 minutes per task), in difficulty and in the number of points the task gives (10 to 
200 points per task). There was no correlation between the task length and number of possible 
points (i.e. some tasks were very short and easy and gave many points). The Organization 
Task was very similar to an exercise used four times in the GMT (identical in format but 
different in content, although both used the same materials: cards, blocks, colour pens, texts 
and word lists). During the training, children were taught to stop, think about the goal and 
make a plan before beginning an activity. They practiced how to make a plan according to the 
predicted difficulty of a task, judgment of the time required to complete it, effectiveness in 
terms of points and personal preference/strength (some children being used to sorting cards 
others preferring simple calculations). Tasks used were not over-trained tasks as the 
intervention was not a repetitive training but an exposure to metacognitive strategies. As the 
format of the Organization Task was identical to exercises used as proof of utility of the 
metacognitive strategies (see table 8.2) it allowed us to detect spontaneous metacognitive 
strategy use without the need to recognize task similarity because task similarity with the 
exercises from the training was so obvious. In case children did not use the metacognitive 
strategy spontaneously, however, a second version of the Organization Task (Organization 
Task 2) followed, in which the examiner explicitly prompted the child to use the strategy 
“make a plan” before beginning the task, to investigate accuracy in the metacognitive 
strategies application. 
The tasks were administered in the following order after the intervention: (1) Organization 
Task 1; (2) Organization Task 2; (3) CCT; (4) six-part test. The following data was recorded 
for all tasks: spontaneous use of a metacognitive strategy, response to examiner’s prompts to 
use a metacognitive strategy (Organization Task 2 only), correct remembering of the 
metacognitive strategy technique, correctness of metacognitive strategy use, success in the 
task with metacognitive strategy use. The underlying question was to assess if metacognitive 
strategies are spontaneously used after training and if they help. Qualitative data were 
recorded to screen for any factor preventing effective metacognitive strategy use. After the 
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intervention, parents and children were interviewed as to the spontaneous or prompted use of 
metacognitive strategy at home to screen for reasons facilitating or preventing children from 
applying metacognitive strategies in their natural contexts.  
RESULTS 
Five children were initially included for the study. One child (YR) dropped out after four 
training sessions, so only the data from the four children who completed the training is 
presented. Pre and post intervention results of the CCT and six-part test are reported in table 
8.4  
Table 8.4: Scores for the Six Part Test and the Children’s Cooking Task (CCT): 
PB CS RK IP YR 
Six-Part Test Standard scores before metacognitive strategy training 
10 7 8 6 7 
Six-Part Test Standard scores after metacognitive strategy training 
10 7 4 9  
Number of errors on CCT before metacognitive strategy training (second baseline) 
64 41 76 168  
Number of errors on CCT after metacognitive strategy training 
69 32 28 72  
 
Note: higher six-part test standard scores show better EF, higher number of errors in 
CCT shows worse EF.  
As previously noted the Organisation Task did not yield a score but was only used to detect 
metacognitive strategy use. Detailed data of cognitive functioning of the children (and 
especially EF), injury and demographic characteristics can be found in chapter 7 of the thesis, 
table 7.1 or in the related paper200. Data on self-awareness (metacognitive knowledge and on-
line awareness) and CCT performance are detailed in chapter 4 (and related paper260) and 
briefly repeated here in table 8.5. 
CHILD PB 
PB was 11. She had sustained a motor-vehicle passenger accident at the age of 2.5 years with 
severe brain lesions and immediate neurosurgical treatment. She attended mainstream school 
with a part time school assistant. She had Epilepsy absences treated by carbamazepine. 
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Training: PB could use metacognitive strategies correctly but she could not see metacognitive 
strategy usefulness and was very resentful of using them throughout the program. When 
strongly prompted to use strategies on simple paper-and pencil tasks (such as GMT card 
sorting), she interpreted the strategy per se to be the main goal and used the strategy correctly, 
but was so focused on the strategy rather than the task that her performance dropped 
compared to card sorting without strategy use. In ecological tasks, when forced to stop and 
check, she had difficulty noticing her errors and omissions. She viewed strategy use as an 
additional task and applied it as a goal of its own, to please the trainer rather than as a helpful 
strategy that could help her to perform an activity. Her attitude towards the training can easily 
be described with her usual response “I love it! I’d like to do the cooking again but please 
don’t make me do that stopping and checking again”.  
Post-training testing: PB showed no strategy use in any of the post-training tasks. No 
improvement was seen in the CCT nor six-part test compared to baseline. In the CCT, she did 
not make the same errors (e.g. forgetting the baking powder) but increased the total number of 
errors, as she considered the recipe easier each time. In Organisation Task 1, after finishing 
two easy subtasks, she spent a considerable time reflecting on what to do next, while time was 
running out and finally earned very few points. Before being prompted in Organisation Task 
2, she began making a plan spontaneously but only took some factors into account (mainly 
personal preferences) without looking at the number of points the task gave. This resulted in a 
slightly better, but still poor performance. When asked about the plan she made, she said she 
was quite satisfied with it. It was not clear if her plan was poor because it was long and 
fastidious to do or because she ignored the goal of earning as many points as possible in order 
to do enjoyable subtasks and have fun, which is consistent with her overall behavior during 
the months of training.  
Daily life: Surprisingly, while showing no sign of strategy use in the post-training tests, 
family, school and PB herself reported she had made great progress after the training. She 
arrived at school on time much more often, without forgetting her schoolbag. Her mother 
found her explaining to a family friend how her brain worked, using analogies presented 
during the training. Moreover, PB identified effective cognitive techniques in daily life by 
herself, for example linking her orange juice with taking her antiepileptic drug at breakfast.  
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CHILD CS 
CS was 11. She had sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) when a soccer post fell on 
her head at the age of 6.5 years, causing mainly cerebellar and right parieto-occipital lesions. 
She attended part-time special, part-time mainstream schooling. Her intellectual quotient was 
in the low average range, and she had impaired theory of mind and language pragmatics 
described in her previous rehabilitation reports. 
Training: Discussion based on GMT stories was difficult to promote as she lacked theory of 
mind skills that are necessary to understand the character’s thoughts. Her poor vocabulary 
(e.g. “consequence” of an error) limited her understanding of GMT concepts and 
metacognitive strategies. CS had severe reasoning difficulties. Even after 15 sessions, she 
could not logically order steps required to prepare a school bag or to plan a party (from easy 
informative drawings of party preparing steps), therefore strategic thinking and strategies like 
“I make a plan” were simply impossible for her. Any unexpected event requiring additional 
problem-solving made her fail the activity, as her flexibility was low. Conversely, once 
provided with an explicit strategy, she was willing to apply it, though usually without success. 
Her strategy use could be described as rigid, not internalized, allowing no flexibility and 
therefore probably not truly “meta-cognitive”.  
Post-training tests: CS showed no correct strategy use in any of the post-training tasks (CCT, 
six-part test), and performance remained stable in both the CCT and six-part test. She was 
used to cooking quite often with her Mum and seemed to rely heavily on her knowledge and 
procedural skills for completing the task, rather than using strategies or problem solving. In 
Organisation Task 1 she spontaneously made a plan on totally arbitrary criteria, without 
reading the full list of tasks and not taking into account the possible points. She chose mainly 
the first tasks, including card sorting, which she always performed poorly during the training. 
As she overestimated her capacity to sort cards, she earned no points in Organisation Task 1. 
In Organisation Task 2, she made a plan based on personal preferences but without any 
reference to the goal of earning points and obtained a poor score. CS seemed proud of having 
made a plan, judging it as a good performance and a goal achieved on its own, ignoring the 
main goal of earning as many points as possible.  
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Daily life metacognitive strategy use: School reported no progress and no spontaneous 
strategy use. Her parents reported some progress in domains that could not be linked with the 
metacognitive strategy training. It was difficult to obtain information from parents about 
strategy use in daily life. 
CHILD IP 
IP was 8 at the beginning of the training. A television post had fallen on his head at the age of 
5.5 years, causing severe TBI. He attended a mainstream school with a part-time school 
assistant. He was diagnosed with ADHD, with symptoms that had probably started prior to 
the TBI.  
Training: IP understood quickly all the metacognitive strategies, although he could not 
understand what they were for and was often annoyed to be asked to use them. He was 
protected by his carers, who confronted him as little as possible with his difficulties (e.g. 
managing his schoolbag preparation). He therefore did not have the opportunity to realize he 
was impaired and lacked knowledge about the consequences of his TBI. During training 
sessions, he alternated from overestimating his abilities (“I’m the most intelligent boy in my 
whole class, this exercise is just too easy”) to deep self-deprecation (“I can’t do it because I’m 
just too stupid”). He showed strong emotional reactions to his performance, including crying 
when he was failing a cooking recipe, inappropriate laughing, and throwing a tantrum on the 
floor when he could not find a solution to a problem. Associated hyperactivity symptoms, 
possibly present prior to TBI made it very challenging for him to concentrate on the tasks.  
Post-training tests: IP showed no strategy use in the post-training tasks. When presented with 
Organisation Task 1, he said: “Oh, I think I need to make a plan first… No actually I don’t 
need a plan, it’s too easy!” and began without a plan, trying different tasks without success 
and earned no points. When prompted to make a plan in Organisation Task 2, he only decided 
which two subtasks to do first, and spent a considerable amount of time reading the tasks 
during the testing and obtained a poor score. Although he did not seem to use strategies, his 
performance on the six-part test and CCT improved. 
Daily life strategy use: His teacher and school assistant reported no progress and no strategy 
use at school. Carers at home thought he made fewer slips and prospective memory failures, 
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however they could not recall a precise strategy or technique they saw him use and therefore 
his progress may be due to other factors than metacognitive strategy training.  
CHILD RK 
RK was 13. He had sustained a severe TBI following a motor-vehicle pedestrian accident at 
the age of 7. He attended part-time private schooling with a school assistant, part time private 
lessons. He suffered severe attention problems. Although he was aged 13 at the time of the 
study, his parents could never leave him at home alone, he was not allowed to enter the 
kitchen as he usually forgot to switch off the gas. 
CCT: He suggested that the recipe was not feasible instead of looking for a strategy to 
compensate for the lack of a knife (children don’t need to cut the butter but if they want to, 
they can use the fork’s handle to cut it). His performance was very much affected by long 
periods of purposeless actions such as cleaning the pastry left on the mixer with a clean little 
spoon, cleaning the spoon with a clean wooden spoon, cleaning the wooden spoon with a fork 
until no clean utensils were left on the table.  
Training: RK was very motivated throughout the training. His good intellectual level, rapid 
reasoning and motivation to be independent helped him understand efficiently the 
metacognitive strategies and kept his motivation up. He rapidly made the techniques his own 
and used them whenever he noticed task similarity with a previous module. He could apply 
them successfully in ecological activities. However, he finished each session exhausted and it 
was clear that he used great attentional resources to use the strategies and to perform the 
activities. After the sessions, he was too tired to participate in cognitively demanding 
activities in the rehabilitation centre. 
Post-training tests: RK spontaneously and efficiently used the “Make a plan” technique in 
Organisation Tasks 1 and 2, without being prompted and took into account all variables, 
earning the maximum possible number of points. Moreover, strategy use was also seen on the 
CCT (e.g. checking he finished a step before moving to the next, saying “Stop!” and thinking 
before pouring a new ingredient). As a result, RK dramatically decreased his number of 
errors, nearly reaching age-matched controls’ performance. However, after completing the 
CCT task, he completely failed the six-part test, decreasing his score compared to baseline.  
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Daily life strategy use: RK reported that, though effective, metacognitive strategies were 
impossible to apply in his stressful and busy lifestyle (he had ten siblings at home). RK 
reported hurrying to begin a task before he could make a plan or write down the necessary 
steps. His family reported that RK didn’t apply the metacognitive strategies to home daily life 
situations they would have liked him to make progress in (e.g. tidying his room, crossing the 
road) so they did not see a real change in his behavior after the intervention. When he did use 
strategies at home for an activity he selected (for example to make biscuits he had practiced 
during the intervention for his family), he could obtain better results than before training, 
however his parents reported that RK was so exhausted afterwards, that his cognitive 
problems increased in the following activity as a result. 
 
Data from all five children is summarized in table 8.5. For all children, the striking point was 
the contrast between the effectiveness of the cognitive techniques in the office based tasks 
(such as the GMT card sorting task) and the difficulty of using them in complex ecological 
activities (such as cooking): children seemed so overwhelmed with the task requirement that 
they forgot to use the metacognitive strategies. When children practiced the strategies, they all 
seemed to consider the metacognitive strategy as something additional to do rather than a way 
of succeeding at the task in hand. Enjoyment was the main motivating factor, irrespective of 
success.  
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 TABLE 8.5: Summary of participants’ use of Metacognitive Strategies (MSs) 
 A
ge 
Awareness 
(see chapter XX for 
details) 
 
Behavior during MS training 
program 
CCT (see chapter 4 and 7 for 
details) 
Six-part test and Organisation 
Tasks 
Daily life 
PB 11 Good basic level of 
intellectual awareness 
Poor higher level of 
intellectual awareness 
and on-line awareness 
“It’s not useful but it’s fun” 
 
 Could use MSs correctly during 
training but resentful to use them 
throughout the program 
 
Focusing on not repeating 
previous errors but making 
more errors each time as she 
considered the recipe easier 
each time. Never repeated 
same errors but forgot another 
step or ingredient each time. 
Did not apply MSs even when 
prompted 
 
Did not see MSs utility 
 
Paradoxically, MSs 
application at home and at 
school; new MSs created 
by herself and applied with 
success. 
CS 11 Good intellectual (both 
basic level and higher 
level) 
Poor on-line awareness 
Poor comprehension and abstract 
reasoning preventing good 
understanding and use of the MSs. 
MS use was rigid, non-truly 
internalized, allowing no flexibility 
and therefore probably not truly 
“meta-cognitive”. 
Good performance. Errors 
were mainly commentaries 
and questions throughout the 
recipe while the instructions 
state to perform the task 
without asking for help.  
Tried to apply MSs but without 
success. 
Viewed MSs application as a 
goal on its own, irrespective of 
outcome (utilization deficiency) 
No effect 
IP 8 Moderate awareness, 
intellectual awareness 
slightly better than on-
line awareness 
Quick understanding of MSs but 
thought he did not need them. 
“I know a strategy for this but this 
task is too easy to apply it”  
Alternated from overestimations of 
his abilities to deep depreciation 
Estimation errors 
Hyperactivity 
Behavioral and emotional 
manifestations 
Failure to make the cake  
Did not want to apply MSs even 
when prompted. 
 
No effect 
RK 13 Good awareness Motivated but overwhelmed by 
attentional demands of the task 
Endless Perseveration 
Fluctuation in attention level 
Difficulty in strategy search 
and poor flexibility 
Applied MSs spontaneously 
with success to Organisation 1 
and 2 and CCT.  
Failed to apply MSs on the last 
task (six-part test) and fails. 
 
Effective in short time 
activities.  
“Too tiring and time 
consuming to apply in 
daily life”  
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DISCUSSION  
After 15-20 hours of metacognitive training, CS used metacognitive strategies 
inappropriately, without success and without understanding them; IP had learned how to use 
strategies but did not understand the need to use them; RK learned strategies well and they 
improved his performance but he could apply them only to time-limited activities and not 
throughout the day, making them impractical and therefore ecologically of little use. PB 
showed a paradoxal response with no strategy use in the rehabilitation setting while using 
them in her natural contexts.  
Our results from children PB and CS are consistent with Bjorklund’s “strategy utilization 
deficiency” 288,261 described in young children: because of the effortful nature of strategies, 
children who use a strategy (especially a new one) may not have enough “mental 
resources”288 and especially WM space left to devote to solving the problem at hand (their 
focus of attention is on the strategy rather than on the task). Developmental research found a 
relation between strategy use and WM 391,392. As such CS concentrated on the strategy rather 
than the task and all her WM was used by the strategy rather than the task, and she did not 
improve performance with the strategy. Also, during the training, most children resorted to 
usual nonstrategic ways when they had to move from a paper and pencil task to a more 
ecological task. Furthermore CS’s lack of awareness that the strategy was not helping did not 
allow her to recognize that the extra effort she was putting in didn’t result in any benefit 386. If 
she had practiced the strategies for long enough, her performance might perhaps improve as 
utilization deficiencies are short-lived in typically-developing children. There remains the 
question of whether this is also the case for children whose EF and metacognitive abilities 
have been compromised by a TBI. Bjorklund also described a “strategy mediation deficiency” 
(children who can’t manage to apply a strategy) and CS’s rigid and inappropriate application 
of strategies might have been due also to a mediation deficiency. Our results are also in line 
with Bjorklund’s finding that the main requirement for children to benefit from strategy 
training is to have fun while learning to use the strategies, irrespective of their success.  
Metacognitive strategy use is a top-down process and thus costly in attentional resources. 
Young children process information less efficiently than older children do, making them less 
206 
 
likely to use a strategy spontaneously and less likely to benefit from the imposition of a 
strategy 288. It has been hypothesized that having a detailed, elaborated knowledge base 
results in faster processing for domain-specific information, which in turn results in more 
efficient processing and greater availability of mental resources. The relationship between 
knowledge and strategy use has been demonstrated in many domains256,261,288. Knowledge 
may influence performance in three ways: (1) by increasing the accessibility of specific items; 
(2) by the relatively effortless activation of relations among sets of items (without the need to 
implement an effortful strategy); (3) by facilitating the use of deliberate strategies. The 
multiple cognitive impairments of included children may have increased WM load and 
contributed to obtaining little benefit from strategy use. Furthermore, the effortful nature of 
metacognitive strategy application may make it impractical for use in daily life and may limit 
its effectiveness given the low attentional resources TBI children experience (RK being an 
example of this limitation). Therefore, before providing the child and the family with 
metacognitive strategy training, its ecological validity should be assessed on real life 
activities. A metacognitive technique effective in an office may not be efficient in daily life 
and in the natural context of the child.  
Preserved metacognition/self-awareness has been linked to the ability to learn the use of 
compensatory strategies 210,393,394,395,396,397. However it has also been reported that patients can 
use compensatory strategies without a prerequisite level of awareness 398: Sohlberg’s study 
indicated a dissociation between behavioral and perceptual indicators of awareness - patient K 
increased his independence in grocery shopping but without any indicators of increased 
insight (measured by caregiver ratings and judgments of photographs depicting cognitive 
failures where patient K had to judge if they would likely occur in his life). Sohlberg had 
proposed that for more severely impaired subjects, it may be more productive to tap into 
implicit learning and procedural knowledge without addressing declarative knowledge for 
why the compensatory strategy is important. PB seems to confirm the dissociation between 
lack of awareness and progress in the problematic behavior in Sohlberg’s patient K. PB is 
particularly interesting because she lacked on-line and anticipatory awareness and did not find 
the strategies useful, nor did she apply them effectively during rehabilitation sessions but she 
applied them at home. Some authors suggested that implicit learning plays an important role 
in on-line awareness. An implicit mechanism is thought to guide behavioral responses in the 
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absence of conscious awareness of current state399 and is an important component of 
awareness models accounting for tacit awareness (evidenced by task avoidance and 
behavioral adaptability in the absence of conscious awareness of deficits). Patients with 
impaired implicit sequence learning have been shown to have more impaired awareness than 
those with intact implicit learning 400.One possible explanation is that learning during a task 
depends upon the integrity of an implicit anticipatory/ predictive mechanism, that may 
contribute to on-line awareness, which is mediated by frontal circuitry and diminished or 
abolished after neuropathology 401. PB might have progressed through this implicit learning. 
“Just because something is not registered in consciousness does not mean that it is not 
registered at all or that it cannot influence ongoing experience”402 (p. 217). An individual, 
who demonstrates poor intellectual awareness at a verbal level, may have some awareness of 
a deficit that can be observed during task performance. Anosognosic patients indicate that 
they appreciate their deficits at some level of awareness even though they do not explicitly 
acknowledge them 403. Clinicians need to be alert to observations that suggest implicit 
awareness. Areas of implicit knowledge can be capitalized on in treatment by either training 
tasks at a nonverbal or procedural level or by trying to make implicit knowledge accessible to 
consciousness 211. 
Finally, IP’s emotional instability may also have affected how he responded to metacognitive 
strategy training. Knowledge and beliefs about one’s capabilities are based on past 
experiences in similar situations211. Beliefs regarding one’s self are the products of 
experience, but they are also involved in the construction of experiences404. Beliefs and 
perceptions of one’s capabilities can create biases in the processing and interpretation of 
information that can enhance or impede cognitive functioning. They can influence activities 
one chooses to engage in, selection of strategies, what is monitored, the degree of effort and 
persistence, and commitment to goals. Thus, inaccurate beliefs regarding one’s capabilities 
can limit cognitive performance by their disrupting effects on self-monitoring and self-
regulatory processes. Larson 248 examined the relative contributions of negative affect and 
cognitive sequelae to performance monitoring dysfunction following severe TBI using event-
related potentials. Negative affect was associated with decreased amplitude of error-related 
negativity that is thought to correspond to implicit error detection. Cognitive sequelae 
predicted positive deflection amplitude that is thought to reflect conscious error detection. In 
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another study Larson405 found that impairment in performance monitoring had a 
disproportionate effect when negative affect is overlaid on severe TBI (event-related potential 
results revealed disproportionately smaller error-related negativity amplitudes in participants 
with TBI relative to controls as a function of negative affect). In future, negative affect and 
more generally self-perception and task orientation406,407 should be addressed during training 
in order to maximize intervention trainings.  
FACTORS IMPEDING METACOGNITIVE STRATEGYUSE 
Based on data from these case-studies and from literature on awareness, metacognitive 
strategy use, and metacognitive and EF development, we identified potential causes impeding 
children to use effectively metacognitive strategies in daily life. These are presented in table 
8.6 together with possible factors contributing to failure at each step and possible ways to 
remediate them that would need to be explored in future research. 
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TABLE 8.6: Hypotheses for potential causes impeding children’s use of metacognitive strategies (MS) in daily life and possible ways to remediate them 
 
Necessary requirements for 
effective MS use 
Child Factors contributing to failure of the requirement 
 
Potential useful principles to remediate to the failure of the 
requirement 
“I’ve been confronted with 
my problem”6 
IP Lack of knowledge 
Young age 
-Parents information: parents may not realise their child who sustained an 
ABI is more impaired than peers and therefore not realize that they give 
more support to their child than to healthy children 
-Child confronted to situations parents usually manage for him: high levels 
of support usually provided by family and professionals to ensure that the 
child experiences success at all times might in turn prevent opportunities 
for the child to develop awareness83. 
“I’m aware I have a problem” 
(Crosson’s lower level of 
intellectual awareness) 
YR “Organic” Awareness, neurologically-based awareness  
Low to high confrontational methods (see Ylvisaker for examples83): 
Ylvisaker et al presented awareness intervention methods ranging from low 
confrontation (e.g. self-evaluation, daily conversational interactions, peer 
teaching...) to high-confrontation (e.g. presentation of low test results, self-
observation of video-tapes performance on a difficult task). They 
emphasized that interventions should be chosen according to child’s age, 
emotional fragility, consequences of unawareness and the resources 
available in the family.  
 
“…And I realize its 
consequences” (Crosson’s 
higher level of intellectual 
awareness) 
 
PB Systematic corrections from environment, minimising of the 
consequences 
-Discussion about the consequences of cognitive failures 
-Confrontation to consequences instead of systematic correction of failures 
before consequences appear. 
“I accept that I have a 
problem “ 
YR Denial Psychological support 
“I understand a metacognitive 
strategy technique” 
CS Weakness in vocabulary, reasoning, global intellectual 
weakness 
Training basic cognitive skills: Knowledge base, Vocabulary before trying 
higher-order interventions such as MS trainings (see the “Pediatric 
Neurocognitive Intervention model”408 for a practical hierarchy of 
interventions to use) 
“I recognize the 
metacognitive strategy as 
useful”  
 
IP, 
PB 
Examples and practice on decontextualized paper-and-pencil 
exercises, without sufficient repetition for utilisation deficiency 
to reduce. 
 
Practice on meaningful, child-chosen tasks 286 
Repetition for Implicit/Procedural learning 398 
Enough practice to gain some automaticity in the strategy and to gain 
effectiveness 
“I recognize task similarity”  Little experience (young children) Train for Transfer on many different tasks, in different contexts (school, 
home) with explicit generalization training 355. 
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TABLE 8.6: Hypotheses for potential causes impeding children’s use of metacognitive strategies (MS) in daily life and possible ways to remediate them (continued) 
 
“I remember to use the 
technique”/ “I initiate the 
MS” 
Automatic/procedural 
prompted versus Recognizing 
task similarity 
RK Memory impairment 
Initiation impairment 
Content-free cueing 97 
Prompts  
Linking an object with a plan 118 
“I detect my errors”/ (On-line 
Awareness)4 
YR Error monitoring deficit 
Overwhelmed Attentional and EF resources 
Negative affects 
Task Orientation training 407 
 
“I can predict the task will be 
difficult for me” (Crosson’s 
anticipatory awareness) 
PB  
IP 
No habit of detecting task difficulty, thus no motivation for 
using MS compensatory strategies 
Include difficulty prediction and review in all tasks 266 
“I manage to focus both on 
the task and the strategy”
1
 
PB 
CS 
Working memory limited capacity 
Totally unknown task increasing WM load 
Increasing task familiarity 
Allow to practice MS without increase performance in task (i.e. allow time 
for utilization deficiency as it is short-lived) 288 
“I like the task”/ “I’m 
motivated to do it”/ “I believe 
I can do it”3 
 Negative affect Training task orientation (see Rath for an example in adults407) 
 
I apply it correctly CS  Executive functions impairments, mediation deficiency Use the MS on simple tasks before proceeding to attention-demanding and 
novel tasks with unfamiliar materials 
“I can adjust MS to the 
situation” 
CS Impairment in cognitive flexibility Practice on various tasks, in various situations and contexts 277 
Include problem-solving and encourage strategic thinking 
Allow unpredicted situations during practice, occurring naturally in natural 
contexts instead of office-based protected artificial context 
“I have time to apply it”  RK Real life time constraints Allow more time on task, self-paced study 
“I have enough attentional 
resources to apply it” 
 
RK Effortful character of MS  Choose time-limited, important tasks rather than expecting metacognitive 
strategy use throughout the whole day 
Choose specific time for soliciting attention for MS use (e.g.: when child is 
left alone) 
“I find the MS is fun”5 
(Bjorklund’s criterion of the 
necessity of a strategy to be 
fun rather than useful in 
children) 
PB  “Selection by pleasure”: only MS that children enjoy or that are 
not too demanding will be used 
Allow the children to practice MS even if MS use is not followed by an 
immediate positive outcome  
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TABLE 8.6: Hypotheses for potential causes impeding children’s use of metacognitive strategies (MS) in daily life and possible ways to remediate them (continued) 
 
“I can integrate my present 
performance with my past 
experiences” 2 
RK Impairment in episodic and/or autobiographical memory -Training episodic memory utilization to improve planning and EF 409410 
(see the model of self-awareness in children260 in chapter 4)  
-Reinforce memory of successful strategy use and of failures without 
effective strategies by reviewing task performance and (for patients using 
routinely memory note books) making notes of successful task 
management.  
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The main limitation of this study is the lack of data on control children i.e. how would 
typically developing children have reacted to the Organisation task, and in particular to the 
prompt of making a plan before starting? It is not possible to conclude if the children in our 
study did not use the strategies because of their TBI or because of their age (i.e. it may not be 
age-appropriate to teach children metacognitive strategies). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Children in our pilot study seemed to have benefited very little from metacognitive strategy 
training. If the pGMT program has any effect, metacognitive strategy teaching is probably not 
an important active ingredient. This should be explored further by comparing typically 
developing children’s response to a metacognitive training with our data - which could not be 
done here. Patterns of failure of strategy use, however, were similar to developmental data on 
younger children who show mediation and utilization deficiencies in strategy use, mainly 
because of limited WM space. This likely to be similar to the deficits in the children in our 
study who had impaired EF and WM, which makes them closer in cognitive abilities to 
younger children. Further research is needed to confirm our results and those of Missiuna286 
that children with TBI do not benefit easily from metacognitive strategies and to identify why. 
Possible explanations presented in this chapter are only tentative and further research is 
needed to test those hypotheses, especially because some are based on the adult literature and 
may not apply to younger children. It is important to remember that children are not small 
adults and that adult interventions may not be developmentally coherent. “Although from an 
adult perspective the number-one reason to use a strategy is to improve performance, this may 
not reflect the child’s point of view. Trying something new may be a goal unto itself, and the 
fact that it does not improve performance may be relatively unimportant to children”288. 
  
213 
 
CHAPTER 9: GENERAL 
DISCUSSION 
SUMMARYOF FINDINGS 
Part one of this PhD explored EF and related impairments after childhood severe TBI. 
Chapter 1 confirmed that EF dysfunction is worse when the injury occurred during period of 
rapid development of EF and showed that children injured 10-12, at a period of slower EF 
development, may be less vulnerable to the effects of the TBI. Chapter 1 also raised the issue 
of the ecological validity of EF paper and pencil tasks, which are known to underestimate EF 
impairment in daily life. 
Goal Neglect: Chapters 2 and 3 confirmed impairment in prospective memory that persist at 
seven years post injury, and into adulthood (chapter 3) following childhood severe TBI. 
Similarly, to Duncan’s model of goal neglect (GN), primacy of instructions impacted PM as 
instructions given second (make a fruit cocktail, tidy up the kitchen...) were more likely to be 
forgotten than the main instruction of making a chocolate cake (see chapter 2). Motivation 
seemed to impact PM as younger children were as good as adolescents and young adults in 
remembering a motivating PM task (entering a draw for winning an entry in an attraction 
park, chapter 3), although we did not compare it to a control condition (similar task but with 
low motivation). There seemed to be an age effect in typically developing controls (i.e. the 
older the children, the better they remembered to make the fruit cocktail and to tidy up after 
finishing the cake, see chapter 2), but this effect was not present in children with TBI, as those 
aged 14-20 performed close to typically developing controls aged 8-10. It may be possible, 
however, that goal neglect was influenced by poorer working memory and attentional 
resources that made the ongoing task more difficult for children with TBI, rather than a true 
PM effect (see discussion chapter 3).  
Chapter 4 presented a model of anosognosia post-TBI in children, based on dissociated scores 
in three ways of assessing self-awareness. It proposed directions in cognitive rehabilitation 
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based on which component of self-awareness is impaired and alerted to the inappropriateness 
of metacognitive approaches in children who are too young or too anosognosic.  
Part two of this PhD investigated ways to remediate EF dysfunction. First two literature 
reviews identified the best approaches for children (chapter 5) and reviewed evidence of the 
effectiveness of interventions based on Duncan’s goal neglect model (GMT – chapter 6) in 
adults. GMT alone had no proof of effectiveness but it was effective when coupled with 
personal goal setting, external cueing or prompting to apply GMT to the current task, personal 
homework to increase patients' commitment and training intensity and ecological and daily 
life training activities rather than paper-and-pencil, office-type tasks. Based on this literature 
review, a paediatric GMT intervention (pGMT), was developed from the adult GMT, and 
drawing on Ylvisaker’s “context-sensitive” approaches identified as an important factor for 
EF interventions in chapter 5. 
Chapters 7 and 8 - the intervention component of this PhD- tested the efficacy of pGMT on 
EF, PM and on the adaptability to new EF-demanding situations. They showed a limited 
effectiveness of the intervention, with gains on some outcome measures but inconsistency 
across outcome measures (children improving either on the ecological CCT test or on EF 
questionnaires). Most importantly, it showed that progress after an intervention may be 
incorrectly attributed to a reduction of executive deficits, when in fact it reflects rather the 
learning of tasks that make them less demanding in terms of EF: children who made progress 
on the CCT, came back to their pre intervention number of errors and presented a similar 
dysexecutive behaviour when a parallel version of CCT, using a totally unknown recipe, was 
used. Chapter 8 explored further if metacognitive strategies (such as those in the pGMT) 
could be taught to children and proposed that it is necessary to take into consideration the 
stage of EF development, which may limit the ability of younger children to benefit from 
these types of interventions. 
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STRENGTH AND CHALLENGES OF THE PHD 
This PhD used the largest (to our knowledge) cohort of children with severe TBI (n=65) to 
explore EF and PM. Larger cohorts of childhood TBI published so far usually include 
heterogeneous samples of children with a range of TBI severity, where children with severe 
TBI are usually relatively few compared to the rest of the group 161,42,71,162,123,79,19,14,72. 
Further, most samples focus on a restricted age range. Children in this sample were aged 0-15 
years at injury, and were included prospectively immediately after uniformly severe 
accidental TBI. They were followed up seven years after TBI (for the PM assessment). PM 
assessment included ecological contexts and meaningful tasks. Using both performance-based 
tests of EF and ecologically-valid questionnaires to assess EF, EF scores were likely to be 
representative of true EF impairment. Age at injury effects were explored using age at injury 
periods rather than simplified linear relationships. The sample was representative of the TBI 
population in the Paris region, as children whose parents did not speak French were not 
excluded, contrary to other studies161. As part of non-French speaking and low education, 
parents are likely to have more difficulty to apply for help and understand counselling 
regarding their child because of language restrictions, it is important that those children are 
not excluded from trials.  
Apart from PM explored in chapter 3, most results of the TG2 cohort still need to be 
exploited, which will give in the future valuable and unique information about long-term 
outcome specifically after severe TBI, which so far has been explored mostly in small 
samples. Further this study will provide unique and reliable information about transition into 
adulthood of children who sustained a severe TBI, as one third of the sample was aged 
eighteen or more at the seven year follow-up. 
The intervention part of the PhD used a series of relevant outcome measures, that allowed a 
comprehensive evaluation of EF impairment before and after intervention. It used the N of 1 
trial methodology that was adapted for a pilot study in a research domain where very little has 
been rigorously evaluated and proven to be effective. Outcome measures included creative 
ways to better reflect the complexity of EF, and especially the use of Goal Attainment Scales 
as a generalisation measure. The use of a parallel form of the cooking task, allowed capturing 
adaptation to novelty after intervention, which is rarely explored in EF rehabilitation studies, 
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while it constitutes the heart of EF. The use of two baselines and a blinded beginning of 
intervention allowed to better control for enthusiasm effects unrelated to the content of the 
intervention. The intervention included a range of activities chosen to promote generalisation, 
both paper and pencil exercises and more ecological and meaningful activities. A big effort 
was made to involve school staff and families in the training (although it proved difficult). It 
was relatively long (15-20 hours). It probably included the most challenging population for 
rehabilitation, i.e. children with severe TBI, sustained at a young age (and at a rapid 
developmental stage of EF), presenting with a severe dysexecutive syndrome (as reflected by 
the pre intervention BRIEF scores), experiencing extremely complex family situations. The 
comprehensive assessment of children’s self-awareness and use of an external (unbiased) 
investigator to assess family and school staff perception of the intervention and compliance 
allowed to better explore factors limiting intervention success. 
Finally, this PhD opened a series of future possible research, especially on themes that remain 
under-explored in childhood TBI, such as self-awareness, prospective memory and adaptation 
to novelty. This work also highlighted the major importance of everyday implication of 
families and school staff in children’s rehabilitation. 
DEFINING WHAT IS AN EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION 
Part 2 of PhD examined the general question in rehabilitation: what is an effective 
intervention? We identified five criteria for intervention effectiveness, of which most were 
addressed in chapter 7. An effective intervention is one that shows: 
1. Effects in daily life, in meaningful, ecological activities (i.e. not only on paper and 
pencil tests disconnected from the patient’s reality). This implies the need to use 
ecologically valid tests, collaborative goal setting, and requires the family to judge the 
success of an intervention. Of particular usefulness in this PhD were tools such as 
Goal Attainment Scaling411,412,413, and ecological tests180 such as the Children’s 
Cooking Task121,120. 
 
2. Maintenance of effects at long-term follow-up (with or without on-going support, 
booster sessions). Long-term follow-up is essential in children, as a function that was 
not mature at the time of intervention may mature differently because of the 
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intervention. The TGE 1 (chapter 1) and TGE 2 (chapter 3) studies showed how 
ongoing cognitive development is affected in the long term after childhood TBI and 
how consequences are not predicable. Therefore, in children particularly, the 
effectiveness of an intervention should be assessed in the long term (i.e. more than the 
six months post-intervention used here). Furthermore, an intervention may seem 
effective immediately after the training, while in fact it accelerated the development of 
a cognitive skill that would have developed anyway. For this reason, effectiveness 
should be compared in relation to usual care and education in the long term. Finally, 
there is the possibility that the intervention displaces another more beneficial activity, 
that would have helped cognitive development (e.g.: sports, physical activity 319,322,323, 
318–321, traditional martial arts325, special school curricula 310,311,312,313,314).  
 
3. Generalisation to untrained tasks requiring the same cognitive skill (e.g. does 
practicing stepwise processing and use of a checklist to prepare school bag generalise 
to preparing suitcase for a holiday OR does learning to make a chocolate cake 
generalise to another recipe 200, as in the GMT intervention with a parallel form of 
CCT). 
 
4. Transfer to the natural contexts of the child. Progress seen in the rehab centre should 
be seen at school and at home and not just in the office-based rehabilitation session. 
Chapter 8 compared the use of metacognitive strategies during ecological activities 
and during office-based paper-and pencil tasks and found important discrepancies and 
difficulties applying the strategies in real word situations, which was confirmed for 
most children by teachers and parents, using context-specific questionnaires (BRIEF 
teacher and parental forms). 
 
5. Specificity of treatment effects. Although generalisation is an aim, interventions also 
need to show some specificity, in order to prove that gains are not due to general 
cognitive stimulation, but to the key ingredients of the intervention. Any stimulation 
of a child may produce some gains in EF compared to no intervention. In order to 
explore what is effective (and what should be given priority by government funding 
and priority in the children’s busy timetables), future research needs to demonstrate 
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specific effects that are superior to general stimulation. Specificity of the intervention 
was not assessed, although it would have been possible to include, for example, a 
retrospective memory task that was not expected to show any progress. 
CHALLENGES IN COGNITIVE INTERVENTION RESEARCH 
Research on EF interventions for children faces a number of challenges that have only 
partially been addressed in this PhD.  
First, some challenges are relevant to cognitive rehabilitation in general: the lack of validated 
and reliable outcome measures, or insufficient responsiveness of measures, lack of 
availability of recommended tests152 in French. These problems were partially overcome by 
the use of composite EF scores in chapter 1, by transforming all scores into Z-scores but some 
of the tests used did not have evidence of validity/reliability and the conclusions of the TGE1 
study should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Second some additional challenges are specific to a paediatric population:  
-insufficient age range of most tests, requiring use of different tests that makes overall 
comparisons with studies in the adult literature difficult.  
-heterogeneity of the paediatric population making it very difficult to match children with 
controls in a RCT (i.e. EF evolution dependent on age, age at injury, family functioning, 
associated deficits, severity of injury.). 
-children’s busy timetable that requires caution in scheduling time-consuming interventions 
that may displace other valuable activities, socialization opportunities, or rest for children 
experiencing high fatigability post TBI. 
-difficulty in obtaining permission to recruit healthy controls for comparison. This was a 
particular issue for the awareness study in chapter 4 and in the pGMT intervention in chapters 
7 and 8, as we did not manage to compare children with TBI to typically-developing controls. 
In the TGE 2 study (chapter 3), controls could be recruited, which was very helpful in 
interpreting the results. 
Finally, some challenges relate to EF. Most EF tasks involve complex, overlapping and multi-
faceted functions that tap both executive and non-executive processes162. Isolating the 
influence of these processes is difficult20,122 and “purely executive” tasks do not exist162. 
Therefore, it is always difficult to decide if the progress observed post intervention is truly 
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“executive”. Conversely a deficit or lack of progress may be impacted by the patients’ 
impaired general cognition (general intellectual skills, visual-spatial processing, processing 
speed, memory). In children especially (and in adults too 39,40) intelligence is inextricably 
linked to EF36–38 and it is therefore difficult to appreciate how much other functions are 
impaired because of EF deficits and how much EF are impaired because of impaired general 
cognition. In this PhD it was decided not to control for IQ in the EF tests, contrary to other 
studies125 (given the overlap in constructs and hence shared variance between tests of IQ and 
tests of EF, controlling for IQ would potentially remove a lot of variance that one might also 
associate with executive functions). 
SCED METHODOLOGY TO EXPLORE INTERVENTION 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Single-Case Experimental designs (SCEDs), used in this PhD in part 2, use repeated, 
systematic measurement of an outcome variable within and across different conditions and 
sequential (± randomized) introduction of an intervention. Each single case provides its own 
control for the purposes of comparison thus avoiding the issue of unmatched control patients. 
Sequential multiple baselines allow documentation of the intervention effect (consistent 
change in level after intervention is introduced), specificity (lack of change on non-target 
measures, excluding therefore a general recovery hypothesis) as well as potential 
generalization effects (in related although not directly trained behaviours). Further they allow 
us to analyse differential responses to treatment, and factors influencing outcome (changes in 
level not directly related to intervention). SCEDs are now considered as level 1 evidence by 
the Oxford Centre for Evidence-based medicine, and hopefully the future will see many well 
designed SCEDs in paediatric cognitive interventions instead of costly, controlled trials using 
heterogeneous groups, unevenly matched groups and of insufficient power.  
The Single-Case Experimental design in this PhD allowed an in-depth study of intervention 
effect and of factors mediating effectiveness: comprehensive assessment of self-awareness 
during the intervention, observation of metacognitive strategy use in different types of 
exercises, comparisons of questionnaire-reported executive gains versus performance-based 
EF in ecological (CCT) and paper and pencil (FEE) objective tasks. Such comprehensive 
assessment is not possible using large RCTs, where the outcome measures are usually few 
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and often consist of questionnaire that is quicker and less costly to administer (for examples 
see Wade et al.299,414, Kurowski et al.298). When conducting a pilot intervention SCEDs are 
particularly useful, in order to screen the intervention for effectiveness, for factors influencing 
this effectiveness and to better adapt the intervention before eventually running a larger costly 
trial1.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE PHD 
Limitations of each study are discussed in the corresponding chapters. More generally, the 
main limitation of this PhD is the preliminary nature of the findings (pilot data only) for the 
intervention (chapter 7 and 8) and the self-awareness component (chapter 4) that could not be 
explored further in a larger group or replication study, within the timescale for completion of 
this PhD.   
The Anosognosia model especially, proposed in chapter 4, was based on a very small number 
of cases (N=5) combined with an extensive review of the literature. Therefore, firm 
conclusions as to the degree of anosognosia in children due to the TBI cannot be drawn at this 
stage because of unavailable data on developmental immaturity of typically developing 
controls matched in age. Therefore, the model is tentative but nevertheless allows to clinicians 
to have a broader view of self-awareness component processes and assessment tools other 
than just questionnaire discrepancy scores. This important piece of work provides a strong 
rationale for further research, which could investigate self-awareness in a large study using 
the Children’s Cooking Task. Especially the steps needed to gain awareness (see figure 4.3) 
could be compared between children with TBI and typically developing age-matched 
controls, to investigate in which steps children with TBI experience difficulties, and therefore 
which steps should be trained. 
In the light of the results of part 2 of the PhD and of the literature review of EF interventions, 
adapting an adult intervention (GMT) to children was not a developmentally optimal 
approach. It allowed, however, to precisely point the importance of providing interventions 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Pr. Alain Yelnik for suggesting to run this pGMT pilot study before a controlled trial, when 
he reviewed the pGMT intervention ISPEN-SOFMER grant. 
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that are coherent with the child’s developmental stage and with family needs. Although 
adapting an adult intervention to children is often used in neuropsychology, a better approach 
could be to adapt and use interventions developed in other fields (psychiatry and learning 
disabilities especially). 
More collaborations with specialists of developmental disabilities (e.g. ADHD, autism) is 
needed with the aim of adapting existing effective EF interventions from these conditions to 
children with TBI rather than adapting adult TBI EF interventions to children. The latter 
carries a high risk of being developmentally inappropriate, irrelevant or ineffective. There are 
several promising methods in pedo-psychiatric literature with children with developmental 
disabilities: Cogmed ©, “Unstuck and on Target” are examples of intervention that could be 
adapted in the future to children with TBI.  
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
LIMITATIONS IN THE WAY THE SCED METHODOLOGY WAS USED 
In this PhD, SCED methodology lacked some of the quality criteria that have been published 
since the study was performed (see “RoBiNT” scale415 or CONSORT extension of N of 1 
trials, “CENT”342,416,417): 
The design would have been methodologically stronger if the onset of the intervention had 
been staggered (i.e. producing different baseline lengths for each child) and the starting date 
randomized across subjects. In the pGMT study, all children began the intervention at the 
same moment i.e. after 4 weeks of baseline, meaning that PM performance may have 
improved because of task learning, or due to an external factor that occurred after the 4 weeks 
of baseline, rather than specifically as a result of the intervention. Sequential randomized 
introduction of the intervention would have controlled for these confounding effects.  
Intervention fidelity was not monitored. Although the use of PowerPoint slides ensured the 
program was delivered in the same way to all children, the amount and type of support during 
exercises was not precisely defined prior to the intervention, and we did not precisely specify 
use of learning methods such as errorless or errorful learning (that have been shown since our 
study was published to influence GMT effectiveness in adults101).  
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The study used simple quasi-statistical methods to interpret effects (split middle trend lines, 
two-standard deviation bands, non-overlap of all pairs). In recent years a number of 
alternative methods of statistically analysing SCED data have been developed and could have 
been used, though the results would be unlikely to be different given the pattern of data 
obtained.   
OUTCOME MEASURES 
Choosing reliable and valid outcome measures is extremely important but challenging, and 
most chapters of this PhD reflect this issue. The poor psychometric properties of 
performance-based EF test used in chapter 1 did not allow demonstrating an impairment in EF 
while all scores and sub-scores of questionnaires showed important impairment and lack of 
recovery at 2 years post TBI. Similarly, in chapter 2, the Rivermead Behavioural Memory 
Test, did not differentiate children with ABI from typically-developing controls (based on 
norms), while their impairment on the ecological test of EF (the CCT) showed an important 
impairment, with older children and adolescents with TBI performing like young healthy 
children. The self-awareness study that used three different ways for assessing self-awareness 
found dissociated scores and different awareness profiles that would have been missed if the 
classically used approach had been used (i.e. discrepancy score on a questionnaire rated by 
the patient and a proxy).  
All these are examples of the difficulty of measuring EF-related impairment, and highlight the 
possibility of erroneous conclusions if outcome measures are not chosen carefully. 
Particularly striking was the lack of sensitivity of NEPSY-1 tests of EF (used in chapter 1) 
that were (until 2 years ago) the main EF tests used for assessing EF in France, while the 
psychometric properties (and especially discriminant validity) are poor or unreliably explored 
in the NEPSY-1 manual. This may be why, fortunately, a second edition of NEPSY has been 
published recently. 
This PhD tried to overcome those challenges and to develop and use novel or original ways of 
assessing EF: 
(1) Use of paper and pencil tests of EF based on precise neuropsychological models that 
take into account confounding factors: the new battery of EF in French developed by 
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Arnaud Roy and colleagues (“Fonctions Executives Enfant” –FEE418) was used in the 
GMT intervention to better characterize children’s EF impairments, although an 
improvement on paper and pencil task was not expected and although the paper-and 
pencil tasks of FEE alone lack evidence of ecological validity (so the FEE battery 
includes the BRIEF). The FEE battery has been carefully designed and tested by the 
FEE group and has a much stronger scientific base than the classical EF tests that were 
used in the TGE1 study (chapter 1). For example, FEE’s Stroop tests takes into 
account children’s speed of processing (i.e. speed of colour naming) and reading 
ability (i.e. speed for colour names reading) to adequately infer the interference 
(Stroop effect) produced by asking the child to state the ink colour of colour words 
(e.g. The word BLUE written in red colour should be stated as RED). The classical 
Stroop tests, used in TGE1, based on the adult Stroop tests on the other hand, did not 
take into account reading difficulties or slowness in colour naming: children with poor 
reading abilities had therefore less difficulty to state the ink colour, as they had less 
difficulty inhibiting the automatic reading of colours (impairment underestimated) or 
on the contrary, were slow both for reading and naming and their Stroop effect was 
confounded by impaired speed of processing (overestimating impairment).  
 
(2) Use of ecologically valid tests, both performance-based (such as the CCT) and 
questionnaire-based (such as the BRIEF or DEX-C questionnaires): the advantage of 
ecological performance based tests is to measure directly and objectively EF 
performance on tasks, and obtain valuable qualitative data (see chapters 4 and 8). But 
the drawback is the time needed for administration (45-90 minute for the CCT). 
Questionnaires on the other hand do not require therapist time for administration, are 
quick to obtain and refer to a range of activities (at school, at home, during leisure 
time) not assessed during a performance based test, but they require parents to be 
fluent in French (which was the main difficulty in the TGE1 study, see chapter 1). 
They may lack objectivity and be highly dependent on enthusiasm effects in novel 
interventions (as seen by some children improving between the two baselines in the 
GMT intervention, because parents where not informed that the intervention had not 
started yet). They may also be influenced by personal factors of the person answering 
the questionnaire, such as anxiety and depression.  Most of all, they are highly 
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dependent on proxy’s willingness to answer questionnaires, and ability to answer 
accurately (in the pGMT study some teachers did not return the questionnaires, some 
questionnaires could not be used because the inconsistency of scores, reflecting 
contradictory answers, was too high). The strength of the pGMT intervention was to 
have used both approaches. The contradictory results (most children showing progress 
either on questionnaires or on the CCT) means that it is difficult to determine the true 
effectiveness of the intervention. 
 
(3) Taking into account the novelty aspect of EF: EF outcome measures need to be novel 
to really capture EF165,166. When the same task is repeated after intervention, it is more 
“familiar”, which can make it less demanding on EF 367 as it is likely to require the 
application of learned knowledge and task-specific procedures which may have 
become automatic, rather than more general problem solving and goal management 
processes. Familiarity effects increase when patients are tested on several occasions 
(e.g.: pre, post, follow-up…). As the whole purpose of EF tests is to prevent lapses 
into automaticity and promote conscious, novel and effortful processing165, 22, apparent 
progress after EF interventions may not necessarily reflect changes in underlying 
executive processes. In the pGMT intervention, children may have improved on CCT 
because cooking a chocolate cake became less novel and therefore less demanding on 
their EF, as they repeated the test five times (two baselines, immediately after 
intervention, at three and six months). For this reason, we used another recipe, 
“Christmas biscuits”, designed to be a parallel form of the Children’s Cooking Task 
(CCT) for the at 6 month assessment, involving the same number of steps and 
ingredients but requiring different types of ingredients and procedures. Although we 
did not explore the equivalence of difficulty of both recipes and although this parallel 
form has no established psychometric properties, it allowed us to observe children’s 
reactions and use of metacognitive strategies, when faced with a new situation. In the 
pGMT study, it showed that faced with a new situation, most children did not use 
metacognitive strategies taught during the intervention, and presented with a severe 
dysexecutive syndrome (with purposeless actions, perplexity, difficulty in problem 
solving and lack of flexibility) similar to their pre intervention CCT performance. 
Even parallel forms of the same test may not overcome the novelty problem as the 
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content may be new but the format is not 367. For this reason, we then worked on 
another parallel form of CCT that was explored in Christine Alzieu‘s Masters 
thesis419, directed by the PhD candidate, that used the same presentation, number of 
steps and number of different objects, but not food. In this parallel version children 
had to make a rain stick and a maraca (two percussion instruments). Errors were 
counted in the same way as CCT and pilot preliminary data for typically developing 
children and children with high functioning autism suggested it could be a potential 
parallel for the CCT.  
 
(4) Use of Goal Attainment Scaling to measure generalization: Most often, GAS scales 
are set for goal-focused rehabilitation where the goal is directly trained and GAS 
represents the degree of progress towards a goal. In this PhD, GAS was used as a 
measure of generalization200: i.e. after a training relating to a cognitive EF, GAS scales 
assessed if training lead to gains in daily life (e.g. GAS relating to activities relying on 
executive functions such as preparing a schoolbag, putting things in order in one’s 
room), without specifically addressing these goals. A valuable approach in the future, 
could be to use both a set of trained goals (and corresponding GAS) and a set of 
untrained goals (and corresponding GAS) and then to focus the intervention on 
training the former while using the latter as an untrained ecological generalization 
measure. Further it is has been proposed that “control” goals380 (and related GAS 
scales) that are not expected to show progression are used, in order to demonstrate the 
specificity of an intervention (i.e. the client does not just progress on all goals because 
of general cognitive stimulation or goal-driven motivation, but progresses on the 
specific goal that is trained or that relates to the trained function needed to achieve an 
untrained generalization goal).  
GAS is a controversial outcome measure in clinical trials. Some authors argue that GAS 
cannot be used as an outcome measure in studies testing the effectiveness of an intervention 
because of a series of methodological problems: (1) unknown clinimetric qualities of GAS 
scales used in a given study due to their idiosyncratic nature420; (2) subjective scoring, 
especially if not all levels of the scale are formulated or if descriptions are not precise enough; 
(3) risk of choosing goals that are not clinically relevant or too easy/too difficult to attain413 
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and therefore do not represent a meaningful or realistic change in function; (4) ordinal (rather 
than interval) nature of GAS scales421 and the lack of equidistance between GAS levels which 
cannot be controlled for422; (5) the use of a T-score that uses subjective values, especially a 
subjective weighting of GAS scores and a ρ coefficient assumed to be 0.3 which has not been 
confirmed in the literature423,421,380. A major drawback of GAS methodology is that it is 
highly dependent on the ability of the GAS setting team/person to generate valid, reliable and 
meaningful scales. It has even been proposed that GAS is more a measure of how adequately 
a therapist can foresee outcome than an outcome measure itself 380,424,425,426,427. A trial result 
may depend more on how GAS were written than on the effectiveness of the intervention 
itself. As suggested by Ruble et al.: “If GAS scores are higher in the experimental conditions 
[…]one could argue that the targeted outcomes as scaled using GAS were less difficult and 
easier for [clients] in the experimental group to achieve compared to the control group; that 
skills were written in more measureable terms and thus easier to be observed and coded in the 
experimental groups; or that the intervals between each scaled description were unequal and 
favoured the experimental group.” 413 (p3).  
Some authors, on the other hand, proposed recommendations for GAS when it is used in 
research: (1) including a GAS training program 428,420,429,430; (2) establishing all goals prior to 
randomization431,432 or blinding the goal-setter to the patient’s treatment/control status433; (3) 
testing of interrater reliability for initial and post intervention GAS rating428,432; (4) GAS 
scoring by a blind examiner432 who is independent from the team that set the goals 434,435,432,436 
and independent from the therapist providing intervention428,430; (5) the use of ‘‘control 
goals’’ that are not targeted by the intervention380; (6) evaluation of the patients on two 
different GAS scales developed by independent therapists (i.e. treatment success must be 
independent of how the goals were formulated) 376,437,438; (7) goal-setting by a group (rather 
than a single therapist or the patient alone), in order to avoid overly simple or unrealistic 
goals439.  
Based on these criticisms of GAS, and on the reviewer’s suggestion during the reviewing 
process of chapter 7 (the pGMT intervention), we proposed recommendations for GAS use in 
research440(see table 9.1), that were published in Archives of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation  in January 2016. In relation to those recommendations, there were some 
limitations in the way that GAS was used in the pGMT intervention. There was potential for 
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examiner bias with the persons implicated in the intervention completing the ratings (as 
families and schools were expected to act as cognitive coaches). Importance/relevance, 
difficulty, unidimensionality of goals, their specificity to the intervention content, the 
equidistance of GAS levels was not assessed by an external judge. Measurability was not 
formally assessed but was not strong given the questionnaire-based rating (rather than 
performance-based measurement of goal attainment). Neither inter-rater nor intra-rater 
reliability were evaluated. T-scores were used while the GAS scales cannot be considered as 
interval data.  
However, some recommendations were met: Goals were set collaboratively with the child’s 
everyday people (family, school assistants, and teachers). All five levels were precisely 
described for the rating. Most goals corresponded to activity and participation domains and 
goals were included in the published paper (although no full GAS with the five levels was 
included). Definitions of levels were verified with parents and schools and readjusted after the 
first baseline (although the readjustment was not based on an objective, performance-based, 
verification of initial level regarding the goal but based on family and school appreciation of 
current level on the goal). A time-frame for attaining goals was specified as immediately post 
intervention (but aiming at maintaining effects at 6 months). Researchers were aware of 
potential biases in GAS scales and therefore issues of unidimensionality, specificity and 
relevance of goals were taken into consideration (although not checked externally). 
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TABLE 9.1: Goal Attainment Scaling (GAS) methodology quality appraisal for rehabilitation efficacy studies440 
Quality appraisal items Item description 
Content Validity 
Collaborative goal setting The client/family is included in goal selection, when possible and appropriate. If goals are therapist-
chosen, they rely on a comprehensive assessment (and when possible, a client/family interview), 
identifying key target domains for intervention.  
Relevance/ 
importance 
GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check for the relevance of chosen goals and to 
check if GAS levels represent clinically meaningful change. 
ICF classification of goal types GAS themes correspond to functional domains. 
 
Authors report the ICF domain the GAS relate to. 
Specificity  GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check for specificity to the aim of the 
intervention.  
 
If GAS is used as a generalization measure to untrained goals, GAS should be specific to the function 
the intervention is aiming to improve.  
Reliability 
Reliability of scale construction 
Equidistance of levels GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check if difficulty from one level to the next is 
roughly equal. 
Pre-intervention performance 
 
Pre-intervention performance has been verified and corresponds to initial level described in the 
scale. 
 
Pre-intervention score is comparable across groups (same number of clients starting from -2 and -1). 
Attainability/ difficulty GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check for their difficulty/attainability.  
Time-specificity Authors specify if/how longer-term goals were adapted to the specific time frame of the research 
study.  
In the case of multiple assessment, authors specify which assessment was taken as the target 
moment for goal achievement. 
Reliability of scale rating 
Inter-rater reliability (IRR) Inter-rater reliability of GAS scales is reported. 
Criteria affecting IRR 
Precise description of all levels Five GAS levels have been precisely described pre-intervention for each scale. 
Measurability 
 
GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check for measurability. 
 
Subjective and general goals are transformed into more objective and measurable goal attainment 
indicators.  
Unidimensionality GAS scales have been verified by an external judge to check for unidimensionality. 
Context of measurement Context of performance measurement is clearly defined (prompts, cueing, support, amount of 
help/guidance, location…) and is controlled for during GAS rating.  
OR 
Changes in context are carefully manipulated across the GAS levels, with one change per level at a 
time 411.  
Other criteria 
Training Researchers setting the GAS with the client and verifying GAS have received training in writing GAS, 
have practiced GAS writing, are aware of potential sources of bias in GAS, and are experienced in 
the goal domain/population. 
Examiner bias The person scoring the GAS at the end of the intervention is independent from the team who set 
the GAS (and independent from the team that provided the intervention although the latter is not a 
GAS specific criterion). 
Statistical analysis Ordinal nature of GAS scales is preserved using non parametric statistics (rank tests, medians, 
boxplots). 
Example of GAS One (or more) example of a typical GAS full scale, extracted from the trial, is provided. 
A list of chosen goals is reported.  
Criteria are grouped in accordance to the clinimetrics they mostly impact, although some items may impact both reliability and validity.  
If GAS is used in a controlled trial, GAS scales should not only be checked but also compared between groups, similarly to the 
methodology proposed by Ruble et al. 413 For large trials, we propose (as for IRR) that at least 20% of GAS scales be checked. 
ICF: International Classification of Functioning; IRR: inter-rater reliability 
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CHALLENGES IN USING GAS IN RESEARCH 
Appreciation of goal attainment by clients may be subjective and is affected by a series of 
factors (self-awareness, denial, memory, high involvement in goal pursuit) that can bias the 
perceived attainment of a goal. On the other hand, GAS was always intended to be a person-
centred measure and the risk of insisting upon an observable and measurable goal (see 
Discussion Table1) is to exclude the family’s appreciation of goal attainment. The challenge 
for clinicians and researchers is therefore to understand and analyse the child’s (and/or his 
/her families) goal and transform it into an observable, objective, performance-based measure 
that can then be used to discuss goal attainment with the client. For example, a general goal of 
“improving my memory” expressed by a client can be transformed into a GAS scale that 
measures memory functioning in real life situations agreed with the family (e.g. number of 
medicines taken on time without prompting; number of failed-to-deliver messages from 
school in one week). Scoring GAS based on simple interview or patient-filled forms should 
be avoided when possible. Creativity should be used to link subjective goals in difficult 
domains to more objective goal attainment indicators. For example for a GAS scale on anger 
management or use of social skills, rather than asking the client to recall how often she/he felt 
he could cope with his anger or effectively use social/language skills423,441, an effort should be 
made to choose indirect indicators of goal attainment such as a review of controlled versus 
overt anger at the end of a day by the family rating of social/language skill (how many times 
he/she initiated/contributed to conversation or was understood) after regular naturally 
occurring events (outing, family dinner). It is probably the most challenging part of GAS 
methodology but it has been demonstrated that it is feasible to have GAS that are both person-
centred in the choice of goal and objective in the formulation of GAS scales (see Steenbeek et 
al. for an example in motor domains437). Literature (and especially SCED-literature) offers 
growing ingenuous methods for assessment of domains not directly accessible to classical 
performance-based objective measures. These methods include use of smartphone reminders 
to self-assess goal attainment at regular periods to decrease memory bias (see442 for an 
example), use of naturally occurring situations monitored in real life by family/proxy to 
decrease self-awareness bias (see443 for an example), use of objective behavioral measures 
that are thought to reflect the underlying psychological (e.g.: happiness444) or cognitive (e.g.: 
functioning at school290,291) target goals. A reasonable compromise between scientific rigor 
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and person-centred approach could be to have for each child at least one ecological patient-
centred GAS that could be interview-/questionnaire-based (with the risk of being less reliable) 
and at least one performance-based GAS (with the risk of being less ecological). In all cases, 
Kiresuk, who first proposed the GAS method, recommended to “anchor scale points with 
behavioral or other evidence that will be meaningful to the client and readily scored by the 
rater” (p 31)445. 
 
FACTORS MEDIATING EFFECTIVENESS THAT 
COULD APPLY TO NEW INTERVENTIONS  
Specific factors limiting the pGMT intervention effectiveness are reported in the relevant 
chapters (7 and 8). More generally, the following factors mediating effectiveness were 
identified that could apply to any new intervention in the future: 
(1) Younger children (before 13 of age at least) may not have developed sufficient 
metacognitive skills to benefit from the truly “metacognitive” part of the training (i.e. 
they could be taught to use systematically or when prompted some strategies such as 
that the “STOP-STATE your goal-SPLIT-CHECK”, but they were unable to truly 
analyse their cognition and anticipate the need for compensation for their executive 
dysfunction spontaneously). The question remains to determine if they were unable to 
do so because of the cognitive consequences of their TBI, because of their age or both. 
Only future studies including typically developing controls of various age could 
clarify this important point. 
 
(2) Contrary to adults needing good awareness to benefit from metacognitive strategy 
training, the main requirement for children was to have fun while learning to use the 
strategies, irrespective of their success. Making interventions fun is key for effective 
EF rehabilitation. 
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(3) The cognitive coaching guide for parents and school was inappropriate. It was not 
read, some parents lacked the capacity to understand the strategies and foresee their 
possible benefit in everyday life. Most families had challenging problems to deal with, 
on top of their child’s cognitive and behavioural problems. All families reported the 
lack of time or energy to read the guide. Making regular phone calls to parents, 
teachers and school assistants may have been more beneficial for the intervention 
effectiveness, and may also have reduced parental distress and provided support to 
school staff, which are often overwhelmed and misinformed as to the reasons of the 
child’s difficulties (especially challenging behaviours). Face-to face interviews may 
have been also useful, but given the families busy time table, home visits may have 
been the best option. More modern format interventions such as web-based 
programs298,300, on-line coaching with hands-free kit270, or smartphone apps may be 
more enjoyable and more motivating for families. Written supports are perhaps 
outdated. The format of interventions may be as important as the content itself. 
 
(4) Intervention duration, although quite long, was probably insufficient. To allow 
children to automatize the metacognitive strategies, a lot of repeated practice is needed 
which is feasible probably only if undertaken by schools and families. This 
emphasizes the need to better implicate families in the children’s rehabilitation care, in 
a format that would be perceived as useful and motivating by families, by addressing 
their needs before proposing any kind of specific cognitive coaching. 
 
(5) Ylvisaker proposed that “targeting EF goals throughout the day in the context of 
everyday activities and routines is better than targeting these goals in highly 
specialized therapy or instructional periods.”266 (p 243). Therefore, the usual format of 
individual sessions is probably inappropriate and research should rather move towards 
sessions at school, in the classroom, using usual exercise and teaching school staff to 
teach and use the strategies in everyday activities. It is interesting to note that EF 
support that has been proven to be effective in children with TBI289–291,291,446 at school 
has found enthusiasm among teachers who began to use them with the rest of the 
classroom as well.  
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(6) Determining rehabilitation priorities based on children’s associated deficits (e.g. CS 
poor vocabulary, IP’s end YR’s behavioural problems) and family priorities (more 
security for RK) is inescapable. The Pediatric Neurocognitive Intervention (PNI) 
model offers a useful framework for planning interventions (see figure 9.1). The 
pGMT intervention is, according to the PNI model, a level C/D intervention, while 
most children perhaps needed more basic interventions first to address the 
psychosocial and systemic foundations (see table 7.1 showing the difficult family 
situations and challenging behaviour that needs support first). In the PNI model, core 
executive skills such as inhibition, sequencing and working memory should be 
addressed first, which is consistent with developmental successive maturation of EF 
(see Diamond’s model in introduction). CS for example had important sequencing 
impairment and therefore planning exercises such as putting in order steps to organize 
a birthday party was impossible. More generally her poor working memory, 
vocabulary, semantic knowledge (and poor overall intellectual capacity) did not allow 
her to understand the strategies, the exercises and to practice both the task and the 
strategies (she did not have enough mental resources to concentrate on both). 
Figure 9.1: Pediatric Neurocognitive Intervention (PNI) Model408 
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PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PAEDIATRIC EF 
REHABILITATION  
Although this PhD allows only tentative recommendations due to the pilot nature of the 
intervention data (chapters 4, 7, 8), the following recommendations are proposed based on 
literature reviews (chapters 3 and 4) and the pilot data: 
1. There is evidence to encourage collaboration of neuropsychologists with schools, 
training of school team and of parents in understanding and intervening with EF, while 
it is less clear that engaging children in EF interventions decontextualized from the 
school and home environment is effective 277,326. 
 
2. There is growing research on family involvement in cognitive rehabilitation 267,269,447, 
299,384. Targeting the family at some level of the intervention seems necessary, ranging 
from giving family support 408 to actively engaging the family in cognitive 
rehabilitation267. However this may be challenging and not all families are able to 
engage200. In all cases, it is important that family priorities and goals are met, that 
intervention-related burden is evaluated and that it is not greater than perceived gains.  
 
3. Promising programs that offer support to families in order to improve daily EF have 
been published and translating these into French and adapting them to the French 
culture may be a reasonable option (e.g.: TOPS, CAPS and I-Interact Programs in 
chapter 5) 
 
4. The PNI model (se figure 9.1) should be used more systematically, not only in clinics 
but also in research (e.g. a patient’s basic unmet needs should be an exclusion criterion 
for higher-order EF intervention).  
 
5. Adapting interventions from developmental disabilities to children with TBI is more 
likely to be of benefit than adapting adult interventions to children. Developmental 
coherence of interventions is key for success (if not, there is a risk of training more 
elaborate skills, while the basic ones, needed to benefit from the training, have not 
developed/recovered yet). 
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6. A strong emphasis should be put in training school assistants and teachers in simple 
support (such as in papers by Feeney at al.289–291,446) rather than investing money to 
increase specialized rehabilitation outside school. 
 
7. Rather than testing intervention success on isolated components of EF, more open-
ended and ecological tasks should be used 180. Questionnaires should be used in 
association with performance-based testing to assess intervention impact at school and 
at home but also obtain objective measures of EF. 
 
8. Finally, it may be inappropriate to reduce children’s after-school leisure (e.g. sports, 
music) in order to provide cognitive rehabilitation sessions as there is growing 
research on the benefits of sports on EF development (in typically developing children 
however). “Training may even lead to negative effects if the activities it displaces are 
more beneficial than the training itself”264 (p9). As concluded by Diamond (referring 
to typically-developing children), “Stress, loneliness and not being physically fit 
impair prefrontal cortex function and EFs. The best approaches to improving EFs […] 
will probably be those that (a) engage students’ passionate interests, bringing them joy 
and pride, (b) address stresses in students’ lives, attempting to resolve external causes 
and strengthen calmer, healthier responses, (c) have students vigorously exercise, and 
(d) give students a sense of belonging and social acceptance, in addition to giving 
students opportunities to repeatedly practice EFs at progressively more-advanced 
levels. The most effective way to improve EFs […] is probably not to focus narrowly 
on these alone, but also address children’s emotional and social development and 
children’s physical development”315 (p7). 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Executive functions are impaired after childhood severe TBI, but impairment is often 
underestimated due to inadequate outcome measures and failure to assess EF related 
impairments such as prospective memory and self-awareness. Prospective Memory, in 
particular is rarely assessed, while it is commonly impaired after childhood TBI, with a deficit 
that persists into adulthood and that shows important implications for daily life. 
Self-awareness is also rarely assessed in children and is a multi-component construct that can 
mediate the engagement in rehabilitation and effectiveness of interventions. Cooking tasks 
provide a feasible, enjoyable and ecologically valid way for studying on-line awareness. 
Prediction and evaluation of performance are important to assess but also to practice, and 
should be included during activities at school and at home. For intellectual awareness (also 
called metacognitive knowledge), stories seem a particularly well-suited assessment format. 
Brain-storming about personal examples of cognitive failures elicited by stories (or by another 
support including questionnaires) allows one to determine whether children rely on semantic 
awareness, autobiographical awareness or both for their responses. The remember/know 
paradigm and explicit requirement to provide phenomenological details can be used to 
differentiate between autobiographical and semantic awareness. Assessing anticipatory 
awareness remains a challenge but is most likely to be valid during ecological activities at 
home, school or during rehabilitation activities using real life settings and activities such as 
cooking, without prompting and without explicit knowledge of the child being assessed.  
Assessments using (1) ecological performance-based tests; (2) daily life questionnaires of EF; 
(3) novel tasks assessing children’s capacity to adapt to new situations; (4) tests built on solid 
theory and referring to precise models; (5) personalized measures of generalisation such as 
Goal Attainment Scaling are needed to adequately understand a child’s impairment and to 
assess change after an intervention. The choice of adequate outcome measures and 
experimental design will make it possible to attribute change over time to an intervention over 
and above any general improvement arising from enthusiastic participation in a research 
study. Engaging the child’s “everyday people” in EF coaching proved to be challenging and 
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should be systematically considered and achieved as best as possible, in order to improve 
application of adequate strategies in the home environment. 
Interventions based on metacognition (also called metacognitive training) do not seem from 
the pilot data of this PhD to be the best option to train young children with severe EF 
impairments, and especially those most anosognosic or the youngest (before mid-adolescence 
or even adulthood when metacognition matures). Adapting interventions from developmental 
disabilities to children with TBI may be more beneficial than adapting adult interventions to 
children. Developmental coherence of interventions is key for success (if not, there is a risk of 
trying to train more elaborate skills, while the basic ones, that are needed in the training, have 
not developed/recovered yet). A strong emphasis should be put on training school assistants 
and teachers in simple support for developing EF. Targeting the family at some level  of the 
intervention (personalized for each family) seems necessary, ranging from giving family 
support, to actively engaging the family in cognitive rehabilitation. However, this may be 
challenging and not all families are able to engage. In all cases, it is important that family 
priorities and goals are addressed, that intervention-related burden is evaluated and that it is 
not greater than perceived gains. 
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Note préliminaire : cet article porte sur la rééducation des fonctions exécutives (FE) chez 
l’enfant dysexécutif en général, bien que les exemples soient majoritairement tirés de la 
littérature sur les enfants cérébro-lésés et très peu de la littérature de troubles 
développementaux tels que le TDAH et l’autisme. Cet article ne présente pas une revue 
exhaustive de la littérature sur ce thème large, au sein duquel pourtant peu d’approches sont 
clairement validées. 
DEFINITIONS DES FONCTIONS EXECUTIVES  
La définition des FE varie selon les modèles, selon les auteurs, mais il est généralement admis 
que qu’il existe trois FE centrales 25,26: l’inhibition, aussi appelée contrôle inhibiteur, la 
mémoire de travail (MT) et la flexibilité cognitive. Le modèle développemental des FE de 
Diamond 24 est particulièrement utile pour comprendre le lien entre ces FE et la manière dont 
elles s’influencent mutuellement au cours du développement progressif des FE chez l’enfant 
(voir figures introduction.1 et annexe.2) : la MT soutient le contrôle inhibiteur (il faut garder 
en mémoire ce qui est important et approprié pour la tâche en cours et ce qui est à inhiber), 
mais le contrôle inhibiteur soutient à son tour la MT en évitant que l’espace limité de la MT 
soit encombré d’information inutiles pour la tâche en cours. La flexibilité cognitive requiert 
des compétences de MT et de contrôle inhibiteur et permet de changer de perspective, en 
chargeant en mémoire de travail un autre point de vue, tout en inhibant le point de vue 
précédent. A partir de ces 3 FE centrales, les autres FE dites de haut-niveau se construisent, 
telles que la planification, la résolution de problèmes et le raisonnement 35. Contrairement à 
l’adulte où l’intelligence est supposée être indépendante des FE, l’intelligence fluide est 
assimilée chez l’enfant aux FE de haut niveau 24 car de nombreuses études ont montré leur 
lien inextricable 36–38. 
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Figure annexe.1 : Modèle des Fonctions Exécutives de Diamond, traduit et simplifié. 
 
 
PRATIQUES ACTUELLES DANS LA PRISE EN CHARGE DES FE 
Beaucoup de stratégies ont été proposées pour aider les enfants dysexécutifs et de nombreux 
manuels et articles ont été publiés pour guider les professionnels 271–275. Beaucoup de ces 
approches sont prometteuses, mais la plupart n’ont jamais été validées. La plupart des 
techniques et stratégies utilisées reposent sur des données issues de travaux réalisés chez 
l’adulte 448 ou chez l’enfant sain. De plus l’âge développemental de l’enfant et la particularité 
de la pathologie rééduquée (déficits associés ne permettant pas forcément de compenser les 
FE comme chez l’enfant au développement typique) sont rarement pris en compte dans le 
choix des techniques proposées. 
 
En pratique courante, quatre grands types d’approches sont utilisés pour aider les enfants 
cérébro-lésés dans leur fonctionnement exécutif, chacune ayant ses limites: (1) Utilisation 
d’adaptations de l’environnement et d’aides techniques (ex : utilisation de systèmes de rappel 
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électronique tels le « Neuropage » 278,279, qui a montré des effets bénéfiques sur les difficultés 
de planification et de mémoire prospective, et qui peut actuellement être facilement remplacé 
par les smartphones, omniprésents donc accessible à tous). L’inconvénient de ce type 
d’approche est qu’il suppose d’avoir préprogrammé l’aide technique et préparé 
l’environnement, et l’utilisation de ce moyen utile et simple se limite principalement à 
certaines situations prévisibles; (2) Entrainement spécifique de fonctions exécutives 
élémentaires isolées (MT, inhibition…), mais l’effet de généralisation de ces entrainements au 
fonctionnement exécutif dans la vie quotidienne a rarement pu être démontré;  (3) 
Entrainement des enfants sur des tâches précises dans lesquelles ils sont en difficulté à cause 
de leur syndrome dysexécutif (ex : préparer son cartable) en rendant ces tâches routinières, 
voire automatiques et donc nécessitant moins d’implication des FE ; (4) Fournir aux patients 
des stratégies métacognitives applicables à une variété de situations, y compris des situations 
nouvelles et imprévues. Ce dernier type d’approche est efficace chez les adultes 114, mais il y 
a peu d’arguments actuellement pour l’appliquer chez les enfants (surtout en cas de 
dysfonctionnement sévère) 200,260,286. En effet chez l’enfant, la métacognition [terme se 
référant à une analyse de sa propre cognition pendant l’exécution d’une tâche, mais aussi  à la 
juste connaissance des tâches qui risquent d’être difficiles et qui nécessiteront une stratégie de 
compensation 211] est pauvre et ne se développe suffisamment qu’à l’âge adulte. Cependant, 
l’utilisation de stratégies simples enseignées aux enfants par des exercices répétés, visant à 
leur apprendre quand utiliser cette technique (donc pas une technique “métacognitive” à 
proprement parler, malgré l’utilisation du terme par certains auteurs d’études portant sur de 
jeunes enfants), peut être utilisée et semble prometteuse, même avant que les enfants aient un 
niveau métacognitif développé  108,269,287. 
CE QUI EST VALIDE 
Il y a globalement très peu (voire pas) de méthodes de rééducation scientifiquement validées 
des FE chez l’enfant. En dehors de la mémoire de travail (voir paragraphe sur le Cogmed 
®plus loin) et de l’attention (qui ne sera pas traitée dans cet article), les revues internationales 
de la littérature ne rapportent pas de méthode validée de rééducation des FE  chez les enfants 
cérébro-lésés 110–113. Le problème majeur de la plupart des rééducations est l’absence de 
généralisation à des tâches non travaillées et l’absence de transfert des acquis à des contextes 
différents de celui du cadre de rééducation (Ylvisaker, 2005). La rééducation cognitive des 
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enfants en général serait plus efficace sur la MT, la mémoire et l’attention que sur les FE, 
mais les biais méthodologiques rendent difficile l’appréciation de la taille des effets 107. 
Cependant des principes généraux émergent de la recherche actuelle:  
1. Le niveau « challenge » (difficulté d’exercices rapidement croissante dès qu’un niveau 
est atteint) semble indispensable pour obtenir des progrès 264. Les exercices doivent 
donc s’adapter au niveau de l’enfant 24,265 à tout moment (ce qui est le cas de la 
méthode Cogmed® par exemple).  
2. La rééducation doit  prioriser le Contexte et le Contenu (« Context and Content-
sensitive approach ») 277,290,294,356: choix des exercices les plus écologiques et les plus 
fonctionnels possibles (plutôt que des exercices décontextualisés de la « vraie » vie 
familiale et scolaire de l’enfant) et administration de la rééducation sur les lieux de vie 
de l’enfant autant que possible (pour faciliter la généralisation et le transfert). 
3. Implication de la famille et de l’école dans la rééducation (voir paragraphe spécifique 
plus loin) 
4. La durée de l’intervention doit être longue si l’on veut avoir une généralisation des 
effets et un maintien de l’efficacité sur le long terme 112. 
UNE APPROCHE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE ET DEVELOPPEMENTALE 
EST NECESSAIRE DANS LA PRISE EN CHARGE DES FE DE 
L’ENFANT 
Les interventions visant à améliorer les FE devraient être envisagées lorsque les fonctions 
cognitives plus « basiques », pré-requises aux FE ont suffisamment maturé (ou récupéré), ou 
sont compensées. Le modèle « Paediatric Neurocognitive Interventions » (modèle PNI) est un 
cadre utile pour choisir les priorités des prises en charge 262. Une approche interdisciplinaire 
263 est essentielle pour s’assurer que l’intervention proposée soit appropriée dans le contexte 
des difficultés physiques, cognitives, comportementales, sociales et psychologiques de 
l’enfant.  
Il est indispensable que les rééducations proposées soient cohérentes du point de vue 
développemental. Ceci est particulièrement important pour les FE. Les lobes frontaux arrivent 
à maturité tard dans la vie, au début de la 3ème décennie 258 et les FE sont toujours en cours de 
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maturation pendant l’adolescence et au début de l’âge adulte 449. Pour cette raison les 
rééducations construites spécifiquement pour des adultes (et adaptées à l’enfant) ont peu de 
chance d’être bénéfiques pour les enfants, en particulier si elles requièrent des fonctions 
cognitives qui ne sont pas attendues pour un enfant, telles que la métacognition (Krasny-Pacini 
et al., 2015). D’autre part, l’utilisation de stratégies se développe progressivement  pendant 
l’enfance et par conséquent des stratégies efficaces chez les adultes peuvent être inefficaces 
chez l’enfant 261,288. 
STRATEGIES DITES « METACOGNITIVES » 
DEVELOPPEMENT DE STRATEGIES CHEZ L’ENFANT 
Les stratégies sont définies comme des opérations mentales volontaires, orientés vers un but, 
ayant pour objet de résoudre un problème 288. D’un point de vie développemental, les jeunes 
enfants peuvent utiliser des stratégies, mais les enfants plus âgés et les adolescents les 
utilisent plus souvent, sélectionnent des stratégies plus efficaces, et arrivent, mieux que les 
plus jeunes, à améliorer leur performance. Même si les plus jeunes ont des difficultés à mettre 
au point une stratégie (ce que les développementalistes appellent «déficience de production de 
stratégie »), ils peuvent être entrainés à utiliser une stratégie, et améliorer leur performance 
grâce à elle 288. Cependant, ils ne seront en général pas capables de généraliser cette stratégie 
à une tâche nouvelle, qu’ils auront tendance à résoudre de façon peu stratégique 261. D’autres 
jeunes enfants n’améliorent pas leur performance malgré une stratégie adéquate (ce qu’on 
appelle « déficience d’utilisation de stratégie »), en général du fait de limitations de leurs 
capacités cognitives, en particulier de la MT et de la métacognition.  
Il est intéressant de noter que, contrairement aux adultes qui ont besoin d’une bonne 
connaissance de leurs difficultés/troubles (et de la difficulté de la tâche) pour bénéficier de 
l’apprentissage de l’utilisation d’une stratégie, il semblerait que les enfants sains, eux, ont 
avant tout besoin que l’apprentissage de la stratégie soit ludique, motivant et intéressant, 
indépendamment de son succès/bénéfice. Surtout ils ont besoin de la pratiquer de façon 
suffisamment répétée pour que la déficience d’utilisation se résorbe.  
Reste la question de savoir s’il en est de même chez les enfants cérébro-lésés, dont les FE et 
la métacognition sont déficientes, et si l’apprentissage de stratégies dans cette population 
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particulière est une bonne technique de remédiation. Dans l’étude de Krasny-Pacini et al. 200, 
les enfants appliquaient volontiers les stratégies du Goal Management Training sur les tâches 
papier crayon, dans un contexte de bureau de rééducation et les trouvaient effectivement 
amusantes (par exemple s’arrêter régulièrement pour redire l’objectif de la tâche lorsqu’ils 
voyaient le « bonhomme STOP »), mais cette stratégie n’améliorait pas forcément leur 
performance. De plus, lorsque la même stratégie était ensuite appliquée à des activités plus 
complexes et écologiques (cuisine, jeu de piste, jeu de déduction...), ils n’appliquaient plus les 
stratégies apprises. L’étude de Missiuna a mis en évidence le même phénomène 286: rendre les 
séances ludiques et plaisantes semblait utile, tandis qu’enseigner la stratégie “Goal-Plan-Do- 
Check” et essayer de promouvoir son application l’était peu (alors même que cette approche 
est efficace dans d’autre pathologies développementales comme la dyspraxie). Peut-être que 
justement cette méthode de rééducation est efficace dans la dyspraxie développementale car il 
s’agit d’une stratégie mettant en jeu l’utilisation des FE (au moins partiellement efficaces 
chez ces enfants) pour compenser les difficultés de réalisation de gestes spécifiques, 
contrairement aux enfants cérébro-lésés, chez qui des troubles spécifiques et probablement 
plus sévères des fonctions exécutives ne permettent pas l’utilisation efficace de cette stratégie 
pour mener à bien diverses tâches de la vie quotidienne.   
Dans tous les cas, chez les enfants, les stratégies doivent être simples et concrètes, et leur 
apprentissage doit être accompagné, supervisé et répété, contrairement aux adultes cérébro-
lésés pour qui on peut se contenter d’expliquer une stratégie pour la voir appliquer 
spontanément et efficacement (du moins chez des patients ne présentant pas des troubles trop 
sévères des FE) 98,119,285. 
STRATEGIES DITES METACOGNITIVES UTILISEES CHEZ L’ENFANT 
DYSEXECUTIF CEREBRO-LESE 
Différentes stratégies à apprendre et automatiser, utilisées chez des enfants cérébro-lésés ont 
été publiées :  (1) “Goal-Plan-Do-Review” 289–291, contextualisé dans la vie quotidienne de 
l’enfant (Ylvisaker & DeBonis, 2000; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 1998) ; (2) “Goal Plan Do 
Check” 286 utilisé dans le programme pour enfants dyspraxiques  CO-OP “Cognitive 
Orientation to Daily Occupational Therapy” 295; (3) “Stop, State your Goal, Split Task into 
subtasks, Do it, Check” du  Goal Management Training 98,200; (4) ”Nature Planning 
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Representing Monitoring”287. Même si la phrase-type varie, l’idée est toujours la même: 
devant une tâche nouvelle, éviter de commencer de suite impulsivement, mais s’arrêter, 
analyser la nature de la tâche et déterminer quel est le but à atteindre, élaborer un plan 
d’action composé d’étapes, l’appliquer étape par étape, tout en vérifiant régulièrement si ce le 
plan fonctionne et si l’on ne s’éloigne pas du but à atteindre et, enfin, vérifier à la fin de tâche 
si aucune étape n’a été oubliée et si le but est atteint. L’approche de Feeney et Ylvisaker est 
celle qui a montré dans plusieurs études de bonne qualité, menées en méthodologie 
expérimentale de cas uniques multiples, des effets bénéfiques, et qui a pu être répliquée. A 
noter que dans ces études, la stratégie n’était pas simplement enseignée au cours de séances 
de rééducation déconnectées du milieu scolaire, mais (et c’est le point fondamental de ces 
études), elle était relayée aux enfants au quotidien par tous les enseignants à l’école, qui 
étaient formés et supervisés par les investigateurs de l’étude. De plus, avant de débuter une 
tâche ou un exercice, les enfants étaient invités à estimer la difficulté de la tâche et le temps 
qu’elle prendrait. Après l’avoir terminée, ils étaient invités à analyser ce qui avait fonctionné 
et ce qui n’avait pas fonctionné dans le déroulement de la tâche, et à en ré estimer la difficulté 
a posteriori.  
IMPLICATIONS DES PARENTS ET DE L’ECOLE 
Les interventions doivent être longues et suffisamment intensives pour permettre d’entrainer 
un progrès. Ce caractère intensif a peu de chances d’être atteint si la rééducation est 
administrée de façon classique en séances hebdomadaires de neuropsychologie, ergothérapie 
ou orthophonie. C’est pourquoi Ylvisaker a proposé d’adopter plutôt une approche visant à 
former les « everyday people » (personnes au contact quotidien avec l’enfant : parents, 
auxiliaires de vie scolaire, aide maternelle, maitres d’école...) à devenir des « coach 
cognitifs » pour l’enfant. Pour Ylvisaker, il est préférable de travailler les objectifs de 
rééducation pendant la journée, dans le contexte des activités habituelles et des routines avec 
les « everyday people », plutôt que de travailler sur ces objectifs dans un environnement 
spécialisé et structuré, déconnecté de la vie quotidienne de l’enfant 294. 
Idéalement il faudrait donc inclure les parents dans la prise en charge, comme « coach 
cognitifs », en les formant au fonctionnement cérébral, au concept de FE et à leur utilité / leur 
rôle dans les activités de la vie quotidienne, aux difficultés spécifiques de leur enfant, et à la 
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façon dont ils peuvent l’aider concrètement au quotidien à développer ses FE 268,269,298,303. 
L’engagement approprié des familles est parfois difficile à obtenir 200, surtout si les parents 
ont eux-mêmes des difficultés exécutives à minima ou de faibles compétences de 
métacognition. Les études montrant le plus d’efficacité sur les FE sont actuellement celles qui 
ciblent les interactions parents-enfants, et il est intéressant de noter que, contrairement  à ce 
qu’on pourrait prévoir, ce sont les familles les défavorisées qui bénéficient le plus de ce type 
d’intervention (ex : programme “I-Interact” 270).  
L’implication des parents et des intervenants à l’école semble, à ce jour, le meilleur format 
pour obtenir une intensité suffisante, par la répétition qui peut ainsi être obtenue dans les 
activités concrètes et routinières du quotidien. Là encore la culture française est bien éloignée 
de ce type d’approche. L’Education Nationale pas toujours ouverte à des propositions 
innovantes personnalisées par élève et les professionnels ne sont pas toujours prêts à 
transmettre leur savoir à des personnes tout-venant. Nous sommes frileux lorsqu’il s’agit de 
donner plus de « pouvoir » aux parents et de leur permettre de choisir leurs priorités pour leur 
enfant. Pourtant, de plus en plus dans les autres pays, les approches « family-centered » 
267,450,451 ont montré une efficacité supérieure aux approches classiques où la famille n’est que 
le récipient passif du savoir des thérapeutes. L’étude de Braga et al. est une très belle 
démonstration de ce type d’approche dans le domaine cognitif: dans cette étude, des enfants 
traumatisés crâniens étaient randomisés dans 2 formats de rééducation différents : (1) une 
rééducation délivrée classiquement en centre de rééducation par une équipe multidisciplinaire 
de thérapeutes, 2 heures par jour, 5 jours par semaine ; ou (2) une rééducation réalisée au 
domicile, poursuivant les mêmes objectifs de rééducation, via des exercices intégrés dans la 
vie quotidienne de l’enfant au domicile, avec /sous la supervision des parents, en vue 
d’atteindre chacun des objectifs (moteur, fonctionnel et/ou cognitif). Il est fondamental de 
préciser que dans ce deuxième cas, les parents étaient entrainées, soutenus, accompagnés et 
corrigés très régulièrement par les thérapeutes, d’abord au cours d’un séjour avec leur enfant 
en centre de rééducation et par des visites des thérapeutes au domicile. Les enfants et leurs 
parents revenaient tous les 15 jours au centre de rééducation pour des séjours de réévaluation 
de la situation, afin de déterminer si les objectifs avaient été atteints et d’en fixer de nouveaux 
le cas échéant. Les parents disposaient systématiquement d’un classeur de fiches spécifiques 
et personnalisées avec des supports visuels d’exercices (ne requérant pas de capacité de 
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lecture, ce qui était une donnée importante de cette étude incluant des enfants dans des parties 
reculées du Brésil où beaucoup de parents pouvaient être analphabètes). La difficulté et le 
type d’exercices étaient personnalisés et régulièrement (tous les 15 jours) réadaptés par les 
thérapeutes selon les progrès des enfants, et les fiches d’exercices remises à jour. Les 
fonctions exécutives n’ont pas été évaluées spécifiquement dans cette études mais le 
deuxième format de rééducation s’est révélé significativement plus efficace sur les progrès et 
moteurs et cognitifs (évalués par un test de Wechsler). Il était également moins cher et plus 
apprécié des familles et des thérapeutes.    
QUELQUES EXEMPLES DE METHODES PROMETTEUSES DE 
REEDUCATION DES FONCTIONS EXECUTIVES  
 
Le « Cogmed Working Memory Training® » est l’entrainement de la mémoire de travail le 
plus utilisé et ayant fait l’objet de très nombreuses études, principalement chez l’enfant avec 
Trouble Déficitaire de l’Attention/Hyperactivité (TDA/H). Cogmed ® peut être recommandé, 
bien que certaines données soient contradictoires en raison de biais méthodologiques de 
certaines études [voir pour une synthèse les revues de la littérature de 102–104] . Les données de 
la littérature montrent que Cogmed ® peut améliorer la MT verbale et visuo-spatiale et la 
mémoire à court terme visuo-spatiale chez les enfants avec TDA/H (voir étude de Holmes et 
al. 2010, qui a utilisé des tâches non travaillées comme critère de jugement) et les enfants à 
faible niveau de MT [chez qui on est parvenu en plus à améliorer la mémoire à court terme 
verbale dans une étude 105]. Certaines études mettent en évidence des gains persistants à un an 
106. Les données sur le transfert aux capacité de mathématiques et de lecture sont par contre 
contradictoires 105,106.  
Chez les enfants cérébro-lésés, Cogmed ® améliore la mémoire à court terme visuo-spatiale 
(et cet effet est maintenu 3 mois après l’intervention). La lecture s’améliore à 3 mois 
uniquement. A ce jour il n’y a pas à notre connaissance d’études montrant l’efficacité de 
Cogmed ® sur les FE proprement dites chez les enfants cérébro-lésés. L’avantage de cette 
méthode est qu’elle peut être effectuée par l’enfant seul, devant un ordinateur, à l’heure et 
dans le lieu qui arrange la famille, sous la supervision régulière (éventuellement à distance par 
téléphone) d’un thérapeute. Le thérapeute reçoit un feedback de la compliance au programme 
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et des progrès de l’enfant, même s’il n’assiste pas aux séances. Une version française existe, 
commercialisée par Pearson. Le programme s’auto-adapte aux performances de l’enfant, 
créant toujours le niveau « challenge » recommandé dans la littérature. C’est l’une des 
méthodes ayant le plus grand nombre de publications et sa validité est robuste, sous réserve 
que les objectifs fixés soient bien adaptés à ce qu’elle peut apporter. A notre connaissance, 
aucune étude n’a démontré son efficacité sur l’amélioration de l’administrateur central et elle 
ne peut être recommandée actuellement que pour l’objectif d’améliorer la mémoire à court 
terme, ou la MT visuo-spatiale et verbale. Le niveau de preuve de la méthode Cogmed ®est 
supérieur à celui de tous les autres entrainements informatisés, que l’on classe hélas souvent 
ensemble. 
L’équipe de Wade et Kurowski a développé plusieurs méthodes de rééducation administrées à 
distance par internet pour les enfants cérébro-lésés et leur familles : le TOPS [(« Teens On-
Line Probel Solving, 299–301] qui a ensuite donné naissance à deux autres méthodes: le CAPS 
(Counsellor-Assisted Problem Solving, 298,303 et le I-INTERACT 270. Ces méthodes 
s’attachent plus à donner à la famille les outils nécessaires pour favoriser la récupération après 
lésion cérébrale, qu’à entrainer les fonctions défaillantes chez l’enfant/adolescent. Elles 
offrent toutes les trois une base familiale solide sur laquelle d’autres rééducations peuvent 
éventuellement s’ajouter et elles ont, à ce jour, un niveau de preuve supérieur aux 
réentrainements cognitifs administrés dans un bureau par un professionnel seul sans 
participation de la famille. Elles ont été testées dans de grandes études de bonne qualité 
méthodologique (dont certaines randomisées contrôlées) et ont montré un effet bénéfique en 
situation écologique (notamment sur le questionnaire Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive 
Function - BRIEF145, évaluant le fonctionnement exécutif au quotidien). 
 La particularité du CAPS et TOPS est de s’adapter aux rythmes et besoins des 
familles, qui peuvent choisir quand débuter la session. Les thèmes des modules 
incluent la résolution de problèmes, l’auto-régulation, l’implantation et le monitoring 
d’objectifs spécifiques, ainsi que des modules visant davantage le comportement et les 
aspects psychologiques (rester positif, utiliser de manière optimale la communication 
verbale et non verbale, gérer les crises, contrôler le comportement). Les familles 
peuvent également choisir parmi une série de modules optionnels (douleur, sommeil, 
interactions avec la fratrie, habiletés sociales…). L’ensemble de l’intervention dure 
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environ 6 mois, selon le rythme des familles. L’ensemble de la famille participe aux 
sessions. Le CAPS a montré son efficacité chez les adolescents de plus de 14 ans avec 
un maintien des effets, et même une augmentation des effets par rapport au groupe 
contrôle à long terme.  
 Le I-Interact s’adresse aux parents et enfants âgés de 3 à 9 ans, présentant au premier 
plan des difficultés exécutives comportementales (difficultés de contrôle inhibiteur, 
d’autorégulation) et constitue un « télé-coaching » des parents, administré en situation 
de jeu, à la maison (que l’on pourrait comparer au programme télévisé « super 
nounou »).  
 
Le programme adulte CRT (“Cognitive Remediation Therapy”) semble permettre d’obtenir 
des gains sur la flexibilité chez l’adolescent présentant une anorexie accompagnée de troubles 
neuropsychologiques 284, mais les méthodologies des études utilisant la CRT ont souvent des 
biais (utilisation d’un critère de jugement très proche des exercices ayant été utilisés pour la 
rééducation, et manque de mesures de généralisation). A notre connaissance, il n’y a 
actuellement pas d’étude convaincante chez les enfants plus jeunes ou dans d’autres 
pathologies. 
“Unstuck and On Target”304 (tr: « débloqué et focalisé sur la cible » ) est une intervention 
utilisée auprès d’enfant présentant des troubles du spectre autistique sans retard mental global 
associé. Administrée à l’école en 28 sessions de 30-40 minutes, cette méthode vise la 
flexibilité, le « big picture thinking » (voir l’ensemble plutôt que les détails) et la 
planification. Elle intègre les parents et les professeurs non spécialisés pour relayer 
l’intervention au cours de la journée et elle a montré sa supériorité par rapport à un 
entrainement des compétences sociales seules. De plus, de façon surprenante, une 
généralisation aux compétences sociales, pourtant non entrainées spécifiquement par la 
méthode, a été obtenue dans cette étude 268. 
INTERVENTIONS EFFICACES CHEZ L’ENFANT AU 
DEVELOPPEMENT TYPIQUE QUI MERITERAIENT D’ETRE 
INTEGREES DANS DES PROGRAMMES DE REEDUCATION 
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Contrairement au manque d’études sur la rééducation des FE chez les enfants présentant une 
pathologie ou un développement atypique, chez l’enfant sain au développement typique, 
plusieurs interventions ont démontré une capacité à améliorer les FE 265,315,452. 
Certains programmes implantés dans les écoles [ex.: « Tools of the Mind » 310, « Montessori » 
311 « PATHS: Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies »312, « Chicago School Readiness 
Project» 314 313] et délivrés  par les enseignants habituels des enfants, préalablement éduqués à 
la méthode, ont montré qu’il est possible de promouvoir le développement des FE dans les 
écoles non spécialisées [voir les revues de Diamond  315 et 316]. Cependant comme les 
compétences dans les FE et la réussite scolaire sont corrélées, il est difficile d’établir le lien 
direct de causalité entre ces programmes et le développement propre des FE 317. Ce type de 
programmes à l’école semble actuellement plus recommandable pour les enfants dysexécutifs 
que les approches délivrées dans un environnement clinique (centre de rééducation, cabinet 
d’orthophonie…). 
Les professionnels sont souvent amenés à donner des conseils éducatifs aux parents d’enfants 
présentant des troubles dysexécutifs. Ces conseils sont trop souvent basés sur leur expérience 
personnelle, et pas suffisamment sur les techniques ayant prouvé une efficacité. A défaut de 
guidelines validées chez l’enfant dysexécutif, il pourrait être utile d’utiliser ce qui est validé 
chez l’enfant sain. Le site internet australien « Elever les enfants » 
(www.Raisingchildren.net.au) liste les pratiques éducatives testées et efficaces et peut être 
utile pour conseiller les familles. 
Une approche très prometteuse mais non (ou très peu) exploitée en France est la pratique 
d’activité physique pour améliorer les FE. Une série d’études bien menées a montré les effets 
bénéfiques de l’exercice physique sur la cognition en général 318–321, et les FE en particulier. 
L’activité physique soutenue 319,322,323, les sports  à « challenge cognitif », qui stimulent le 
développement de stratégies, comme le tennis 324, ou les arts martiaux traditionnels 325 sont 
des exemples de sports ayant montré une amélioration des FE (indépendamment des effets 
métaboliques), et qui seraient à recommander aux enfants dysexécutifs. Hélas, en France de 
manière générale, lors de la prise en charge d’enfants en situation de handicap, qui sont 
souvent lents et fatigables, qui ont des séances de rééducation organisées sur le temps 
scolaire, lors de l’établissement des Projets Personnalisés de Scolarisation, la première 
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activité à être supprimée des emplois du temps est l’activité physique et sportive, afin de 
« caser » une séance de rééducation ou d’alléger le nombre d’heures de cours de l’enfant. Ceci 
est particulièrement dommage, si l’on considère que l’activité physique est l’activité qui a 
actuellement le niveau de preuve le plus élevé en termes de développement des FE. La 
fatigabilité des enfants ayant un handicap moteur associé entraine souvent l’utilisation d’un 
fauteuil roulant (parfois électrique) à l’école, ce qui peut contribuer à créer un cercle vicieux 
de déconditionnement à l’effort, baisse des fonctions exécutives et attentionnelles et 
fatigabilité cognitive accrue. Il serait urgent de prendre ces éléments en compte et d’inclure un 
réentrainement à l’effort avec des exercices aérobies dans les programmes multidisciplinaires 
dédiés aux enfants dysexécutifs, et d’évaluer leur bénéfice.  
Comme souligné par Diamond, «le stress, la solitude et la mauvaise condition physique 
handicapent la fonction du cortex préfrontal et les FE. Les meilleures approches pour 
améliorer les FE […] seront (a) celles qui aident les enfants à s’engager dans ce qui les 
passionne et leur apporte joie et fierté, (b) celles qui prennent en compte les éléments 
stressants de la vie des enfants, en essayant d’en résoudre les causes externes et en renforçant 
les réactions plus saines et calmes, (c) celles qui font pratiquer vigoureusement des exercices 
et sport, (d) celles qui donnent aux enfants un sentiment d’appartenance et d’acceptation 
sociale, tout en leur donnant des opportunités de pratiquer de manière répétée les FE à des 
niveaux progressivement plus difficiles. La meilleure manière d’améliorer les FE n’est pas de 
se focaliser étroitement sur celles-ci, mais de s’occuper du développement physique, 
émotionnel et social de l’enfant » 315. 
DES METHODES NON REEDUCATIVES A L’ETAT DE 
RECHERCHE, QUI POURRAIENT DANS LE FUTUR S’ASSOCIER A 
LA REEDUCATION 
Le Neurofeedback 453 a montré des effets intéressants dans certaines études sur des 
populations avec autisme et TDAH 454–456, mais nécessite davantage de recherche. Son 
application aux enfants cérébro-lésés n’a pratiquement pas été évaluée. 
La recherche sur la stimulation trans-crânienne magnétique répétitive (rTMS) ou par 
techniques similaires (type tDCS) en est actuellement à une étape de recherche uniquement 
457,458. Les effets à long terme doivent être explorés pour s’assurer de l’innocuité de la 
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méthode, mais il pourrait s’agir de méthodes d’avenir, particulièrement en phase aigüe après 
lésion cérébrale de l’enfant.   
LIMITES METHODOLOGIQUES DES ETUDES EVALUANT LES 
PROGRAMMES DE REMEDIATION DES FE CHEZ L’ENFANT 
Les limites de la plupart des méthodes de rééducation publiées sont nombreuses. 
1. Beaucoup d’études utilisent le même type d’exercices pour l’entrainement et 
l’évaluation post rééducation. Elles permettent de prouver que les enfants s’améliorent 
sur ces tâches, mais ne permettent aucune conclusion sur l’efficacité de la rééducation 
sur les FE (et leur utilisation au quotidien). Une tâche évaluant les FE doit être 
nouvelle, non apprise, non automatisée, sans quoi elle n’évalue plus les FE en tant que 
telles 22,229,367. De plus, à force d’utiliser en rééducation des exercices inspirés du 
« Stroop » ou de tests de classement de formes (Wisonsin Card Sorting Test, exercice 
du Cogntive Remediation Therapy), nos tests d’évaluation risquent de perdre en 
validité et cela peut fausser les résultats des bilans, car les tâche ne seront plus 
nouvelles pour l’enfant.  
2. Pour les FE on ne devrait utiliser un test qu’une fois si on veut évaluer l’adaptation à 
une situation non routinière. Dans l’étude du Goal Mangement Training par exemple 
200, les enfants semblaient s’être améliorés sur la tâche écologique du gâteau au 
chocolat 120,121 mais lorsqu’ils ont été confrontés à une nouvelle recette ayant le même 
nombre d’étapes, le même nombre d’ingrédients et présentée sous la même forme 
dans le même lieu, ils revenaient au nombre d’erreurs qu’ils avaient faites avant la 
rééducation. La généralisation à des tâches non travaillées, et surtout à des tâches 
écologiques et au contexte de l’enfant est insuffisamment évaluée, or elle constitue 
l’élément clé permettant de dire qu’une rééducation est réellement efficace.  
3. Le transfert au contexte de l’enfant et la généralisation à des tâches écologiques sont 
insuffisamment évalués. Les critères de jugement ne peuvent être constitués 
uniquement d’exercices papier-crayon. 
4. Les études portant sur des approches globales qui pourrait avoir un effet sur les FE, 
n’évaluent pas souvent le progrès sur le FE proprement dites 267,382. 
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5. Souvent dans les études de grande puissance (incluant de nombreux enfant dans le 
cadre d’essais randomisés contrôlés) le critère de jugement principal est un 
questionnaire rempli par les parents 299, avec toute la subjectivité inhérente à ce type 
d’évaluation. L’aveugle des parents par rapport à la rééducation testée pourrait 
compenser en partie ce biais. Dans les études de plus petit effectif, un critère objectif 
serait nécessaire.  
6. Les exercices de résolution de problèmes utilisés sont souvent éloignées de la vie de 
tous les jours de l’enfant et manquent de validité écologique 297. 
7. Le design des études est souvent pauvre, avec uniquement des mesures avant et après 
rééducation, ne permettant pas d’exclure que l’effet observé soit lié à un effet retest ou 
à un effet développemental indépendant de la rééducation, surtout si l’étude ne 
comporte pas de groupe contrôle 286,383. 
Finalement, à  partir de quel niveau de preuve peut-on considérer qu’une rééducation est 
efficace ? L’amélioration d’une tâche travaillée est rarement le reflet d’un vrai progrès des FE 
mais plus souvent d’un apprentissage de la tâche, qui la rend plus routinière et donc moins 
dépendante des FE.  
Même lorsque les enfants sont évalués par une tâche différente de celle utilisée en 
rééducation, bien souvent ces tâches sont des tâches papier crayon très éloignées de la vie des 
enfants, qui manquent de validité écologique. Idéalement un bon critère de jugement de 
progrès exécutif serait une tâche ayant une bonne validité écologique (voir pour une revue180, 
dont l’effet retest est connu et le plus faible possible. Les questionnaires tels le BRIEF, sont 
un complément utile, mais ne devraient pas constituer le seul critère de jugement. Les tests 
utilisant la réalité virtuelle 459, le test du gâteau au chocolat 120,121 sont des exemples de tests 
écologiques valides et sensibles, mais qui ont pour l’instant des normes insuffisantes. Dans le 
futur, le développement de versions parallèles de ce type de tests permettrait de garder leur 
caractère « exécutif » 22,229,367, c’est-à-dire mesurant l’adaptation à la nouveauté, la recherche 
de stratégie, au cours d’un traitement non automatique. Une autre approche consiste à 
quantifier la réussite d’objectifs personnalisés de rééducation par des méthodes de type « Goal 
Attainement Scaling » - GAS 376,377,380,460 qui peuvent être un critère de jugement intéressant, 
surtout dans des populations hétérogènes. Une rigueur dans le choix du critère d’atteinte de 
l’objectif est nécessaire, surtout en situation de recherche 413,440.  
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Dans tous les cas, pour être efficace, tout protocole de rééducation doit promouvoir et évaluer 
la généralisation à des activités non travaillées, le transfert à d’autres contextes et situations 
que le lieu et cadre de la rééducation (et en particulier l’école et la maison) et le maintien à 
long terme des effets 111–113,329.  
RECOMMANDATIONS ET CONCLUSION 
Beaucoup de manuels/méthodes/exercices visant l’amélioration des FE (et le travail cognitif 
en général) sont commercialisés, desquels la plupart n’ont pas montré d’efficacité supérieure à 
des activités non spécifiques (voir des amis, faire du sport…). Les professionnels doivent être 
prudents avant d’acheter et d’utiliser ce type de matériel, et vérifier s’il a fait l’objet de 
publications utilisant une méthodologie sérieuse. Les professionnels doivent rester critiques 
devant les interventions largement diffusées alors que certaines sont chères, inefficaces (ou 
d’efficacité non prouvée) et chronophages. Il peut y avoir une perte de chance à participer à 
des séances de rééducation cognitive au détriment d’activités physiques, de loisirs ou 
d’activités qui permettraient un développement de la socialisation, d’un sentiment de 
satisfaction issu de la réalisation d’une activité investie voire d’une passion, ou plus 
simplement de phases de repos permettant une diminution des facteurs de stress qui 
influencent négativement le développement des FE. Au vu de la littérature publiée, il n’est pas 
éthique de diminuer les loisirs de l’enfant (sport, musique, etc.) au profit de séances de 
rééducation dérivées de méthodes adultes (telles le Goal Management Training, le Probem 
Solving Therapy) qui, pour le moment n’ont pas montré d’efficacité franche chez l’enfant. 
« La rééducation peut avoir des effets délétères si elle remplace des activités plus bénéfiques à 
l’enfant que la rééducation elle-même » 264. 
Les rééducations doivent être répétées, ludiques, représenter toujours un challenge et ne pas 
être totalement déconnectées de l’environnement écologique de l’enfant (maison, école) et 
pour ce faire, l’implication des parents et des intervenants des écoles (enseignants, auxiliaires 
de vie scolaire, etc.) semble à ce jour le meilleur format pour obtenir une intensité suffisante, 
par la répétition qui peut ainsi être obtenue. Il y a actuellement un meilleur niveau de preuve 
pour les méthodes visant à encourager la coopération des neuropsychologues avec les écoles, 
l’entrainement des équipes à l’école, l’éducation des parents et la formation des auxiliaires de 
vie scolaire, que pour les méthodes utilisant des interventions décontextualisés de 
l’environnement naturel de l’enfant, administrées sur des séances hebdomadaires dans un 
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bureau 277,326. Par contre, l’implication de certaines familles et l’interaction avec les 
enseignants dans certaines écoles peuvent se révéler problématiques et dans ce cas, il faut 
faire preuve d’inventivité et une intervention « décontextualisée » dans un bureau de 
rééducateur pourra se révéler nécessaire pour donner à l’enfant des stratégies et des 
techniques dont on espère qu’il pourra se les approprier pour les automatiser ultérieurement. 
Dans tous les cas le contenu de ce type d’approches devrait être davantage évalué, et 
l’utilisation de méthodes validées privilégiés (ex : utilisation de Cogmed® pour la mémoire de 
travail, utilisation d’exercices à difficulté croissante et adaptative). Une combinaison des deux 
approches semble raisonnable à envisager.  
Les méthodes de rééducation devraient davantage s’appuyer sur ce qui est utilisé dans 
d’autres pathologies développementales (ex : adapter une méthode utilisée dans l’autisme ou 
le TDA/H aux enfants cérébro-lésés) plutôt que d’essayer d’adapter des rééducations 
d’adultes cérébro-lésés aux enfants, qui risquent d’être inappropriées du point de vue 
développemental, inefficaces ou non pertinentes pour les difficultés rencontrées par ces 
enfants.  
D’une manière générale, tout protocole de rééducation doit promouvoir et évaluer la 
généralisation à des activités non travaillée, le transfert à d’autres contextes et situations et le 
maintien de l’effet à long terme des effets obtenus 111–113,329.  
L’idée reçue que seules les études de grande ampleur (peu réalisables en rééducation 
cognitive de l’enfant) peuvent être publiées est fausse: devant le manque de méthodes 
validées, de bons journaux internationaux (Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 
Developemental Neurorehabilitation, Brain Injury par exemple) publient régulièrement des 
études même de petit effectif, des études pilotes, ou des cas uniques expérimentaux (méthode 
N-of-1 trial), du moment que la méthodologie utilisée est appropriée et rigoureuse. La 
publication de résultats de ce type contribuerait à avancer plus vite dans ce domaine difficile 
où nous manquons d’outils validés. 
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OR SUBMITTED CHAPTERS 
 
CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS FOLLOWING SEVERE CHILDHOOD 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY – THE TGE PROSPECTIVE LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY: AGE AT INJURY VULNERABILITY PERIODS  
Submitted to the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, in march 2016 
Introduction: Executive functioning (EF) impairment is a major predictor of overall outcome 
following traumatic brain injury (TBI). While TBI severity is known to be a factor of poorer 
outcome, most studies include a majority of children with mild and moderate TBI. The aims 
of this study were to estimate EF impairment after childhood severe TBI and to explore 
factors predicting EF outcome. Secondary aim was to compare recovery trajectories across 
age at injury groups. 
Methods: Prospective longitudinal study of children (N=65) who sustained severe TBI, tested 
on EF at 3, 12 and 24 months, by performance-based tests and questionnaires.  
Results: Children had significant impairment on working memory, inhibition, attention and 
global EF, with little or no recovery at 24 months. For flexibility and performance-based EF 
score, children were impaired at 3 months only and improved to reach normal scores by 12 
months. No impairment was found on planning. Global EF was predicted at 3 and 24 months 
by Glasgow Coma Score and parental education. Children aged 10-12 at injury showed better 
EF outcome and better EF progress than the other age groups. Coma duration predicted EF at 
3 months but was no longer a significant predictor at 24 months. 
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CHAPTER 2: ECOLOGICAL PROSPECTIVE MEMORY ASSESSMENT IN 
CHILDREN WITH ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY USING THE CHILDREN’S 
COOKING TASK  
Published in Developemental Neurorehabilitation Journal 
Ecological prospective memory assessment in children with acquired brain injury using the 
Children's Cooking Task. Krasny-Pacini A, Servant V, Alzieu C, Chevignard M. Dev 
Neurorehabil. 2015 Jul 29:1-6. 
Prospective memory (PM) has been shown to be impaired in children with acquired brain 
injuries (ABI) and is a major concern for parents. Few studies have addressed this 
issue and most used tasks that are not ecologically valid. The aims of this study were (1) 
to explore if children who have sustained an ABI suffer PM impairment, measured both by 
the Children’s Cooking task (CCT) PM score and using the two PM subtests of the 
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT), and (2) to explore if the CCT PM score is 
sensitive to developmental changes in PM in typically developing children and in children 
with ABI. Fifty-four children with ABI and 33 typically developing controls participated in 
the study. Children with ABI had significantly lower PM scores and poorer performance in 
the CCT than their typically developing peers. PM scores increased significantly with age, 
indicating developmental progress of PM performance.  
 
CHAPTER 3: PROSPECTIVE MEMORY SEVEN YEARS AFTER CHILDHOOD 
SEVERE TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY - THE TGE 2 COHORT 
To be submitted  
Objective: to investigate long term outcome in prospective memory (PM), seven years after 
childhood severe traumatic brain injury (TBI), in a prospective longitudinal cohort. Design: 
inception cohort. Setting: individuals from the general community, with severe TBI identified 
seven years earlier from a single, regional, University pediatric neurosurgical intensive care 
unit. Participants: 76 young individuals (aged 7-22): 39 patients with a severe accidental TBI 
(defined as Glasgow Coma Score GCS of 8 or lower), aged 0-15 years at injury, and 37 
population-based controls individually matched on age, gender and parental education. Main 
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outcome measures: three novel short PM tasks varying in the delay (long versus short), 
motivation (high versus low motivation) and context (ecological versus office-based). 
Interventions: Not applicable. Results: individuals with sTBI showed significantly poorer PM 
than matched controls in the two low-motivation PM tasks: (1) The ecological long-delay task 
consisting of sending a letter on a rainy day, showed significant differences both in its PM 
component (p=0.047, odds ratio = 2.6), and the retrospective memory component 
(p=0.01,odds ratio= 3.7). (2)The non-ecological short-delay task consisting of taking off post-
its while identifying facial emotions showed a significant medium effect (p=0.004, r=0.34). 
PM performance on the high motivation task did not differ from controls. Conclusions: PM is 
impaired in individuals long-term post childhood sTBI. High motivation conditions may 
enhance PM in individuals with sTBI. Key words (MeSH): brain injuries, child, cohort 
studies, memory 
 
CHAPTER 4: SELF-AWARENESS ASSESSMENT DURING COGNITIVE 
REHABILITATION IN CHILDREN WITH ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY: A 
FEASIBILITY STUDY AND PROPOSED MODEL OF CHILD ANOSOGNOSIA 
Published in Disability and Rehabilitation Journal 
Self-awareness assessment during cognitive rehabilitation in children with acquired brain 
injury : a feasibility study and proposed model of child anosognosia. Krasny-Pacini A, 
Limond J, Evans J, Hiebel J, Bendjelida K, Chevignard M. Disabil Rehabil. 
2015;37(22):2092-106.  
Children with brain injuries and development disabilities can have impaired awareness due to 
both developmental immaturity and organically based unawareness/anosognosia. Although 
awareness of deficits is thought to be essential for effective cognitive rehabilitation, there is a 
lack of clinical models of awareness in children. This paper presents a model of cognitive 
awareness in children, based on dissociations found in a pilot study of five single cases of 
children with traumatic brain injury, aged 8 to 14, undergoing metacognitive training. 
Comprehensive assessment of children’s awareness of cognitive impairments was performed 
using three types of awareness measures showing large awareness variability.  We propose a 
framework for awareness assessment in cognitive rehabilitation, drawing on developmental, 
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neuropsychological and learning disability literature. The model emphasizes the role of on-
line error detection in the construction of autobiographical memories that allow a child to 
build a self-knowledge of his/her strengths and difficulties. Implications for rehabilitation are 
discussed. 
 
CHAPTER 6: GOAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING FOR REHABILITATION OF 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF EFFECTIVNESS IN 
PATIENTS WITH ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY. 
Published in Disability and Rehabilitation Journal 
Goal Management Training for rehabilitation of executive functions: a systematic review of 
effectiveness in patients with acquired brain injury. Krasny-Pacini A, Chevignard M, Evans J. 
Disabil Rehabil. 2014;36(2):105-16. Epub 2013 Apr 18. Review. 
PURPOSE: To determine if Goal Management Training (GMT) is effective for the 
rehabilitation of executive functions following brain injury when administered alone or in 
combination with other interventions. 
METHOD: Systematic review, with quality appraisal specific to executive functions research 
and calculation of effect sizes. 
RESULTS: Twelve studies were included. Four studies were "Proof-of-principle" studies, 
testing the potential effectiveness of GMT and eight were rehabilitation studies. Effectiveness 
was greater when GMT was combined with other interventions. The most effective 
interventions appeared to be those combing GMT with: Problem Solving Therapy; personal 
goal setting; external cueing or prompting apply GMT to the current task; personal homework 
to increase patients' commitment and training intensity; ecological and daily life training 
activities rather than paper-and-pencil, office-type tasks. Level of support for GMT was 
higher for studies measuring outcome in terms of increases in participation in everyday 
activities rather than on measures of executive impairment. 
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CONCLUSION: Comprehensive rehabilitation programs incorporating GMT, but integrating 
other approaches, are effective in executive function rehabilitation following brain injury in 
adults. There is insufficient evidence to support use of GMT as a stand-alone intervention. 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GOAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING FOR 
EVERYDAY EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION IN CHILDREN AFTER SEVERE TBI. 
Published in the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 
Context-sensitive goal management training for everyday executive dysfunction in children 
after severe traumatic brain injury. Krasny-Pacini A, Limond J, Evans J, Hiebel J, Bendjelida 
K, Chevignard M. J Head Trauma Rehabil. 2014 Sep-Oct;29(5):E49-64.  
Objectives: To assess the effectiveness of a metacognitive training intervention, based on an 
adapted Goal Management Training (GMT) and on Ylvisaker's principles, on three activity 
domains of executive functions: (1) prospective memory (PM) performance in ecological 
setting, (2) complex cooking task management, (3) daily executive functioning (EF) at home 
and at school. Participants: Five children aged 8-14, who were 3-11 years post severe 
traumatic brain injury (TBI), experiencing severe EF difficulties in daily life. Design: Single-
case experimental design, and assessment of EF twice prior to intervention, post-intervention, 
3- and 6-months post-intervention. Progress was monitored by a weekly ecological PM score. 
The effect on EF was assessed using the Children's Cooking Task (CCT). Transfer to the 
child's natural context was assessed by parental and teacher questionnaires and Goal 
Attainment Scaling. Results: All children improved on the measure of PM and on 
questionnaires of daily EF. Two children improved on the CCT but returned to their pre-
intervention level in a novel cooking task at follow-up. School personnel and parents' 
participation in the program was low. Conclusions: It is feasible but challenging to use GMT 
in children with TBI. Further research is needed in relation to how to promote generalization 
and how to increase the involvement of the child's "everyday people" in the intervention.  
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LONG SUMMARY OF THE PHD IN 
FRENCH 
 
Fonctions Exécutives, Memoire Prospective et Métacognition chez l'enfant traumatisé 
crânien: évaluation, caractérisation et rééducation. 
Le traumatisme crânien (TC) sévère de l’enfant est un enjeu de santé publique de par sa 
fréquence (incidence annuelle du TC, toutes gravités confondues, estimée à 864/100 000, dont 
environ 10% de TC sévères) et les séquelles générées. Même si on assiste souvent à une 
relativement bonne récupération sur le plan moteur, des déficits cognitifs sévères et 
invalidants sont fréquents, concernant de nombreux domaines, dont les fonctions exécutives 
(FE). Les FE se définissent comme un ensemble de fonctions cognitives élaborées intervenant 
dans le comportement intentionnel, organisé, volontaire, dirigé vers un but et la gestion des 
activités non routinières. A l’heure actuelle, aucune rééducation spécifique des FE n’a 
scientifiquement prouvé son efficacité chez l’enfant cérébro-lésé.  
Cette thèse explore deux aspects particuliers des FE : la métacognition (capacité à réfléchir à 
sa propre cognition, monitorer sa pensée, la contrôler et être conscient de ses limites lors de 
l’exécution d’une tâche) et la mémoire prospective, c’est à dire la capacité à se rappeler ce 
que l'on doit faire à un moment donné. Ces deux aspects sont particulièrement importants 
pour les techniques de rééducation fondées sur le modèle de la négligence du but (« goal 
neglect »), utilisé dans cette thèse. Ce modèle considère que syndrome dysexécutif et 
difficultés de mémoire prospective sont des présentations similaires du phénomène du « goal 
neglect ». Le « Goal Management Training » (GMT) se fonde sur ce modèle et tente de 
rééduquer le syndrome dysexécutif en améliorant le maintien en mémoire prospective de 
l’objectif principal d’une tâche donnée. Le GMT utilise la métacognition pour compenser les 
difficultés exécutives et lutter contre la négligence du but, et semble efficace chez les adultes 
dysexécutifs cérébro-lésés. Chez l’enfant, dont la métacognition ne mature que très tard (à 
l’adolescence voire au début de l’âge adulte), ce type d’approche pourrait donc ne pas être 
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approprié. D’autre part il y a actuellement très peu de données sur les troubles de la mémoire 
prospective chez les enfants cérébro-lésés. 
La première section de cette thèse explore les aspects controversés ou incomplètement connus 
concernant l’atteinte des FE après TC de l’enfant : les périodes de vulnérabilité et les 
altérations des FE en fonction de l’âge de survenue du TC (chapitre 1), les conséquences d’un 
TC sévère sur la mémoire prospective, notamment en contexte écologique (chapitres 2 et 3), 
les conséquences du TC sur les capacités métacognitives (chapitre 4). Cette première partie 
permet premièrement de constater que les FE sont plus sévèrement atteints lorsqu’elles sont 
dans une période de développement rapide et que l’utilisation de tests papier-crayon (pourtant 
largement utilisés pour évaluer, dépister et suivre le syndrome dysexécutif de l’enfant) sous-
estiment largement les conséquences du TC sur la vie quotidienne (chapitre 1). 
Deuxièmement, elle confirme les conséquences du TC et du syndrome dysexécutif sur la 
mémoire prospective, en montrant que les difficultés de mémoire prospective sont de sévérité 
telle que les adolescents cérébro-lésés ont des difficultés similaires à celles rencontrées par les 
jeunes enfants sains, âgés de 8-10 ans (chapitre 2) et que ces difficultés persistent à 7 ans post 
TC (chapitre 3). Le chapitre 4 présente les résultats pilotes d’une évaluation multimodale de 
la métacognition et montre des dissociations de l’atteinte de ses différents composants chez 
des enfants cérébro-lésés. Il soulève les difficultés potentielles liées à l’utilisation des 
rééducations métacognitives chez de jeunes enfants, particulièrement s’ils sont 
anosognosiques du fait de leur TC. Ce chapitre propose également un modèle d’anosognosie 
de l’enfant, permettant de mieux adapter la rééducation cognitive aux capacités 
métacognitives de l’enfant.  
Suite à la mise en évidence des effets d’un TC survenu dans l’enfance sur les FE et la 
mémoire prospective, la section 2 de cette thèse tente de proposer des moyens d’améliorer ces 
fonctions. Le chapitre 5 présente un état des lieux des interventions visant à améliorer les 
fonctions exécutives chez l’enfant. Le chapitre 6 (revue systématique de la littérature) 
examine l’efficacité du Goal Management Training chez l’adulte cérébro-lésé, dans l’objectif 
de pouvoir ensuite l’adapter à l’enfant. Il propose une revue critique des études publiées en 
proposant des critères d’évaluation spécifiques à prendre en compte dans les études testant 
une intervention de rééducation des FE. Les chapitres 7 et 8 décrivent l’adaptation du GMT à 
l’enfant et en explorant son efficacité sur la mémoire prospective et les FE, et en particulier 
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les capacités d’adaptation à une tâche nouvelle. Cette étude confirme la difficulté de 
rééduquer les FE, et alerte sur le risque de juger efficaces des interventions au cours 
desquelles les sujets s’améliorent par effet d’apprentissage des tests et effet d’enthousiasme, 
sans amélioration de leurs réelles capacités à utiliser efficacement leurs FE en situation de 
tâche nouvelle. Elle alerte également sur la nécessité de mieux prendre en compte les aspects 
développementaux chez l’enfant cérébro-lésé, concernant l’anosognosie (basé sur le chapitre 
4) et l’utilisation de stratégies métacognitives (chapitre 8). 
En conclusion, les difficultés exécutives et de mémoire prospective après TC de l’enfant sont 
souvent sous-estimées du fait de l’utilisation d’évaluations inadéquates ou trop peu 
« écologiques ». Les rééducations basées sur la métacognition ne semblent pas être le meilleur 
moyen d’améliorer les FE, en particulier chez les enfants jeunes, présentant une anosognosie 
importante et des troubles sévères des FE.  
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Résumé : 
Fonctions Exécutives, Mémoire Prospective et Métacognition chez l'enfant traumatisé crânien 
(TC): évaluation, caractérisation et rééducation. 
La première section permet premièrement de constater que les fonctions exécutives (FE) sont plus sévèrement 
atteintes lorsqu’elles sont dans une période de développement rapide et que l’utilisation de tests papier-crayon 
sous-estime largement les conséquences du TC sur la vie quotidienne. Deuxièmement, elle confirme les 
conséquences du TC et du syndrome dysexécutif sur la mémoire prospective. Enfin, elle présente les résultats 
pilotes d’une évaluation multimodale de la métacognition et montre des dissociations de l’atteinte de ses 
différents composants chez des enfants cérébro-lésés. Elle propose également un modèle d’anosognosie de 
l’enfant, permettant de mieux adapter la rééducation cognitive aux capacités métacognitives de l’enfant. La 
section 2 de cette thèse tente de proposer des moyens d’améliorer les FE. Une revue systématique de la 
littérature examine d’abord l’efficacité du Goal Management Training (GMT) chez l’adulte cérébro-lésé. Le 
travail expérimental décrit ensuite l’adaptation du GMT à l’enfant. Cette étude confirme la difficulté de 
rééduquer les FE, avec des résultats contradictoires entre les critères de jugement (certains enfants s’améliorant 
sur la tâche écologique de « gâteau au chocolat » et d’autres sur les questionnaires de FE). De plus, quand ils 
étaient confrontés à une nouvelle recette de cuisine, les enfants revenaient à leur comportement dysexécutif, 
suggérant que la fonction d’adaptation à la nouveauté n’avait pas progressé. Enfin les enfants utilisaient peu les 
stratégies métacognitives du GMT. La discussion alerte sur la nécessité de mieux prendre en compte les aspects 
développementaux chez l’enfant cérébro-lésé, concernant l’anosognosie et l’utilisation de stratégies 
métacognitives. Elle propose également des critères de jugement et de méthodologies innovants pour la 
recherche sur la rééducation des FE de l’enfant. En conclusion, le TC de l’enfance provoque des difficultés de 
FE qui persistent à l’âge adulte et pour lesquelles, à l’heure actuelle, il y a peu de traitements dont l’efficacité 
soit clairement démontrée.  
Mots clefs: Fonctions Executives, Mémoire Prospective, Traumatisme Crânien, enfant, écologique, ansosgnosie, 
métacognition, Goal Management Training 
Executive Functions, Prospective Memory and Metacognition in children with traumatic brain injury 
(TBI): assessment, characterization and rehabilitation 
Part one of this PhD explored executive functions (EF) and related impairments after childhood severe TBI. 
Executive dysfunction was worse when the injury occurred during the period of rapid development of EF. Paper 
and pencil tasks underestimated EF impairment in daily life. Impairment in prospective memory persisted at 
seven years post injury, and into adulthood. A model of child anosognosia, and directions for cognitive 
rehabilitation interventions, are proposed based on a study of self-awareness after childhood TBI. Part two of 
this PhD investigated methods of remediating EF dysfunction. A systematic review found that Goal 
Management Training (GMT) is effective in adults when coupled with personal goal setting, external cueing, 
personalised homework to increase patients' commitment and training intensity and daily life training activities. 
Based on this literature review, a paediatric GMT intervention was adapted and tested. The intervention showed 
limited effectiveness, with inconsistency across outcome measures. Children did not apply the metacognitive 
strategies taught during the training. Furthermore, there was no evidence of generalisation of task-specific 
improvements to a novel, parallel version of the secondary outcome measure (the Children’s Cooking Task). The 
adapted GMT did not seem developmentally coherent for younger children. It is clear that deficits in EF arising 
from TBI continue to be an important target for rehabilitation interventions in children. Proposals on how the use 
of novel innovative outcome measures and methodologies may improve the field of EF rehabilitation in children 
with TBI are presented.  
Keywords: Executive functions, Prospective memory, Traumatic/Acquired brain injury, child, intervention, 
ecological, self-awareness, anosognosia, metacognition, goal neglect, Goal Management Training  
